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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is the response brief of Defendant-Respondent-Cross Appellant City of Hayden
("Hayden" or "City"). It responds to the North Idaho Building Contractors Association's
Appellant Brief("Appellants 'Brief') of Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross Respondents North Idaho
Building Contractors Association, et al. ("Builders"). This brief also serves as Hayden's opening
brief on cross appeal.

I.

NATURE OF THE CASE

This is the latest and, if the District Court is affirmed, should be the last in a series of
cases to reach this Court in which developers trained their sights on development fees after the
housing market went from huckledebuck to the doldrums. Unlike the others, this one goes
straight to the merits.
For many years, Hayden has engaged in a program to ensure that, as Hayden grows,
sewer capacity continues to be available to serve new residents and businesses. Pursuant to City
Code § 8-1-5 (R. Vol. 1, pp. 136-3 7), Hayden charges a one-time sewer capitalization fee ("cap
fee") at the time of building permit issuance. 1 The cap fees are accounted for in a segregated
account and are used only for capacity expansion. Hayden also charges a bi-monthly fee that
covers operation and maintenance of the system. That fee has not been challenged. See Chatwin
Affidavit#1 (R. Vol. 1, pp. 108-90) for a detailed explanation of the City's fees and how they
relate to the Hayden Area Regional Sewer Board ("HARSB") (pronounced "harbs").
The cap fees are used by Hayden to fund capital improvements necessary to replace the
system capacity consumed by newly permitted structures. The cap fee is based on the cost of
replacing the units of capacity required for new hook-ups. This is a simple concept. Hayden

1

Fees of this type go by various other names including connection fees, hook-on fees, tap fees, or the like.
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totals the cost of all planned sewer infrastructure projects that expand capacity, and then divides
by the number of future users that will be served by that added capacity. If a particular project
provides both capacity expansion and replacement/upgrade of existing capacity, the project cost
is apportioned, and the cap fee is based solely on the expansion portion.
This is a self-perpetuating system which ensures that infrastructure will be available to
serve new users as they arrive. If Hayden did not operate in this way, existing excess sewer
capacity would quickly be consumed, and Hayden would have to deny new permit applications
and/or require developers to provide that infrastructure on their own nickel with attendant delays.
The cap fee keeps costs as low as possible by allowing the system to be expanded at
opportune times in appropriately sized increments.2 Ironically, Builders are challenging the very
thing that keeps them in business-the availability of infrastructure for new development. The
gravamen of their complaint is that the fees are illegal taxes because they are based on the
replacement value of the system capacity and generate revenue to fund future expansion of the
sewer system. Because the program facilitates new growth, Builders insist that Hayden's only
lawful option is to adopt an ordinance for impact fees pursuant to Idaho Development Impact
Fee Act ("IDIFA"), Idaho Code§§ 67-8201 to 67-8216. Hayden contends that IDIFA is not
mandatory and cap fees are authorized by four other Idaho statutes.
II.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

The District Court granted Hayden's motion for summary judgment on the critical legal

2 An intriguing example of this is the Government Way project. Government Way is a thoroughfare that
was tom up and reconstructed a few years ago. When Builders found that payments for the "Government Way
Project" were included among the expenses paid by the cap fees, they assumed, incorrectly, that the expenses were
for the road project. They were not. Hayden had the foresight to save money by expanding the capacity of the
sewer line at the same time the road was tom up. If there had been no funds available from the cap fee, the sewer
project would have had to be undertaken eventually (tearing up the road a second time) with attendant delays and
much higher cost. Phillips Affidavit at 5 (R. Vol. 3, p. 661). Builders, by the way, could have simply asked about
the Government Way project. Instead, they litigated.
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issue. It ruled that Hayden's cap fees are lawful user fees authorized by statute and that the
money collected may be used to fund new infrastructure to serve future demand as it arrives.
The District Court stopped short of granting the motion in full, however, because it concluded
that there were unresolved issues concerning Builders' allegation of accounting improprieties.
Recognizing that the central question in the case had been answered, the parties
endeavored to resolve the accounting issues by stipulation so Builders' appeal could proceed
without delay. The parties agreed that Hayden would present to Builders a detailed statement
explaining the status of each of the outstanding accounting issues. That information was
provided by way of the Phillips Affidavit (R. Vol. 3, pp. 657-68).
The parties then stipulated to all of the facts set out in the Phillips Affidavit. In addition,
Builders agreed to withdraw with prejudice any claim relating to alleged accounting errors,
financial discrepancies, or improper expenditures. Each of the above-recited facts is taken
directly from the Stipulation at 2-3 (R. Vol. 2, pp. 270-71).
The Stipulation paved the way for the District Court to enter its Order Granting SJ and

Judgment #1. Unlike the earlier Decision on MSJ, this decision resolved the entire case by
dismissing all of Builders' claims with prejudice. Builders timely filed Builders' Appeal. 3
Meanwhile, the parties briefed and argued Hayden's Attorney Fee Memo.
This Court remanded the matter because Judgment # 1 contained a reference to the

Stipulation in violation of rules prohibiting the inclusion of procedural matters. The District
Court thereafter issued Judgment #2 and later its Decision on Fees denying Hayden's request for

Builders' Appeal, by the way, states that NIBCA is appealing the "Order Granting Summary Judgment"
dated April 5, 2013. It should have given the date as July 2, 2013. This resulted in Hayden referring incorrectly, in
City's First Appeal and City's Amended Appeal, to the April 5, 2013 order as the basis for Builders' Appeal. This is
of no consequence, however. Hayden acknowledges Builders' Appeal was a timely and effective appeal of the July
2, 2013 order despite the improper date reference.
3
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fees. Hayden timely cross-appealed the attorney fee denial.

Ill.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

The facts are not in dispute. The gravamen of Builders' lawsuit is that the cap fee is
calculated on the basis of replacement cost (rather than original construction cost) and that
Hayden uses the money to expand its sewer system to serve future customers. That is, indeed,
how the cap fee works. The only question is whether doing so is authorized by statute.
Initially, that appeared to be all the case was about. After Hayden filed its motion for
summary judgment, Builders pivoted. Suddenly, it seemed, the case was all about accounting
issues. Discovery consumed considerable time and expense--despite the fact that Hayden had
opened all its books to Builders' accountant a year before suit was filed and despite Builders'
attorney's earlier statement that the accounting appeared to be in order. 4
Given the extent of discovery that Builders insisted on conducting, it may seem
surprising that they simply walked away from accounting issues following the Phillips Affidavit.
But it is not surprising when one considers what that affidavit proved. It showed that Builders'
allegations of accounting issues amounted to little or nothing. Except for one inadvertent $110
error, not a penny of the cap fee money was spent on non-sewer expenses. In fact, on balance,
Hayden was undercharging its cap fee account, not overcharging it as Builders alleged.
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Builders framed the substantive issue in terms of two statutes. Hayden would frame it
more broadly to encompass other statutes. Hayden also seeks attorney fees.

4

In a letter of January 27, 2012, Builders' counsel acknowledged the extensive pre-litigation information
exchange, which resolved their concerns as to whether cap fees were being spent improperly on maintenance and
other non-capital expenses. The letter then focused exclusively on the legal issue of whether the cap fee may be
used to fund future expansion. Meyer Affidavit #2, Exh. 4 (R. 330-32). See also, Letter to John R. Jameson at 2-3
(Oct. 22, 2012), Meyer Affidavit #2, Exh. 11 (R. Vol. II. pp. 354-55).
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1. Is the cap fee authorized by any Idaho Statute, including Idaho Code § 63-1311 (user
fees), Idaho Code§ 50-323 (water systems), Idaho Code§ 50-301 (home rule), or
Idaho Code § 50-1030 (Idaho Revenue Bond Act)?
2. Should the District Court have granted Hayden's request for attorney fees?
3. Should this Court grant attorney fees to Hayden on appeal?
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

Hayden seeks reversal of the denial of attorney fees by the District Court. It also seeks
attorney fees on this appeal and cross appeal pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-117(1) and
12-117(2). The basis of Hayden's claims of attorney fees and opposition to Builders' request for
fees is set out in section LE at page 31 below.
DOCUMENTS IN THE APPELLATE RECORD

For the convenience of the Court and the parties, the following list sets out the names and
locations of all documents in the appellate record. They are listed alphabetically by their "short
name" used in this brief.

"Amended Complaint" -Amended Complaint dated Apr. 11, 2012 and filed Apr. 12, 2012 (R. Vol.
1, pp. 32-50).
"Answer" -Answer to Amended Complaint dated and filed June 27, 2012 (R. Vol. 1, pp. 51-67).
"Builders' Appeal" NJBCA 's Notice ofAppeal dated Aug. 6, 2013 and filed Aug. 12, 2013 (R.
Vol. 4, pp. 778-81 ).
"Builders' Attorney Fee Opposition" -Motion and Memorandum to Deny Defendant's Request/or
Costs and Attorney Fees dated and filed July 30, 2013 (R. Vol. 4, pp. 767-77).
"Builders' Attorney Fee Reply" - Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Deny Defendant's Request
for Costs and Attorney Fees dated and filed Sept. 6, 2013 (R. Vol. 4, pp. 801-05).
"Builders' Response #1" - Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
dated and filed on December 6, 2012 (R. Vol. 2, pp. 384-400).
"Builders' Response #2" - Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
dated Mar. 4, 2013 and filed Mar. 5, 2013 (R. Vol. 3, pp. 577-601).
"Chatwin Affidavit #1" -First Affidavit ofStefan Chatwin dated Oct. 11, 2012 (R. Vol. 1, pp. 10890).
"Chatwin Affidavit #2" -Second Affidavit of Stefan Chatwin dated Dec. 5, 2012 and filed Dec. 6,
2012 (R. Vol. 2, pp. 401-06).
"Chatwin Letter" -Letter from Stefan Chatwin to John R. Jameson dated October 30, 2012
(reproduced in Second Meyer Affidavit, Exh. 12) (R. Vol. 2, pp. 361-65).
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"Complaint" - Complaint dated Apr. 11, 2012 and filed Apr. 12, 2012 (R. Vol. 1, pp. 15-31 ).
"Decision on Fees" - Memorandum Decision and Order Granting in Park and Denying in Part
Plaintiff's Motion to Deny Defendant's Requests for Costs and Attorney Fees dated and filed
Sept. 11, 2013 (R. Vol. 4, pp. 806-21).
"Decision on MSJ" - Memorandum Decision and Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment dated and filed Apr. 5, 2013 (R. Vol. 3, pp. 63456).
"Hayden's Amended Appeal" -Amended Notice ofAppeal and Cross-Appeal dated and filed Nov.
4, 2013 (R. Vol. 4, pp. 835-40).
"Hayden's Appeal #1" -Notice ofAppeal and Cross-Appeal dated Oct. 22, 2013 and filed Oct. 23,
2013 (R. Vol. 4, pp. 828-33).
"Hayden's Attorney Fee Memo" -City's Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees with
Supporting Statement dated and filed July 16, 2013 (R. Vol. 3, pp. 720-48).
"Hayden's Attorney Fee Response" - City's Response Brief in Opposition to Builders' Motion to
Deny City's Request for Costs and Attorney Fees dated and filed Sept. 3, 2013 (R. Vol. 4, pp.
787-800).
"Hayden's MSJ" - City's Motion for Summary Judgment dated October 11, 2012 and filed October
15, 2012 (R. Vol. 1, pp. 68-70).
"Hayden's MSJ Brief' - City's Opening Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment dated
Oct. 11, 2012 and filed Oct. 15, 2012 (R. Vol. 1, pp. 71-107).
"Hayden's MSJ Reply #1" - City's Reply Brief in Support ofMotion for Summary Judgment dated
and filed Dec. 12, 2012 (R. Vol. 3, pp. 540-58).
"Hayden's MSJ Reply #2" - City's Reply to Builders' Substituted Response on Motion for
Summary Judgment dated and filed Mar. 12, 2013 (R. Vol. 3, pp. 606-33).
"Hendrickson Affidavit #1" - First Affidavit ofMartin C. Hendrickson dated and filed Mar. 12,
2013 (R. Vol. 3, pp. 602-05).
"Hendrickson Affidavit #2" - Second Affidavit ofMartin C. Hendrickson dated and filed July 16,
2013 (R. Vol. 3, pp. 711-14).
"Jameson Affidavit #1" -Affidavit ofJohn R. Jameson in Support of Response to Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment dated and filed Dec. 6, 2012 (A.R. pp. 1-118). See comment
following Welch Comer Report.
"Jameson Affidavit #2" -Second Affidavit ofJohn R. Jameson in Support ofResponse to
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment dated Mar. 4, 2013 and filed Mar. 5, 2013 (R.
Vol. 3, pp. 559-76).
"Jameson Affidavit #3" -Affidavit ofJohn R. Jameson in Support of Motion to Deny Costs and
Fees dated and filed July 30, 2013 (R. Vol. 4, pp. 762-66).
"Jameson Letter" -Letter from John R. Jameson to Nancy Stricklin dated January 27, 2012
(reproduced in Second Meyer Affidavit, Exh. 4) (R. Vol. 2, pp. 330-32).
"Judgment #1" -Judgment dated and filed July 2, 2013 (R. Vol. 1, pp. 679-81).
"Judgment #2" -Final Judgment dated and filed Aug. 29, 2013 (R. Vol. 4, pp. 784-86).
"Judgment #3" -Amended Final Judgment dated and filed Oct. 3, 2013 (R. Vol. 4, pp. 822-24).
"Meyer Affidavit #1" -First Affidavit of Christopher H Meyer dated October 11, 2012 (R. Vol. 2,
pp. 204-317).
"Meyer Affidavit #2" -Second Affidavit of Christopher H Meyer dated Dec. 4, 2013, filed Dec. 5,
2013 (R. Vol. 2, pp. 318-83).
"Meyer Affidavit #4" -Fourth Affidavit of Christopher H Meyer dated and filed July 16, 2013 (R.
Vol. 3, pp. 582-710).
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"Meyer/Phillips Letters" - Letter by Christopher H. Meyer to John R. Jameson dated November 14,
2012 forwarding letter from Donna L. Phillips to Christopher M. Meyer (sic] dated
November 14, 2012 (reproduced in Second Meyer Affidavit, Exh. 15) (R. Vol. 2, pp. 369-75).
"Notice of Transcript #1" -Notice of Transcript Lodged dated and filed Oct. 30, 2013 (R. Vol. 4,
pp. 834).
"Notice of Transcript #2" - Notice of Transcript Lodged dated and filed Dec. 17, 2013 (R. Vol. 4,
pp. 841).
"Order Granting SJ" - Order Granting Summary Judgment dated and filed July 2, 2013 (R. Vol. 3,
pp. 674-78).
"Phillips Affidavit" First Affidavit ofDonna L. Phillips dated May 14, 2013 and filed May 16,
2013 (R. Vol. 3, pp. 657-68).
"Remand" - Order Remanding to District Court for Final Judgment dated Aug. 20, 2013 and filed
Aug. 21, 2013 (R. Vol. 4, pp. 782-83).
"Satisfaction of Judgment" - Satisfaction ofJudgment dated and filed Oct. 8, 2013 (R. Vol. 4, pp.
825-27).
"Stipulation" - Stipulation Regarding Accounting Issues (dated June 26, 2013 and filed June 28,
2013) (R. Vol. 3, pp. 669-73).
"Stricklin Affidavit" -Affidavit of Nancy Stricklin dated July 15, 2013 and filed July 16, 2013 (R.
Vol. 3, pp. 715-19).
"Welch Comer Report" - Welch Comer &Associates, Inc., Hayden Sewer Master Plan Update
dated December 2006 (reproduced in Jameson Affidavit#1, Exh. A) (A.R. pp. 5-118).
"A.R." refers to the stipulated augmented record submitted by the parties. The Welch Comer
Report also appears in the original record at R. Vol. 2, pp. 411-526 (Jameson Affidavit #1,
Exh. A). However, the pages were in the wrong order. An additional version of the Welch
Comer Report was later provided by the District Court and appears in the record at pages
848-964. Unfortunately, the pages in the second version were also incorrect. The parties
then provided the A.R.

ARGUMENT

I.

HAYDEN'S CAP FEE IS AUTHORIZED BY STATUTE.

A.

Some statutory authority is required for this proprietary action.

The central premise of this case, and all illegal tax cases, is that Idaho follows Dillon's
Rule. That is, the powers of local governments are limited to those granted or clearly implied by
the state Constitution or legislation. Caesar v. State, l O1 Idaho 158, 160, 610 P .2d 517, 519
(1980) (Donaldson, C.J.).
While the Idaho Constitution includes a broad and self-executing grant of police power to
cities and counties (Idaho Const. art. XII,§ 2) the power of taxation is granted only to the
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Legislature (Idaho Const. art. VII, § 6). Hence, the only fees that are lawful without statutory
authorization are "incidental regulatory fees" (which are considered an incident of the police
power). 5 Every other fee must have some specific statutory basis. This, in tum, gives rise to
mountains of litigation over whether the particular fee fits the particular statute or is really a
revenue-raising tax masquerading as a fee under that statute.
Hayden does not contend, and has never contended, that its cap fee is an incidental
regulatory fee. The cap fee does not fund a regulatory program and thus cannot be sustained
under the police power. Rather, it is a user fee-a fee charged to a user for a city-provided
service. This is a proprietary function and therefore requires statutory authorization. That
authorization may be found in any of four statutes. One of them, Idaho Code§ 50-301, extends
home rule to Idaho cities (at least as to proprietary functions and perhaps all functions). 6 If the
Court declines to find that Idaho cities have home rule, the cap fee is nevertheless authorized by
three other statutes discussed below.

5 Examples of incidental regulatory fees are parking meters (Foster's Inc. v. Boise City, 63 Idaho 201, 118
P.2d 721 (1941) (Ailshie, J.)), license fees for dance halls (State v. Bowman, 104 Idaho 39,655 P.2d 933 (1982)
(Walters, J.)), and fees for recording wills or filing legal documents (Brewster v. City ofPocatello, 115 Idaho 502,
505, 768 P.2d 765, 768 (1988) (Shepard, J.)).
6 Hayden did not become aware of this authority until recently and consequently did not present this
argument to the District Court. Indeed, it has never been presented to any court so far as we can determine. In any
event, there is no bar to raising it now. The Court "will uphold the decision of a trial court if any alternative legal
basis can be found to support it." Hanf v. Syringa Reality, Inc., 120 Idaho 364,370, 816 P.2d 320,326 (1991);
Martel v. Bulotti, 138 Idaho 451, 545-55, 65 P.3d 192, 195-96 (2003). The Court has never required that the
alternate basis be presented to the district court. So far as Hayden can determine, the "general rule [that] an
appellate court will consider only such points as were raised in the trial court" has been applied exclusively against
the party appealing the adverse ruling. E.g., Ochoa v. State, 118 Idaho 71, 78, 794 P.2d 1127, 1134 (1990)
(applying rule against appellant); Commercial Ventures, Inc. v. Rex M. & Lynn Lea Family Trust, 145 Idaho 208,
216, 177 P.3d 955,963 (2008) (same); Johannsen v. Utterbeck, 146 Idaho 423,429, 106 P.3d 341,347 (2008)
("Appellant procedurally defaulted on this issue by raising it for the first time on appeal."). This makes sense: the
rule is for "the protection of inferior courts," to ensure they are not overturned on the basis of arguments not
presented to them. Sanchezv. Arave, 120 Idaho 321,322,815 P.2d 1061, 1062 (1991).
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B.

Hayden's cap fee is authorized by Idaho Code§ 63-1311.
(1)

Section 63-1311 expressly authorizes cities to impose user fees
for any service that could have been funded through ad
valorem taxes.

In 1980 the Idaho Legislature enacted Idaho Code § 63-1311, which authorizes taxing
districts (including cities 7) to charge fees for services provided. The legislation provides:
(1) Notwithstanding any other provision oflaw, the
governing board of any taxing district may impose and cause to be
collected fees for those services provided by that district which
would otherwise be funded by property tax revenues. The fees
collected pursuant to this section shall be reasonably related to, but
shall not exceed, the actual cost of the service being rendered.
Idaho Code§ 63-1311(1). 8
The legislative history to the 1980 enactment (H.B. 680, based on R.S. 5694) confirms
that the legislation means what it says. 9 Of course, resort to legislative history is appropriate

7 "'Taxing district' means any entity or unit with the statutory authority to levy a property tax." Idaho
Code§ 63-201(23).

8

When enacted in 1980, the first sentence of what is now section 63-1311 (1) was enacted and codified as
Idaho Code§ 63-2201A. H.B. 680, 1980 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 290 § 2. In 1988, section 63-2201A (now section
63-1311(1)) was amended to add what is now the second sentence. S.B. 1340, 1988 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 201 § 3.
In 1996, the entire revenue and taxation code was re-enacted, and section 63-2201A was recodified as section
63-1311. H.B. 836, 1996 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 98 § 14 at 393; see also 1996 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 322 § 7
(correcting cross-reference to section 63-1311 in section 31-870). In 1997, the provision was renumbered as section
63-1311(1), and what is now section 63-1311(2) was added. 1997 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 117 § 35 at 333.
A virtually identical provision authorizes county governments to impose such user fees. Idaho Code
§ 31-870. Both section 31-870 and the predecessor of section 63-1311 were enacted via the same bill in 1980 (H.B.
680, 1980 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 290). It is unclear why both sections are needed.
9

The legislative history is set out in Meyer Affidavit #1 Exh. A, B & C (R. Vol. 2, pp. 204-317). It
confirms that the statute was intended to authorize all taxing authorities to impose user fees where the charge is for
"garbage, water and sewage" (Minutes of the House Revenue and Taxation Committee (Feb. 29, 1980)) and other
"functions that are clearly user oriented" (Minutes of House/Senate Legislative Council, Committee on Local
Government Revenues, at 3 (Sept. 10, 1986)). "The purpose of this legislation is to give county commissioners and
the governing boards of other taxing districts the power to collect fees for services in lieu of ad valorem taxes."
Statement of Purpose (R.S. 5694). "Mr. Young explained that RS 5694 is permissive legislation for those levies that
county commissioners do not have the power to impose. It will allow authority which many already have." Minutes
of the Munger Subcommittee of the House Committee on Revenue and Taxation (Feb. 28, 1980). "Mr. Young
explained that the purpose of RS 5694 is to allow county commissioners and governing boards of other taxing
districts the authority to collect fees in lieu of ad valorem taxes. Many are now already doing this and this makes it
all inclusive. Some examples of those fees are: garbage, water and sewage. Mr. Munger stated that it is permissive
legislation and is not mandatory." Minutes of the House Revenue and Taxation Committee (Feb. 29, 1980).
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only where the meaning of the statute itself is unclear. 10
In 1988, the statute was amended by adding this sentence: "The fees collected pursuant
to this section shall be reasonably related to, but shall not exceed, the actual cost of the services
being rendered." S.B. 1340, 1988 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 201 (amending Idaho Code§§ 31-870
and 63-2201A (now section 63-1311(1)). The legislative history of the 1988 amendment
reinforced the purpose of the original legislation. 11
The bottom line is that section 63-1311 provides simple, direct, and unambiguous
authority for the imposition of user fees for services rendered by a city that might otherwise be
funded by ad valorem taxes. This is true with or without the legislative history. The only
question is whether Hayden's cap fee is, in fact, a user fee as contemplated under the statute.
The cases discussed below show that Hayden's fee easily meets the test for a user fee and
therefore falls within the statute.

"Chuck Holden, Association ofldaho Counties, stated H 680 adds to the existing law to allow counties and taxing
districts to impose fees for providing services which are normally funded by ad valorem tax revenues. Cities have
had this authority for a number of years and haven't abused it and we feel the counties should have it. Much
discussion followed." Minutes of Senate Local Government and Taxation Committee (Mar. 22, 1980). "H680 Tax
and Taxation Adds to existing law to allow counties and taxing districts to impose fees for providing services
which are normally funded by ad valorem tax revenues." Official computer summary oflegislation by House
Revenue and Taxation Committee (tracking action through passage on Ap. 1, 1980).

Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 895-86, 265 P.3d 502, 508-09 (2011)
(Eismann, J.). Here, the language is clear, and Hayden does not suggest that the legislative history is necessary to
understand the statute. Nevertheless, Hayden presents the entire relevant statutory history so that the Court may
examine it if it deems appropriate.
10

"The concept of this bill is to start the move to fund those functions that are clearly user oriented with
fees collected from the users themselves, rather than have so much reliance on ad valorem tax." Minutes of
House/Senate Legislative Council, Committee on Local Government Revenues, at 4 (Sept. 10, 1986) (regarding R.S.
12966 in 1986, which initially was limited to amending Idaho Code§ 49-158 dealing with motor vehicle fees; that
bill was replaced by S.B. 1304AA in 1988 which added the provisions amending sections 31-870 and 63-2201A).
11
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(2)

The cap fee meets the Brewster test because it is based on the
user's consumption of services.

In Brewster v. City ofPocatello, 115 Idaho 502, 768 P .2d 765 (1988), this Court
discussed the scope and effect of section 63-1311(1) (then codified at section 63-2201A). That
case struck down Pocatello' s fee as falling outside the statute, but it established principles under
which Hayden's fee should be upheld. When voters rejected bonds for street maintenance,
Pocatello attempted an end run by imposing a "street restoration and maintenance fee" on all
property owners. Property owners challenged the fee as an unauthorized tax. The city
contended it was an incidental regulatory fee and/or a service fee authorized by the predecessor
to section 63-1311(1). Brewster, 115 Idaho at 503, 768 P.2d at 766.
The Court first noted that the fee charged was not an incidental regulatory fee of the sort
allowed under Foster's Inc. (see footnote 5 at page 15) because "the revenue to be collected from
Pocatello's street fee has no necessary relationship to the regulation of travel over its streets, but
rather is to generate funds for the non-regulatory function of repairing and maintaining streets."

Brewster, 115 Idaho at 504, 768 P.2d at 767.

It bears emphasis that Pocatello defended its street maintenance fee as an incidental
regulatory fee, while Hayden defends its cap fee as a user fee. 12 Brewster is nevertheless
instructive because it went on to analyze the alternative defense that Pocatello's fee might be
justified under section 63-2201A (the predecessor to section 63-1311).

12 Another illegal tax case defended (unsuccessfully) as an incidental regulatory fee was Idaho Building
Contractors Ass 'n v. City of Coeur d'Alene ("JBCA"), 126 Idaho 740, 890 P.2d 326 (1995) (Trout, J.). In IBCA, the
Court struck down the Coeur d' Alene's impact fee, which the city required as a precondition to the issuance of a
building permit "to pay for a proportionate share of the cost of improvements needed to serve development." IBCA,
126 Idaho at 741, 890 P.2d at 327. The fees were not targeted or quantified for any particular use or service, but
were generally "spent on capital improvements serving such things as libraries, police, fire, and streets. IBCA, 126
Idaho at 741-42, 890 P.2d at 327-28. Coeur d'Alene (like Pocatello) defended the fee as an exercise of its police
power. JBCA, 126 Idaho at 743, 890 P.2d at 329. The Court analyzed it as an incidental regulatory fee, and found it
fell short. Hayden's cap fee bears no resemblance to that fee either.
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The Court found that the statute did indeed authorize user fees for services provided, but
did not authorize "a tax upon users or abutters of public streets." Brewster, 115 Idaho at 504,
768 P.2d at 767 (emphasis original). The Court found that Pocatello's street fee was nothing
more than "a tax imposed for the privilege of owning property." Id.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court contrasted Pocatello's street fee with a legitimate
user fee--establishing a test that Hayden easily meets.
We agree with appellants that municipalities at times
provide sewer, water and electrical services to its residents.
However, those services, in one way or another, are based on
user's consumption of the particular commodity, as are fees
imposed for public services as the recording of wills or filing legal
actions. In a general sense a fee is a charge for a direct public
service rendered to the particular consumer, while a tax is a forced
contribution by the public at large to meet public needs.
Brewster, 115 Idaho at 505, 768 P.2d at 768 (emphasis added).

For the very reason that Pocatello's fee failed in Brewster, Hayden's fee passes muster
here-not as an incidental regulatory fee but as a user fee. Indeed, Hayden's cap fee is precisely
the sort of legitimate user fee described by the Court as being authorized by statute-a fee for
sewer services based on the "user's consumption of the particular commodity." Id.
As the District Court below aptly concluded:
Despite Plaintiffs' contentions to the contrary, the City's
capitalization fee is imposed in direct relation to the hook-up to the
City's sewer system and the cost is calculated accordingly. The
fee is calculated using a formula which essentially determines the
cost of replacing the capacity that each new user has consumed.
Decision on MSJ at 13 (R. Vol. 3, p. 646).

The District Court was right. Each new user consumes a portion of Hayden's existing
collection system capacity and is charged a fee in proportion to that consumption. This type of
consumption-based user fee is exactly what the Court in Brewster said was permissible.
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Moreover, Hayden's fee easily satisfies the statutory test set out in section 63-1311(1)
requiring that the fees "be reasonably related to, but shall not exceed, the actual cost of the
service being rendered." Hayden's cost calculation, and how it relates to the actual cost of
replacement, is explained in detail in Chatwin Affidavit #1 (R. Vol. 1, pp. 108-90).
Builders concede that Hayden is authorized to charge a user fee under Brewster, IBCA,
and Idaho Code § 63-1311. Instead they complain that the cap fee is not a proper user fee
because it is based on the replacement cost rather than the original construction cost of the
infrastructure consumed by the new user. Appellants' Brief at 10. But they fail to explain what
is wrong with using the replacement cost as the basis of the fee. Brewster does not speak to the
question, and section 63-1311(1) merely requires that the fee be based on "the actual cost." It is
perfectly reasonable for a city to base "the actual cost" on the actual cost of replacing the
consumed good so that it will have the funds necessary to continue to provide the good to
newcomers. Indeed, this is exactly what the Viking Court said was reasonable in the context of
the Idaho Revenue Bond Act, discussed below in section 1.C(2)(c) at page 27.
(3)

Kootenai Property Owners confirms that future benefits may
be included in user fees and further reinforces the conclusion
that Hayden's fee is a proper user fee.

The year after Brewster, the Court upheld Kootenai County's mandatory solid waste
disposal fee in Kootenai County Property Owners Assn. v. Kootenai County ("Kootenai Property
Owners"), 115 Idaho 676, 769 P.2d 553 (1989) (Bakes, J.). Kootenai Property Owners was not

based on Idaho Code § 63-1311; instead, the county relied on another specific statutory
authorization for fees to fund solid waste programs, Idaho Code § 31-4404. But the principle is
identical. Under the statute, there was no doubt that counties had authority to charge a fee for
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solid waste services. The only question was whether Kootenai County's fee was in the nature of
a user fee or just a disguised tax.
The plaintiffs contended that it was not really a user fee because (1) it was imposed on all
homeowners whether they chose to use the landfill services or not, (2) the fee was not precisely
tailored to match the quantity of services consumed, and (3) it funded a future benefit
(acquisition and preparation of new landfill sites) rather than providing an immediate "service."
The third argument is the gravamen of Builders' lawsuit.
First, the Court rejected the idea that a charge for service must be voluntary in order to
qualify as a user fee. Kootenai Property Owners, 115 Idaho at 679, 769 P.2d at 556. Second,
the Court ruled that it is not necessary that the fee be based precisely on how much garbage is
generated and that a flat fee for residential use is reasonable.
A solid waste disposal system is comparable to a sewer system.
Charging a flat residential sewage fee is reasonable even though
the actual use (outflow volume) varies somewhat from house to
house. The legislature has not imposed exacting rate requirements
upon localities for measuring actual residential solid waste disposal
or sewage use. Reasonable approximation is all that is necessary.

Kootenai Property Owners, 115 Idaho at 678-79, 769 P.2d at 555-56 (citation omitted)
(emphasis supplied).
Finally, and most importantly, the Court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the solid
waste charge was not a fee because "it would not provide an immediate benefit, but rather would
only provide a future benefit, i.e., acquisition and preparation of new landfill sites." Kootenai

Property Owners, 115 Idaho at 679, 769 P .2d at 556. Whether the fee is used to fund immediate
services or the acquisition of new sites makes no difference, said the Court, because both were
authorized activities under the statute. Id.
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As noted above, the Court was referring to a different statute (Idaho Code § 31-4404)
than the one involved here (Idaho Code § 63-1311 (1 )). But the same result obtains under either
statute. Indeed, section 63-1311(1) is even broader than the one that was sufficient to uphold the
user fee in Kootenai Property Owners. Section 63-1311(1) authorizes user fees for anything a
city is authorized to fund with ad valorem taxes. That obviously includes constructing
expansions to Hayden's sewer connection system. As the District Court correctly concluded,
"both future expansion and replacement of existing capacity are authorized by the statute, LC.
§ 63-1311." Decision on MSJ at 11 (R. Vol. 3, p. 644). 13

In sum, the Kootenai Property Owners case is on all fours with the instant litigation, and
it destroys Builders' argument that Hayden's user fee cannot fund infrastructure for future use.

C.

Hayden's cap fee is also authorized by the Idaho Revenue Bond Act.
(1)

Loomis held that the Idaho Revenue Bond Act provides a
statutory basis for user fees and reserved the question of using
fees for future expansion.

An independent basis for Hayden's cap fee is found in the Idaho Revenue Bond Act,
Idaho Code §§ 50-1027 to 50-1042. It contains the following key provisions authorizing user
fees:
In addition to the powers which it may now have, any city
shall have power under and subject to the following provisions:
(a) To acquire by gift or purchase and to construct,
reconstruct, improve, better or extend any works within or without
the city, or partially within or partially without the city, or within
any part of the city, and acquire by gift or purchase lands or rights
in lands or water rights in connection therewith, including
13

The District Court continued on this point, noting that Idaho Code § 63-1311 "does not speak specifically
to the collection of fees for expansion, acquisition, or replacement, but it does allow for the collection of fees for
services provided which would otherwise be funded by ad valorem tax revenues." Decision on MSJ at 11 (R. Vol.
3, p. 644). The District Court then cited Idaho Code§ 42-3213, which applies to sewer districts, as the authority for
ad valorem taxes. Id. Hayden respectfully suggests that the District Court should have referred to Idaho Code
§§ 50-235, 50-1007. But this is ofno consequence. There is no doubt that cities are authorized to build sewer
systems and to pay for them through ad valorem taxes.
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easements, rights-of-way, contract rights, leases, franchises,
approaches, dams and reservoirs; to sell excess or surplus water
under such terms as are in compliance with section 42-222, Idaho
Code, and deemed advisable by the city; to lease any portion of the
excess or surplus capacity of any such works to any party located
within or without the city, subject to the following conditions: that
such capacity shall be returned or replaced by the lessee when and
as needed by such city for the purposes set forth in section
50-1028, Idaho Code, as determined by the city; that the city shall
not be made subject to any debt or liability thereby; and the city
shall not pledge any of its faith or credit in aid to such lessee;
(f) To prescribe and collect rates, fees, tolls or charges,
including the levy or assessment of such rates, fees, tolls or
charges against governmental units, departments or agencies,
including the state of Idaho and its subdivisions, for the services,
facilities and commodities furnished by such works, or by such
rehabilitated existing electrical generating facilities, and to provide
methods of collections and penalties, including denial of service
for nonpayment of such rates, fees, tolls or charges;
Idaho Code § 50-1030 ( emphasis supplied).
The term "works" referenced in subsection 50-1030 is defined to include "water systems,
drainage systems, sewerage systems, recreational facilities, off-street parking facilities, airport
facilities, air-navigation facilities, [and] electrical systems." Idaho Code§ 50-1029(a). The
"works" may be located inside or outside of the city. Idaho Code§ 50-1030(a).
Read together, these provisions make clear that cities are authorized to charge user fees
for the specified "works," and that revenue from those fees may be used for future expansion of
the "works."
This is confirmed by Idaho case law. In Loomis v. City ofHailey, 119 Idaho 434, 807
P.2d 1272 (1991) (Boyle, J.), city residents challenged the City of Hailey's cap fee, which they
called an "equity buy-in." The Court recognized that some fees may be upheld as incidental
regulatory fees. Loomis, 119 Idaho at 437, 807 P.2d at 1275. This fee, however, did not fall into
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that category of police power functions. Instead, the Court analyzed the equity buy-in as a
"proprietary" function of the city. Loomis, 119 Idaho at 437-38, 807 P.2d at 1275-76.
In other words, the fee could be upheld even if it was not imposed under the city's police
power, so long as there was legislative authority for the action. The Court then ruled that the fee
was authorized under the Idaho Revenue Bond Act. "Thus, when rates, fees and charges
conform to the statutory scheme set forth in the Idaho Revenue Bond Act or are imposed
pursuant to a valid police power, the charges are not construed as taxes." Loomis, 119 Idaho at
438, 807 P.2d at 1276.
The Court launched into a detailed discussion of what was allowed under the Idaho
Revenue Bond Act, reading those requirements generously and deferentially as to cities. The
Court rejected plaintiffs' contention that the connection fee was too steep and should have been
limited to the actual cost of the connection. The Court found that the Idaho Revenue Bond Act
gives cities broad flexibility in setting fees, and that the city's approach was not unreasonable.

Loomis, 119 Idaho at 441-44, 807 P.2d at 1279-82.
Recall that in Kootenai Property Owners, the Court ruled that it was permissible for the
user fee to be used for a "future benefit"-in that case future acquisition of new landfill sites. In

Loomis, the Court found it unnecessary to revisit this question, because the city had tailored its
equity buy-in fee so that it was not used to fund future expansion of the sewer system. 14 Loomis,
119 Idaho at 439-40, 807 P.2d at 1277-78. In a footnote, the Loomis Court noted that "[s]ince
the precise issue of whether fees may be collected for future expansion of a sewer or water

This restriction was imposed, by the way, as a result of the city's compliance with an earlier district court
decision mentioned by the Loomis Court. That decision, by the way, was plainly wrong-given the decision in
Kootenai Property Owners. Nevertheless, for whatever reason, the City of Hailey chose not to appeal.
14
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system is not before us on this appeal, we leave for another day the determination of that issue."

Loomis, 119 Idaho at 439 n.3, 807 P.2d at 1277 n.3.
In sum, the Loomis decision stands squarely for the proposition that the Idaho Revenue
Bond Act authorizes cities to charge a connection fee for sewer hook-ups and that cities have
broad flexibility in designing that fee structure. There is nothing in Loomis suggesting that such
fees may not be used for future expansion of service infrastructure. That question was reserved
and answered in the affirmative in Viking Constr., Inc. v. Hayden Lake Irrigation Dist., 149
Idaho 187,233 P.3d 118 (2010) (Eismann, C.J.) (discussed below).

(2)

Viking held that the Irrigation District Bond Act authorizes
future expansions and applies even if no bonds are issued.
(a)

The Irrigation District Bond Act is functionally
identical to the Idaho Revenue Bond Act; both
authorize cap fees irrespective of whether bonds are
issued.

In Viking, a land developer challenged a domestic water system connection fee charged
by the Hayden Lake Irrigation District (an entity that provided both irrigation and domestic water
supplies). Relying on Loomis, the irrigation district defended the fee under section 43-1909 of
the Irrigation District Domestic Water System Revenue Bond Act, Idaho Code§§ 43-1906 to
43-1920 ("Irrigation District Bond Act").
The Court found that to be a no-brainer. "The [district] court compared this provision
with the identical language in Idaho Code § 50-1030(f) [the Idaho Revenue Bond Act], which
this Court held in Loomis v. City ofHailey, 119 Idaho 434, 807 P.2d 1272 (1991), authorized a
city to collect a sewer and water connection fee. Since there is no basis for giving differing
constructions to the identical language in the two statutes, Idaho Code§ 43-1909(e) authorizes
charging a connection fee to connect to an irrigation district's domestic water system." Viking,
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149 Idaho at 191,233 P.3d at 122.
The plaintiff in Viking contended, however, that the bond act could not be used to justify
the fee, because the irrigation district had not issued bonds. The Court rejected that argument,
ruling that the act was clear on its face and that it unambiguously authorized user fees
irrespective of whether bonds were issued. Viking, 149 Idaho at 193,197,233 P.3d at 124,
128. 15
Thus, it follows that Hayden may rely on the authority granted by section 50-1030 of the
Idaho Revenue Bond Act to justify fees for "works" defined under the act irrespective of whether
Hayden has issued revenue bonds for those "works." 16
(b)

The bond acts authorize use of fees for future
expansion.

Now we turn to the question of whether user fees are authorized for future expansion.
Recall that Kootenai Property Owners answered this question in the affirmative and that Loomis
set that question aside. In Viking, the question was presented again and, again, answered in the
affirmative.
Viking complained that "the primary purpose of the hook-on fees was to pay for future
capital assets and future improvements required due to population growth" ( Viking, 149 Idaho at
196, 233 P.3d at 127) and that the act "prevents the Irrigation District from accumulating
reserves with the connection fees" (Viking, 149 Idaho at 197,233 P.3d at 128). The Court
rejected these arguments (consistent with its earlier ruling in Kootenai Property Owners):

15 While the Court ruled that the authorities set out in Idaho Code§ 50-1030 (and corresponding section
43-1909) are applicable irrespective of whether bonds have been issued, it held that other provisions of the bond acts
(Idaho Code §§ 50-1032 and 50-1033 and corresponding sections 43-1911 and 43-1912) do not come into play
unless bonds are issued.
16

The Viking Court went on to rule that there was a material fact in dispute (and therefore denied summary
judgment) on the question of whether the particular fee was reasonable.
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The powers of an irrigation district under the Irrigation
District Bond Act include "to construct, reconstruct, improve,
better or extend any works within or without the district" and "[t]o
operate and maintain any works within or without the boundaries
of the district." LC.§ 43-1909(a) & (c). Spending revenues from
connection fees for these purposes would be consistent with the
Act.

Viking, 149 Idaho at 197,233 P.3d at 128 (emphasis supplied).
Thus, any doubt left on the subject by Loomis is eliminated by Viking. Cities, even those
that have not issued revenue bonds, may employ user fees to "provide a reserve for
improvements to their works" and may spend such money "to construct, reconstruct, improve,
better or extend any works."
(c)

Hayden's cap fee is reasonably based on the
replacement cost of the system capacity used.

The Viking Court emphasized the point, first made in Loomis, that cities have broad
discretion in determining how to quantify the cap fee, and that the fee may be based on the
replacement cost of the system capacity consumed--exactly what Hayden has done:
Thus, this section permitted the Irrigation District to charge new
users of the domestic water system a connection fee that included
an amount equal to the value of that portion of the system capacity
that the new user will utilize at that point in time.
The Irrigation District had discretion to decide what
methodology to use in order to determine that value. For example,
it is entitled to use replacement cost rather than historical cost as
the basis of its calculations. The court's limited role is simply to
determine whether the methodology used to determine the value is
reasonable and not arbitrary.

Viking, 149 Idaho at 194, 23 3 P .3d at 125 (emphasis supplied) (citing Loomis, 119 Idaho at
443-44, 807 P.2d at 1281-82). Thus, the very issue presented here-Hayden's use of
replacement cost for system capacity consumed by the new user-was decided in Viking.
Alas, the irrigation district in Viking did a rather sloppy job of developing its connection
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fee. For instance, the district did not even hire an engineer. This resulted in a remand. Viking,
149 Idaho at 195,233 P.3d at 126. Hayden has not made the same mistake. Its state-of-the-art
Sewer Master Plan Update (the Welch Comer Report) is a model for what cities should do.
Builders complain: "No portion of the fee is used for maintenance, repair, or upkeep of
the existing system (the City has a bi-monthly fee to cover that), and the fee has no relation to the
value of the existing system." Appellants' Brief at 7. Let us pick that apart. The first part is
true, and it is a good thing. Hayden has carefully avoided either basing the fee on or using the
fee revenue for maintenance, repair, or upkeep of the system. It has meticulously calculated the
fee based on the cost of replacement of the system capacity consumed by the new user. Chatwin
Affidavit #1 (R. Vol. 1, pp. 108-18). The second part of Builders' statement reflects a
fundamental misunderstanding of the law. Apparently, what Builders mean is that the cap fee is
illegal because it is not based on the historical cost of the system capacity consumed by the new
user. But that is only one way to calculate a reasonable fee. As noted above, the Viking Court
expressly ruled that another valid approach is to measure that value in terms ofreplacement cost
of the system capacity consumed.
(3)

Hayden's cap fee satisfies the opt-out requirement in Waters
Garbage and Lewiston Independent.

In Kootenai Property Owners, 115 Idaho at 678, 769 P.2d at 555, the Court held local
governments may require local residents to use a public service such as trash collection, and that
such fees still qualify as a user fee despite their mandatory nature. Two cases have carved out an
exception to this-where there is a practical and lawful way for residents to obtain the service
elsewhere. Waters Garbage v. Shoshone County, 138 Idaho 648, 67 P.3d 1260 (2003); Lewiston
Independent School Dist. No. 1 v. City ofLewiston, 151 Idaho 800,264 P.3d 907 (2011).
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Waters Garbage and Lewiston Independent pose no problem for Hayden, because
Hayden's cap does not apply to persons who do not use the City's sewer collection system. In
· · 17
· an opt-out prov1s1on.
oth er words, th ere 1s
(4)

The provisions of the Idaho Revenue Bond Act dealing with
"ordinary and necessary" expenses are inapplicable here
because Hayden is incurring no debt or liability.

NIBCA contends that the cap fee is not authorized by the Idaho Revenue Bond Act
because it is not an "ordinary and necessary" expense. Appellants' Brief at 6-7. The "ordinary
and necessary" exception has nothing to do with this case. This provision (found in both Idaho
Const. art. VIII, § 3 and the Idaho Revenue Bond Act) requires cities to hold elections before
incurring debt or liability except in the case of "ordinary and necessary" expenses. It has no
applicability here because Hayden it is not incurring any debt or liability. After all, the whole
point of the cap fee is to avoid going into debt. 18
Builders cite two cases. The first, Loomis v. City ofHailey, 119 Idaho 434, 440, 807 P .2d
1272, 1278 (1991), mentions the ordinary and necessary exception, but only to explain why
another case-O'Bryant v. City ofIdaho Falls, 78 Idaho 313,303 P.2d 672 (1956)-was
inapposite. 19 The plaintiffs in Loomis argued that O 'Bryant and similar cases helped them. The

17 As explained in Chatwin Affidavit# I, some developments within Hayden have the option of connecting
to the Hayden Lake Recreational Water & Sewer District instead of Hayden's sewer collection system. They are not
charged a fee by Hayden. If no connection to the City's sewer system is required, then no sewer capitalization fee is
charged. Of course, new developments are required to connect to some sewer system. Wastewater Services Chapter
§ 8-l-3(B)(2) (Chatwin Affidavit #I (R. Vol. I, at pp. 110-11); Chatwin Affidavit #1, Exh. B (R. Vol. 1, p. 131)).

18 This should not come as a surprise to Builders. As the City explained in its Answer, ,i 33 at 11 (R. Vol.
1, p. 61 ): "Collecting money from sewer utility fees is not an incursion of debt. Having money in the bank is the
opposite of debt. Nor does spending money that has been previously collected constitute the incursion of debt."
19 In O 'Bryant, the City ofldaho Falls granted a franchise to a company to create a gas distribution system
serving city residents, including a fifty-mile pipeline from Pocatello. That Court noted that the city could not fund
such a measure itself without incurring debt. 0 'Bryant, 78 Idaho at 320, 303 P.2d at 675. The Court said it would
"pierce the corporate veil" because the franchise in reality was "an instrumentality of' the city and a subterfuge for
allowing it to incur the financial obligation of constructing and operating a gas distribution system without a vote of
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Loomis Court rejected that argument. "In the instant case the City of Hailey is not incurring any
indebtedness and voter approval pursuant to art. 8, § 3 of the Idaho Constitution is required only
when the city is incurring indebtedness." Loomis, 119 Idaho at 440, 807 P.2d at 1278. The same
is true here.
Builders wander off the field again in citing City of Boise v. Frazier, 143 Idaho 1, 137
P.3d 388 (2006) (Burdick, J.). Frazier was a straight-up bonding case in which the Court
determined that revenue bonds issued for the Boise Airport were ordinary but not necessary,
therefore requiring an election. Frazier is inapplicable where, as here, no bond debt is incurred.

D.

Hayden's cap fee is authorized by Idaho Code§ 50-323.

Idaho Code § 63-1311 and the Revenue Bond Act have received most of the attention in
cases involving sewer fees. It appears, however, that a third statute, Idaho Code§ 50-323, also
authorizes these fees. It provides: "Cities are empowered to establish, create, develop, maintain
and operate domestic water systems ... and to do all things necessary to protect the source of
water from contamination."

InAlpertv. Boise Water Corp., 118 Idaho 136,143,795 P.2d 298,305 (1990) (Boyle, J.),
the Court cited section 50-323 and another statute, noting: "It is undisputed that municipal
corporations in Idaho have the power to operate their own utility systems and provide water,
power, light, gas and other utility services within the city limits."
Section 50-323 is also discussed in City of Grangeville v. Haskin, 116 Idaho 535, 777
P .2d 1208 ( 1989) (Johnson, J.) which struck down an ordinance authorizing the actions against

the qualified electors. 0 'Bryant, 78 Idaho at 324-25, 303 P.2d at 677-78 (described in Loomis, 119 Idaho at 440,
807 P.2d at 1278).
Nothing of the sort is occurring here. Indeed, Hayden sought and received voter approval for $3.9 million
dollars in bonding authority for the City's share of anticipated costs of federally mandated upgrades to HARSB's
regional water treatment plant. So far, those bonds have not been issued. Chatwin Affidavit #1 1140-42 (R. Vol. 1,
atp. 117).
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landlords to collect sewer fees charged to and unpaid by tenants. The strong implication of the
case, however, is that section 50-323 (together with principles of contract law) authorizes cities
to impose fees for sewer service. The district court ruled for city, finding that Idaho Code
§§ 50-323 and 50-1030(f) authorized such fees, and that Idaho Code§ 50-1813 authorized the
imposition of a lien on property to collect such fees. This Court reversed only as to the lien
issue, Grangeville, 116 Idaho at 537, 777 P.2d at 1210, and had no trouble with the city charging
the user for such fees, Grangeville, 116 Idaho at 538-39, 777 P.2d at 1211-12.

E.

Idaho Code § 50-301 grants home rule to cities.

This Court could affirm the District Court's holding that the cap fee is authorized by the
three statutes discussed above. There may, however, be a simpler approach-home rule.
It is well established that Idaho is a Dillon's Rule state, and that Idaho's Constitution
extends home rule only to the police power. The authors of two law review articles, however,
contend that a statutory amendment in 1976 contains a broad grant that extends home rule in
Idaho past the police power. Michael C. Moore, Powers and Authorities ofIdaho Cities: Home

Rule or Legislative Control?, 14 Idaho L. Rev. 143 (1977); James S. Macdonald & Jacqueline R.
Papez, Over JOO Years Without True "Home Rule" in Idaho: A Time for Change, 46 Idaho L.
Rev. 587,608 (2010).
Idaho Code§ 50-301 sets out the basic authorities of cities. In 1976, the Idaho
Legislature amended the statute to read as follows:
50-301. CORPORATE AND LOCAL SELFGOVERNMENT POWERS. Cities governed by this act shall be
bodies corporate and politic; may sue and be sued; contract and be
contracted with; accept grants-in-aid and gifts of property, both
real and personal, in the name of the city; acquire, hold, lease, and
convey property, real and personal; have a common seal, which
they may change and alter at pleasure; may erect buildings or
structures of any kind, needful for the uses or purposes of the city;
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and exercise such other pov;ers as may be conferred by law all
powers and perform all functions of local self-government in city
affairs as are not specifically prohibited by or in conflict with the
general laws or the constitution of the state ofldaho.
Idaho Code § 50-301 (showing amendment made by R.S. 685, H.B. 422, 1976 Idaho Sess. Laws
ch. 214 § 1).
Prior to its revision in 1976, the statute contained an explicit recognition of the Dillon's
Rule limitation (limiting a city's powers to those "conferred by law"). 20 The 1976 amendment
struck that provision, replacing it with what a sweeping grant of home rule, albeit still subject to
any limitations imposed by the Legislature. Yet no Idaho court has so ruled, or even considered
the matter. Although several post-1976 decisions (e.g., Caesar v. State, 101 Idaho 158, 160,610
P.2d 517,519 (1980) (Donaldson, CJ.)) have reiterated the applicability of Dillon's Rule in
Idaho, none has discussed the effect ofldaho Code§ 50-301.
Professor Moore21 was skeptical that the 1976 amendment granted across-the-board home
rule status (including the power to tax), but he thought it rather plain that the amendment granted
home rule status as to proprietary functions. "Third, and perhaps most important, the
amendment can be viewed as granting to cities all private-corporate, proprietary, and
administrative-powers, except where the existence of such power is reserved to the legislature
by the Constitution or is expressly prohibited or comprehensively set forth by statute." Moore
(1977), at 171. He concluded:

20 In 1976 the Idaho Attorney General concluded that the pre-amendment statute did not extend home rule
past the constitutional grant of police power authority. "Idaho cities and counties do not enjoy constitutional home
rule powers in local matters which fall outside the realm oflocal police powers.... [N]either Section 50-301,
Idaho Code, nor Section 50-302, Idaho Code, can be considered a grant of legislative home rule regarding matters
beyond the realm of police powers." Idaho Attorney General Opinion No. 76-3 at 7 (Jan. 20, 1976) (Wayne
Kidwell, A.G.) (reproduced as Exhibit B to this brief).

21

Professor Moore was an adjunct law professor at the time; he is now in private practice in Boise.
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Under this interpretation, a city would not have to point to a
specific statute in order to justify engaging in some proprietary
activity. Although the city would still be subject to constitutional
and statutory fiscal debt limitations, and to the general restriction
that all activities of the city must be for a public purpose, a city
could engage in many functions not expressly authorized by law.
Michael C. Moore, Powers and Authorities of Idaho Cities: Home Rule or Legislative Control?,
14 Idaho L. Rev. 143, 170-71 (1977).
Professor Macdonald would go a step further. "Enactment of this legislation would
permit the exercise of true local self-government in Idaho." Macdonald at 607. In other words,
he views the 1976 amendment as establishing true home rule as to all local matters, including the
power to tax, though still subject to legislative oversight. That, too, is a plausible reading of the
amendment. After all, a grant of authority to "exercise all powers and perform all functions of
local self-government" appears to be all encompassing.
In the event that the Court finds the language of section 50-301 to be ambiguous, Hayden
has attached the legislative history of the 197 6 amendment as Exhibit A to this brief. It clearly
reinforces the broad sweep of this grant of power. The Statement of Purpose reads:
The purpose of this bill is to grant a limited form of local
self-government authority to Idaho's cities. Currently, Idaho's
cities may exercise only those powers and perform only those
functions specifically mentioned in the Constitution of the State of
Idaho or in the Idaho Code. If the Constitution and the Code are
silent, cities may not act. Unlike the state government, which may
exercise any power and perform any function not prohibited by the _
United States Constitution, Idaho's cities do not have "residual
powers." They may act only if they have been specifically
authorized to act-and only in the manner prescribed by the Idaho
Constitution or the Idaho Code.
Enactment of this bill would provide Idaho's cities with
real local control over local affairs by permitting them to exercise
those powers and perform those functions not specifically
prohibited by or in conflict with the Idaho Constitution or the
Idaho Code. Because the Idaho Code is presently so restrictive,
the immediate impact of the enactment of this bill would not be
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great. It would, however, establish a general framework from
which meaningful local self-government could be constructed over
a period of time.
Statement of Purpose for RS 685 and HB 422 (1976) (emphasis supplied) (reproduced in
Exhibit A to this brief).
Lest there be any mistake, the testimony of Dr. James Weatherby expressly identified
home rule as the purpose and effect of the legislation:
Mr. Weatherby told the committee that the purpose of this
bill is to grant a limited form oflocal self-government authority to
Idaho cities. Currently, Idaho's cities may exercise only those
powers and perform only those functions specifically mentioned in
the Constitution of the State ofldaho or in the Idaho Code.
Mr. Weatherby said that the cities should be given those authorities
that are not granted by the Constitution and the Idaho Code. With
the passage ofH 422 the Legislature would give them home rule,
then we can come back and propose to the Legislature areas we
feel that are too restrictive or in conflict with the Code. This is a
most limited form of home rule. Does not provide areas beyond
the control of the Legislature.
Testimony of Dr. James Weatherby, Minutes of the House Local Government & Taxation
Committee at 1-2 (Mar. 10, 1976) (emphasis supplied) (reproduced in Exhibit A to this brief).

When Dr. Weatherby describes this as limited home rule, he means that, unlike in some foreign
jurisdictions, the Idaho Legislature retains complete power to curtail the cities' authority through
legislative action. But this is home rule nonetheless. Unless the Legislature affirmatively
prohibits the cities from doing so, cities are free to act as to any matter oflocal concern.
The legislative history reflects concerns raised by some (including the Idaho Association
of Commerce and Industry, the Association of Idaho Taxpayers, and Senator Risch) that the bill
should be amended so as not to extend home rule to matters oftaxation. 22 No such limiting

22

The minutes to the March 10, 1976 hearing refers to an attached "testimony" by Paul Ennis. No such
attachment exists in the State's official legislative history, and Hayden has been unable to locate this document. The
legislative history also references Attorney General Opinion 76-3. Hayden obtained a copy of that opinion, which is
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amendments were adopted.
Here is a fair question: If the 1976 amendment created home rule, why would the
Legislature enact section 63-1311 in 1980? After all, if cities have home rule (either Professor
Macdonald's true home rule or Professor Moore's home rule as to proprietary matters), why do
they need a statute authorizing the imposition of user fees?
The quick answer is that they do not. Recall that the 1980 legislative history discussed in
section 1.B(l) repeatedly noted that cities already had this authority, and the purpose of the 1980
legislation was to extend it to other taxing authorities. For example: "Cities have had this
authority for a number of years and haven't abused it and we feel the counties should have it."
Minutes of Senate Local Government and Taxation Committee (Mar. 22, 1980). See footnote 9
at page 16 for additional legislative history on this point.
The simplest conclusion to this litigation would be the one suggested by Professor
Macdonald-to declare that the laborious and contentious exercise of determining what is a fee
and what is a tax was done away with by the Legislature in 1976 as to cities. That body oflaw
would remain, of course, for counties and other units of local government. Thus, absent an
express statutory prohibition or other issue (such as takings, equal protection, or unlawful
bonding), cities would be free to establish either fees or taxes for any legitimate local purposes.
The more modest approach suggested by Professor Moore would not eliminate the taxversus-fee debate. But it would eliminate the need to parse the words of specific statutes like
section 67-1311(1) or the Idaho Revenue Bond Act to find authority for cities to construct sewer
systems and to charge for them. Because building and charging for sewer systems is plainly a

appended hereto as Exhibit B. That opinion concluded that section 50-301 does not extend home rule status beyond
the police power. It bears emphasis, however, that the attorney general opinion addresses the statute before the 1976
amendment.
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proprietary function paid for by user fees, and doing so is not in conflict with the general laws or
the Constitution, the Court need look no further than section 50-301.
Hayden recognizes that this is cutting edge stuff. It does not appear that the question of
whether section 50-301 extended home rule status has ever been presented to an appellate court.
Then again, the statute seems mighty clear. That said, it is not necessary for the Court to find
that cities have either limited or true home rule status-or even to address section 50-301. As
shown above, there is ample other statutory authority-supported by settled case lawauthorizing Hayden's cap fee.
II.

HAYDEN IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES

A.

Hayden should have been awarded attorney fees below.

Hayden sought attorney fees below pursuant to Idaho R. Civ. P. 54 and Idaho Code
§§ 12-117(1) and 12-117(2). 23 Hayden cross appealed the District Court's denial of that request.
Section 12-117(1) authorizes awards of attorney fees to the "prevailing party" when "the
nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." Both determinations are
committed to the discretion of the trial court and are reviewed under an abuse of discretion
standard. City of Osburn v. Randel, 152 Idaho 906,908,277 P.3d 353,355 (2012) (J. Jones, J.).
However, if those tests are met, the award is mandatory. Fuchs v. Idaho State Police, Alcohol

Beverage Control, 153 Idaho 114,117,279 P.3d 100, 103 (2012) (Burdick, C.J.).

23 Hayden could have requested attorney fees under Idaho Code§ 12-121 as well. Syringa Networks, LLC
v. Idaho Dep 't ofAdmin., 155 Idaho 55, 67, 305 P.3d 499, 511 (2013) (Eismann, J.). However, this Court has
equated the "reasonable basis" standard under section 12-117 and the "frivolous" standard under section 12-121.
Ada Cnty. Highway Dist. v. Total Success Investments, UC, 145 Idaho 360, 372, 179 P.3d 323, 335 (2008)
("Burdick, J."); Jenkins v. Barsalou, 145 Idaho 202, 207, 177 P.3d 949, 954 (2008) (Burdick, J.); Nation v. State,
Dep 't of Correction, 144 Idaho 177, 194, 158 P.3d 953,970 (2007) (Burdick, J.). Likewise, the prevailing party
provisions in both statutes are governed by the same Rule 54 provisions. Consequently, Hayden does not perceive
that adding section 12-121 would contribute anything. If we have missed something here, Hayden throws itself on
the mercy of the Court.
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The District Court found that Hayden was the prevailing party but denied an award of
attorney fees because it found that Builders acted with a reasonable basis in fact and law.
Decision on Fees (R. Vol. 4, pp. 806-21). The District Court did not address Hayden's request,

in the alternative, for a partial award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-11 7(2).
(1)

Hayden was the overall prevailing party.

It is rare for a litigant to win every issue, particularly in a case such as this calling into

question numerous financial transactions over a number of years. Hayden would posit that a few
inadvertent errors could be found in the accounting of every municipality, corporation, or home
checkbook. The law is clear, however, that in determining who is the overall winner, the courts
must take a broad view of what was at stake and what each side accomplished.
Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(d)(l)(B) provides clear guidance on the subject:
(B) Prevailing Party. In determining which party to an
action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs, the trial court shall
in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or result of the
action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. The
trial court in its sound discretion may determine that a party to an
action prevailed in part and did not prevail in part, and upon so
finding may apportion the costs between and among the parties in
a fair and equitable manner after considering all of the issues and
claims involved in the action and the resultant judgment or
judgments obtained.
In Hobson Fabricating Corp. v. SEIZ Constr., LLC, 154 Idaho 45, 49,294 P.3d 171, 175
(2012) (Burdick, CJ.), this Court reiterated that Rule 54 mandates an "overall view, not a claimby-claim analysis." The Court concluded: "Therefore, the issue in this case is not who
succeeded on more individual claims, but rather who succeeded on the main issue of the action
based on the outcome of both the litigation and the settlement." Id. (emphasis supplied). The
same analysis applies where, as here, the case was ultimately settled by stipulation. Hobson, 154
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Idaho at 51, 294 P.3d at 177. 24
Where a defendant succeeds in fending off a lawsuit, he or she is the prevailing party:
In Daisy Manufacturing Co. v. Paintball Sports, Inc., 134 Idaho
259, 999 P.2d 914 (Ct. App. 2000), the Court of Appeals observed:
"The ·result obtained' in this case was a dismissal of [plaintiffs]
action with prejudice, the most favorable outcome that could
possibly be achieved by [a defendant].

Shore, 146 Idaho at 915,204 P.3d at 1126 (brackets original).
In some instances, there is no clear, overall winner. Where there is a true split decisionwith each side scoring significant wins-neither side is a prevailing party for purposes of section
12-117. Trilogy Network Systems, Inc. v. Johnson, 144 Idaho 844, 172 P .3d 1119 (2007)
("Burdick, J."); Fuchs v. Idaho State Police, Alcohol Beverage Control, 153 Idaho 114, 117, 279
P.3d 100, 103 (2012) (Burdick, CJ.). Such is not the case here. Builders lost on the main illegal
tax issue, failed to prove any significant accounting issue, and stipulated away the rest.
It is not surprising that Builders agreed to dismiss the accounting issues. The "big"

accounting issue-Builders' premise that Hayden was using cap fees to fund non-sewer
programs-fizzled. The litigation did prompt Hayden to discover some minor accounting errors.
But, as it turned out, the net effect of those errors actually favored Builders. Once Hayden
corrected them, Builders were worse off than when they started. 25 Plainly, the District Court did
not abuse its discretion in finding Hayden to be the overall prevailing party.

24In

the context of a stipulated settlement, the Court explained: "In litigation, avoiding liability is as good
for a defendant as winning a money judgment is for a plaintiff." Straub v. Smith, 145 Idaho 65, 72, 175 P.3d 754,
761 (2007) (Eismann, J., concurring) (quoting Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141
Idaho 716, 719, 117 P.3d 130, 133 (2005) (J. Jones, J.)). The Straub case is not precisely on point because it dealt
with a stipulation that completely dismissed the case. In our situation, Builders reserved the right to appeal the
merits. However, the case is otherwise on all fours.
25 Builders' abiding belief that Hayden was up to no good was not only unfounded but unfathomable. From
the start, even before the lawsuit was filed, Hayden bent over backwards to work with Builders. From day one,
Hayden opened its books to Builders' accountant. See footnote 4 at page 11. Of course, as public records, those
books are open to everyone.
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(2)

Builders pursued this case without reasonable basis in fact or
law.

This Court has held that a losing party cannot be said to have acted without reasonable
basis when litigating an issue of first impression. E.g., Arambarri v. Armstrong, 152 Idaho 734,
740-41, 274 P.3d 1249, 1255-56 (2012) (W. Jones, J.). But this is not such a case.
Builders asserted that "there is not one statute or Idaho appellate court decision that has
dealt exclusively with whether municipalities may charge cap fees solely to fund future
expansion projects." Builders' Attorney Fee Opposition at 4 (R. Vol. 4, p. 770). In fact, multiple
statutes and five appellate decisions (JBCA, Kootenai Property Owners, Brewster, Loomis, and
Viking) control the case.
The District Court carefully stepped through each of Builders' arguments, explaining
why each was wrong:
•

Both future expansion and replacement of existing capacity are authorized by
Idaho Code § 63-1311. Decision on Fees at 11 (R. Vol. 4, p. 816).

•

The District Court did not have to look to foreign decisions to support its holding.
Decision on Fees at 11 (R. Vol. 4, p. 816).

•

As for Idaho Code § 50-1030, "the issue being debated ... was addressed by the
Idaho Supreme Court in Viking." Decision on Fees at 11 (R. Vol. 4, p. 816).

•

Both Loomis and Viking show that "funds from the capitalization fee [may be
used] to construct, reconstruct, improve, better, or extend the system." Decision
on Fees at 11-12 (R. Vol. 4, pp. 816-17).

•

Whatever disputed issues of fact were present were resolved when "the parties
eventually reached a stipulation regarding the City's expenditure of funds, and
Plaintiffs [withdrew] with prejudice any claim relating to alleged accounting
errors .... " Decision on Fees at 12 (R. Vol. 4, p. 817) (brackets original).

The District Court then concluded that this case was controlled by existing precedent and
was not a question of first impression:
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As to the legal issues brought before the Court, the Court
was able to reach its conclusion based upon existing Idaho
statutory and case law that had previously addressed fees similar to
the City's and that said law authorized the City to collect sewer
capitalization fees as a matter of law.
Decision on Fees at 12-13 (R. Vol. 4, pp. 817-18).

Despite this finding, the District Court concluded in the next sentence that attorney fees
should be denied because "the authority was not so clear as to preclude good faith litigation of
the issue." Decision on Fees at 13 (R. Vol. 4, p. 818). This does not reconcile. If the decision
was controlled by prior cases, then the outcome was clear. Essentially, the District Court said
that it would let Builders off the hook. That was an abuse of discretion.
The District Court then turned to the disputed facts. Despite recognizing that these were
all resolved by stipulation, the District Court concluded that their presence in the case meant that
Builders acted with a reasonable basis. Decision on Fees at 13 (R. Vol. 4, p. 818). This, too,
was an abuse of discretion. It is apparent from the Phillips Affidavit and the Stipulation that the
accounting errors worked in Builders' favor and that their litigation worked against them.
(3)

In the alternative, Hayden should be awarded partial attorney
fees below.

Hayden sought attorney fees under both subsection ( 1) and, in the alternative,
subsection (2). It provides:
(2) If a party to a proceeding prevails on a portion of the
case, and the state agency or political subdivision or the court
hearing the proceeding, including on appeal, finds that the
nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law
with respect to that portion of the case, it shall award the partially
prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and other
reasonable expenses with respect to that portion of the case on
which it prevailed.
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Idaho Code§ 12-117(2). Even if the accounting issue kerfuffle means there was no overall
winner, precluding an award under subsection (1 ), Hayden should at least have been awarded its
fees on the illegal tax issue. The District Court did not address subsection (2).
Curiously, this provision has received scant attention in the appellate cases. The first
case to address the subsection (2) is Roe v. Harris, 128 Idaho 569, 917 P .2d 403 ( 1996)
(Johnson, J.). Consistent with the plain language of the statute, the Roe Court ruled that a litigant
may lose a part of the case and still be entitled to an attorney fee award as to those issues on
which he or she prevailed.
In Roe, pro-choice plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of an anti-abortion statute
and an anti-abortion rule. The district court upheld the statute (but based on an interpretation
favorable to the plaintiffs) and struck down the rule. The Court found that the district court
abused its discretion by failing to award plaintiffs attorney fees for the portion of the case they
won pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-117(2).
Thus, under Roe, if the Court determines that Hayden is not entitled to attorney fees with
respect to the accounting issues, it is nonetheless entitled to fees as to the main part of the casethat is, its authority to impose a cap fee based on replacement cost-if Builders pursued that part
frivolously. This result follows from the statute itself which calls for an award where the Court
"finds that the nonprevailing party [Builders] acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law with
respect to that portion of the case" on which Hayden prevailed. Idaho Code§ 12-117(2).
The Court briefly referenced the statute in Nelson v. Big Lost River Irrigation Dist., 133
Idaho 139,143,983 P.2d 212,216 (1999) (Kidwell, J.). In that case, the Court upheld the
district court's award of partial attorney fees to each party under Idaho Code§ 12-117(2). In so
holding, the Nelson Court referenced its decision in Prouse v. Ransom, 117 Idaho 734, 791 P.2d
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1313 (Ct. App. 1989) (Burnett, J.) (upholding a split award on the basis ofldaho R. Civ. P.
54(d)(l)).
In Hobson Fabricating Corp. v. SEIZ Constr., LLC, 154 Idaho 45, 49-51, 294 P.3d 171,
175-77 (2012) (Burdick, C.J.), the Court upheld the district court's finding that the parties
seeking attorney fees were not the "overall prevailing party" and thus not entitled to attorney fees
under Idaho Code § 12-117 ( 1). On appeal, those parties argued, in the alternative, that they were
at least entitled to partial recovery of attorney fees under Idaho Code§ 12-117(2). The Court
said, in essence, "Too bad, you should have raised it below."26 Thus, the Hobson Court rejected
the 12-117(2) argument on technical pleading grounds. Its ruling did nothing to disturb or
question the holding in Roe that partially prevailing parties may be entitled, at least, to partial
awards.
In conclusion, if the Court finds that Hayden is not entitled to an award of all its fees
under subsection (1), Hayden is entitled, at the very least, to a partial award as to those issues on
which it prevailed and as to which Builders' position was not reasonable.
B.

Hayden is entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal.
(1)

Builders' appeal was pursued without a reasonable basis in
fact or law.

Idaho Code§ 12-117 applies on appeal as well as below. "The Court employs a two-part
test for LC. § 12-117 on appeal: the party seeking fees must be the prevailing party and the
losing party must have acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." City of Osburn v.
Randel, 152 Idaho 906,910,277 P.3d 353,357 (2012) (J. Jones, J.). For all of the reasons stated

26

"In this case, the Contractors failed to adequately describe that the basis of the award they were pursuing
was centered on LC. § 12-117(2), and they did not cite to any case where an award of attorney fees was made
pursuant to LC.§ 12-117(2).... Because the Contractors did not properly present a request pursuant to LC. §
12-117(2) below, they are not allowed to pursue that request on appeal." Hobson, 154 Idaho at 52-53, 294 P.3d 171,
178-79.
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above, Hayden satisfies these tests and should be awarded attorney fees on appeal.
Even if this Court were to affirm the denial of fees below, the Court, in its discretion,
may determine that fees are appropriate on appeal. These are matters of discretion, and this
Court must reach its own conclusion as to whether Builders had a reasonable basis to pursue the
appeal. For instance, in Alpine Village Co. v. City ofMcCall, 154 Idaho 930, 303 P .3d 617
(2013) (Burdick, C.J.), this Court awarded attorney fees on appeal notwithstanding the district
court's denial of attorney fees below.
It appears that the trial court cut Builders some slack in reaching its conclusion that their
litigation was not frivolous. But Builders now have the benefit of the teaching of the District
Court which addressed and explained with great clarity why each of the arguments that Builders
continue to pursue on appeal is wrong. At some point, litigants are expected to learn from the
process oflitigation. 27 Even if filing the complaint was reasonable, pursing this appeal was not.
What this Court said in 2005 applies equally here:
Although the Castrignos may have had a good faith basis to bring
the original suit based on their interpretation of Idaho law, the
Castrignos ... were clearly advised on the applicable law in an
articulate and well reasoned written decision from the district
court. Nevertheless, the Castrignos chose to further appeal that
decision to this Court, even though they failed to add any new
analysis or authority to the issues raised below.

Castrigno v. McQuade, 141 Idaho 93, 98, 106 P.3d 419,424 (2005) (Trout, J.).

27 For example, the District Court explained, "The Loomis court expressly abstained from addressing the
particular issue being addressed in the present case, which is whether the use of fees to pay for future expansion is
permissible under the Idaho Revenue Bond Act. Id. at 439, 808 P.2d at 1278 (see FN3)." Decision on MSJ at 18 (R.
Vol. 3, p. 651 ). Hayden repeatedly made this same point about footnote 3 in its briefing. Hayden's MSJ Brief at 27
(R. Vol. 1, p. 97); Hayden's Reply #2 at 15 (R. Vol. 3, p. 620); Hayden's Attorney Fee Memo at 22 (R. Vol. 3, p.
741). One would expect the Builders, at some point, to catch on to this footnote. Instead, in their latest brief,
Builders conclude their discussion of Loomis with this explanation of why the cap fee fails the Loomis test: "Its sole
purpose is to raise revenue for the future expansion of Respondent's sewer system." Appellants' Brief at 7. Builders
should know by now that Loomis did not address the question of whether user fees may be used to raise revenue to
fund future expansion.
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(2)

If Hayden prevails on the appeal but not its cross appeal, it is
still entitled to some or all attorney fees.
(a)

Hayden would still be the overall prevailing party on
appeal.

If Hayden were to prevail on Builders' appeal, but lose its cross appeal on attorney fees,

Hayden contends that it would still be the overall prevailing party, because the attorney fee issue
is a minor, collateral issue compared to the merits. Hayden acknowledges, however, that this
Court seems to have adopted a contrary rule-of-thumb whereby if a party loses any aspect of an
appeal it can never be a prevailing party on appeal. 28 Accordingly, Hayden approaches this issue
with trepidation, aware that bringing a cross appeal might cause it to forfeit an award of attorney
fees on appeal.
Curiously, despite the number of occasions on which the Court has summarily denied
attorney fees on appeal (see footnote 28), it does not appear that anyone has ever brought this
issue to the Court's attention. In doing so today, Hayden urges the Court to take a hard look at
this per se rule. It is not fair, it is contrary to the goals of the attorney fee statutes, and it cannot
be reconciled with the plain language of the attorney fee statues or Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(d)(l)(B).
Nor is it consistent with other precedents of this Court, which make clear that in district
court a holistic approach is employed to determine who is the prevailing party. For example:
"In determining which party prevailed in an action where there are
claims and counterclaims between opposing parties, the court
determines who prevailed 'in the action.' That is, the prevailing
28

Hoskins v. Circle A Constr., Inc., 138 Idaho 336, 63 P.3d 462 (2003) (Schroeder, J.); Keller v. Inland
Metals All Weather Conditioning, Inc., 139 Idaho 233, 241, 76 P.3d 977, 985 (2003) (Eismann, J.); KEB
Enterprises, L.P. v. Smedley, 101 P.3d 690,699, 140 Idaho 746, 755 (2004) (Eismann, J.); Total Success
Investments, LLC v. Ada Cnty. Highway Dist., 148 Idaho 688,696,227 P.3d 942,950 (Ct. App. 2010); Tapadeera,
LLC v. Knowlton, 153 Idaho 182,189,280 P.3d 685,692 (2012) (Eismann, J.); Hurtado v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 153
Idaho 13, 23,278 P.3d 415,415 (2012) (Horton, J.); Buckskin Properties, Inc. v. Valley Cnty., 154 Idaho 486,498,
300 P.3d 18, 30 (2013) (J. Jones, J.); Hehrv. City ofMcCall, 155 Idaho 92, 97,305 P.3d 536,543 (2013) (Burdick,
C.J.); Sanders v. Bd. of Trustees ofMtn. Home School Dist. No. 193, 2013 WL 1349418 (Idaho Apr. 7, 2014)
(Burdick, C.J.).
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party question is examined and determined from an overall view,
not a claim-by-claim analysis."

Advanced Medical Diagnostics, LLCv. Imaging Center ofIdaho, LLC, 154 Idaho 812,814,303
P.3d 171, 173 (2013) (Eismann, J.) (quoting Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating &

Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 719, 117 P.3d 130, 133 (2005) (J. Jones, J.)). The same is true in
administrative proceedings. 29 It is difficult to see why it would be any different on appeal.
Moreover, Idaho Code§ 12-117(1) was amended in 2012 to expressly provide that it
apply to appeals. 2012 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 149. It seems implausible that the Legislature
intended that the same statutory language would apply one way here and another way below.
Surely the Legislature would have expected that the "overall view" approach mandated by Rule
54 and applied by this Court to lower courts and administrative agencies would be applied
identically on appeal. Thus, to paraphrase this Court's rejection of a "claim-by-claim analysis,"
where there are appeals and cross appeals, should not the Court determine who prevailed overall,
not on an appeal-by-appeal basis?
It would seem that this Court's embrace of a per se rule prohibiting fees whenever a party

loses a cross appeal has evolved accidentally. For example, Hoskins, Keller, and Tapadeera (see
footnote 28 above) are classic split decisions in which each party won a substantial part and lost
a substantial part on appeal. In other words, there was no obvious winner, and it is easy to see
why attorney fees were not awarded to either party on appeal.

Hoskins involved dueling appeals and cross-appeals, both of which raised significant
substantive issues. Hoskins won one and lost the other. They canceled out, so he was not the

29

In 2012, this Court noted: "This Court can discern no basis for applying a differing standard to the
determination of prevailing party status in an administrative proceeding." Fuchs v. Idaho State Police, Alcohol
Beverage Control, 153 Idaho 114, 118,279 P.3d 100, 104 (2012) (Burdick, C.J.). If the same standard applies in an
administrative proceeding and at trial, it is not apparent why a different standard would apply on appeal.
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prevailing party. Hoskins, 138 Idaho at 343, 63 P.3d at 469.

Keller was a contract damages case involving a defective dehumidifier. The trial court
awarded damages of $13,452 and attorney fees of $74,400. The defendant appealed. This Court
slashed most of the damage award-cutting it to $2, 793-but left the attorney fee award in
place. That makes it hard to say who the winner was. The Court concluded: "Because both
parties have prevailed in part on appeal, we will not award attorney fees on appeal." Keller, 139
Idaho at 241, 76 P.3d at 985.

Tapadeera also involved offsetting wins and losses. In the district court, Tapadeera
obtained a judgment against the defendants for $23,421, but lost its request for attorney fees in
the amount of$22,666. Tapadeera, 153 Idaho at 185-86, 280 P.3d at 688-89. Both sides
appealed, and this Court affirmed on both scores, resulting in a wash. The Court concluded,
simply: "[Tapadera] prevailed on the Knowltons' appeal but lost its cross-appeal. Therefore,
Tapadeera is not the prevailing party on appeal and is not entitled to an award of attorney fees
under Idaho Code section 12-121." Tapadeera, 153 Idaho at 189,280 P.3d at 692.
If Hayden were to prevail on Builders' appeal-protecting tens of millions of dollars
worth of sewer improvements30 and establishing a precedent that will have even greater
impact31 -and lose its cross-appeal worth $221,543 in attorney fees, that is not a wash and it
does not follow from Tapadeera, Keller, or Hoskins that Hayden is not the prevailing party.

30

The District Court observed in its Decision on MSJ at 4 (R. Vol. 3, p. 63 7) that more than $10 million has
been spent or budgeted for sewer system expansion projects from 2005 through 2014. The fee at issue was
calculated based upon the estimated cost of build out of the system at a total of more than $20 million. Welch
Comer Report, pp. 35-36 (A.R. pp. 41-42).
Frankly, the millions of dollars at stake in this case pale in comparison to what was coming next. Should
Builders prevail in their challenge to Hayden's cap fee, the HARSB cap fee undoubtedly would be challenged next.
See ChatwinA.ffidavit#l (R. Vol. 1, atp. 112).
31
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Yet Tapadeera, Keller, or Hoskins are now cited routinely without analysis. The result is
that the sensible outcome in those cases has morphed into a wooden rule-of-thumb in which the
big picture is of no consequence and any loss on appeal bars an award of attorney fees. 32
Hayden urges the Court to reconsider this approach. As the Court said in Syringa

Networks, LLC v. Idaho Dep 't ofAdmin., 155 Idaho 55, 68, 305 P.3d 499, 512 (2013) (Eismann,
J.), "That holding has been followed in subsequent cases, but it is incorrect."

Here, the attorney fee issue pales into insignificance compared to the importance of the
precedent set on the main issue. (See footnotes 30 and 31 at page 46.) As this Court once
observed: "Furthermore, we have said costs and attorney fees are collateral issues which do not
go to the merits of an action .... " Straub v. Smith, 145 Idaho 65, 69, 175 P.3d 754, 758 (2007)
(Burdick, J.). Admittedly, that observation was made in another context. But it would seem to
reinforce the intuitive idea that party who wins the merits but fails to win reversal of a
comparatively small attorney fee denial is still the overall prevailing party. To be sure, it is quite
another thing where the attorney fees equal (as in Tapadeera) or substantially exceed (as in

Keller) the value of a case. But where, as here, the attorney fees are the tail on the dog, the dog
may still prevail despite the loss of its tail.

(b)

At a minimum, Hayden is entitled to fees on the appeal
it wins.

In any event, none of the cases applying the per se rule addressed Idaho Code
§ 12-117(2). For the reasons discussed above in section II.A(3) at page 40, if Hayden prevails on
the merits, it is entitled, at the very least, to an award of partial attorney fees on appeal.

32 For example, in Hurtado the Court said flatly, "Where both parties prevail in part on appeal, this Court
does not award attorney fees to either party." Hurtado, 153 Idaho at 23, 278 P.3d at 425. Both Keller and Hurtado
involved only Idaho Code§ 12-120(3). However, Hurtado (which cited Keller) was cited in Sanders involving
section 12-117 and 12-120(3).
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CONCLUSION

This Court ruled in Viking, 149 Idaho at 194,233 P.3d at 125, that user fees may be based
on ''the value of that portion of the system capacity that the new user will utilize" and that the
value may be calculated based on "replacement cost rather than historical cost." The Court then
rejected Viking's argument that fees cannot be used ''to pay for future capital assets and future
improvements required due to population growth." Viking, 149 Idaho at 196,233 P.3d at 127.
In keeping with the Court's guidance, Hayden retained an engineering firm to carefully calibrate
the fee to ensure that it would be just enough to allow the City to stay a step ahead of
development, by charging the new user what it costs the City to replace the capacity consumed.
Having adhered to this Court's mandate, and for all the other reasons discussed above, Hayden
urges that the District Court's decision be afiirmed as to the merits, and that attorney fees be
granted below and on appeal.
Respectfully submitted on May 19, 2014.
GIVENS PURSLEY

LLP

By

Christoph r H. Meyer

By

}1/f/l

/I//
(.,. Mart

Attorneys for City of Hayden

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT-CROSS APPELLA'.'IT CITY OF HAYDEN
2002 l 27 ~ 75

l I 599-4

Page 48

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on May 19, 2014 the foregoing was served as follows:
Jason S. Risch, Esq.
Risch• Pisca, PLLC
407 W Jefferson St
Boise ID 83702-6012
Facsimile: (208) 345-9928
jrisch@rischpisca. corn

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT-CROSS APPELLANT CITY OF HAYDEN
2002127~75 11599-4

D
~

D
D
D

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
E-mail

Page 49

EXHIBIT

A: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY TO 1976 AMENDMENT TO IDAHO CODE§ 50-301

784

IDAHO SESSION LAWS

C. 214 '76

board, as provided by chapter 19, title 54, Idaho Code;
Idaho real estate ~ea•« fcommissionf, as provided by chapter
20, title 54, Idaho Code, board of social work examiners as
provided by chapter 32, title 54, Idaho Code, ,and the board
of veterinary medicine, as provided by chapter 21, title 54,
Idaho Code; and,
(3)
The bureau of occupational licenses is hereby
created within the department of self-governing agencies.
Approved March 19, 1976.

CHAPTER 214
(H.B. No. 422)

AN ACT
RELATING TO SELF-GOVERNING POWERS OF ClTl.ESJ
AMENDING
SECTION 50-301, IDAHO CODE, TO PROVIDE THAT CITIES MAY
EXERCISE AND PERFORM ALL FUNCTIONS OF LOCAL SELFGOVERNMENT NOT PROHIBITED BY LAW OR BY THE CONSTITUTION.

Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho;
SECTION 1. That Section 50-301, Idaho Code, be, and the
same is hereby amended to read as follows:
50-301. CORPORATE AND LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT POWERS.
Cities governed by this act shall be bodies corporate and
politic; may sue and be sued; contract and be contracted
with; accept grants-in-aid and gifts of property, both rea1
and personal, in the name of the city, acquire, hold, lease,
and convey property, real and personal; have a common seal,
which they may change and alter at pleasure; may erect
buildings or structures of any kind, needful for the uses or
purposes of the city; and exercise e~eh-e~her-pewere-as-fflay
Be-eea~e~~ea-ey-~aw all powers and perform all functions of
local self-government in city affairs as are not specifically prohibited by or in conflict with the general laws or
the constitution of the state of Idaho.
Approved March 22, 1976.
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1976

HOUSE

STATEMENTS OF PURPOSE
for

House Bills
House Concurrent Resolutions
House Joint Memorials
House Joint Resolutions
House Resolutions

2nd Regular Session
43rd Idaho Legislature

,.:,.:... ,_.. :,:·,1
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LOCAL GOVERNMENT COMMI'l''l'EE

MINUTES
'l'IMEt

1130 l',M,

PLACE:

1\0011\ 416 , S'l'ATEHOUSE

DATE,

January 20, 1976

PRESENT,

onweiler, Neider, Ingram, Wheeler, Bunting,
Munger, Stivers, swisher, Harlow, Twilegar
Abbott, Hosack.

ABSENT:

None.

GUESTS:

Barbera Dyer of the League of Women Voters;
Ms. Southwick of the Idaho Free Press, Bob
Leeright of AP, Gilliland, Statesman:
Weatherby and Decker of Association of Idaho Cities,
Dick Hronek; Marj Jonasson Ma County Treasurer.
The meeting was called to order by Chairman
Onweiler at 1130 p.m.

There was considerable discussion as to whether
to continue the meetings at 1:30 in the afternoon
or convene at 2 o'clock instead, It was agreed
to continue at 1:30 until such time it will
be impossible to gather at that time,
Motion was made by Representative swisher to approve
the minutes of the January 12 and January 16
-etings: Seconded by Munger.
MOTION CARRIED.
RS 699 ,

'l'his RS brought by Representative Wheeler relates
to change or the fiscal years of the cities and
counties in the State from the calendar years to
October 1 throuqh September 30 so that property
taxes are budgeted and levied in the same year they
are received. Mr. Weatherby explained considerably
with regard to this legislation.

MOTION:

Motion was made by Representative Stivers for
introduction of the bill; seconded by Wheeler.

HB 350

Brought by Representative Jackson. Bill was
discussed by Bill Lee the attorney who prepared
the legislation. Relates to criminal trespass
laws.

MO'l'ION:

Motion made by Representative Stivers to •no pass•
Seconded by Representative Swisher.

HB 361

MOTION Cl\RRIED.
C0111pan..1.on bill to tlB 3$0 brought by Representative
Jackson, Relates to civil trespa111 laws,
·

MO'l':tON1

Motion 111ade by Representative Stivers that HB 361
Do Pass, Seconded hy Representative swisher,

MO'l.'ION CARRIED - No opposed.

MO'l':tON CARRI!ill),
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~INOTES Cont'd - ;4nu~ry 20, 1~76
Drought by Reprea~nt~tive Swighor - to gr~nt ll~ited
to~· of loctt l ~alf· ·:0vernTI1Cnt authority tc Idaho's=
citie,,, w•endinq i..cction 50-301 to provide th,n.t cJ.tiesa
rtay axerci.?t• tutd piirfona all !unctions ot local
setf govornse~t.
1'!0!'10N:

Motion by Rop:ce1'e:\.tati '-'~ Swisht!'r t,) int!"oducc
ltS 685, YiU'l a chanqe in the fi:a;ca.t not~. shO'Wing
that there: would be - fi:;c:-al iJ1:1pact but .it c.annot

b$ estimated.:

RS Gfi(>

Seconded by T\ofileg~r.

By Onwu-iler - RS 660 .set.::: reqtli!:'(:Hlf!nt~ for th~
distribution of l.rrigAtion w.atar :'1ir,hi~ irrig,'!tion

districts~
Reprcs'!ntutive Swi;h<!r rnovqd for i.ntrod\?Ction
or"' RS 660; Secon(!ei1 by Re'f}resent.ltiv!!: Munger.
f.lC7TION

RS 661

CARRIED.

By Onwoiler
RS 661 provides that counti.tt!I mny
creat'3 local improver!'lcnt di•trictJ! for tha Gons::::.::uc-

tion of irriqatlon sy~tom~.

No tr-etg of tiYe acr•s

or ~ore »hall bs included in LIO.

KO'l'tON:

Repriliiii!Bentative Swis;her m:ovad for fntroctuo:tion
of RS G6l; seconded by Mungar.
flO'ft<:fi

RG 694

CARlUBD.

By Jtep. Little - Allendll Section 16-1820 by atriking

the requirotMnt that laloction and componAation of
connty probation of!icsr9 sh4ll be don<i in

4ccordanc« with ths provi~ions of the Merit system.

!IO'l'lON,

Motion mads by Repressntativo Hunger to introduce
RS 694; aecondsd by !ngru.
Motion OJ>P0906 by Swichar.
CARRIED by 11.11jodty.

l10Tl011

RS 669;

By P.,,p~•aentative ifhaeler r.alates to the purpo1aa

ot local plnnning; a~ending 9eo, 67-6502 to

providQ that protection against noi;';e pollution shall
be within conditions considered as Promotion of
he4lth; gafety and general vQlfare.Hc1rIO~,

Hotion 1Md8 by Reprosentative lf!\oeler to introduce
RS 6691 eecondod by Roprsgentative Harlow.
MOTION CARRIED.
lloisat Ke11orial brnught by R"pru.,ntativ• Hosack,

Thi• fflemorial comunic4tes tha sense of the tortythird 16aho Legi• lature th4t !11der4l rov,;nue ~haring
prograll haa been valuable to the •tnt• and urges
continu~tion of the progru.
MO'r!Ol'I:

Reprfla«ntative ilo•ack l'!lOVt!d that RS 69!. be introduced;
seconded by Twilogar.

Ill FAVOR - Wheeler, Bunting, svl.1oher, Harlow,
Twilegar, Abbott, Roeeok,

OPPOSED

~

onweiler, Neider, Ingrain, Munger, Stivers.

MOTION C/\RRU:D.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT-CROSS APPELLANT CITY OF HAYDEN

2002 I 27_ 75 I I 1599-4

Page 55

LOCAL GOVEllNr-lENT COMMITTEE
M I N U '1' E! S
TIME:

1:30 P,M.

Pr.ACE :

Room 416, STATEHOUSE

DATE:

J'anuary 16, 1976

PReSENTt

Onweiler, Inqra~, ~he eler . Munger,
Stivers, Swis her, Twilegar~ ~..bhott,
Hosack ..

AllSENT:

Neider, Bunting, !larlow.

The meeting was cal led to order by Cha irman
onweiler .
RS 510

Requires all members of Boards of county Commi ssi oners
and ci ty councils to vote on all qu~stions put,

MOTION:

Motion made by Repre sentative swisher that RS 510
not be introduced and re turned to the sponsor;
Seconded by ~epresentative Munger.

amending Section 50 -705 -- brouqht by Scor esby .

MOTION CARIU!W ,

HB 362

Re l ating to county financial assistance to soil
conservation districts, amending Sec . 22-2726 to
Strike references to cler ical assistance,

MOTION :

Motion made by Representative Swisher to
move it to t he floor to be placed on Gene ral
Orders for considerati on and runendm.ent.
Seconded by Twilegar . (to be carried by Munger)
MOTION CARRIED:

HB 372

RS 629 brough t by Representati ve P.ollifield
would repeal that section of !daho Code which reqµires
t he various counties to p rovide adequate quarter s
for the personnel . of the Department of Health and
Welfare.
Now Ull 372 ,

MOTI ON:

Motion made by Representative Abbot t that the bill
be put on the floor wi t h do pass.
Seconded by Representative Stiv~rs. (Hol li field to carry)
MOTION CAR.RI ED ,

HJI 360

Providinq that drafting Mylar may be used for plats
offered fo r record. (Stivers to carry.)

MOTION:

Motion made by Representa tive Swishe r tha t HB 360
be sent to t he desk with a do pass. soconded
by !ngram. (Stivers to carry)
MOTION CARRIED.

Relating to self-governing powers of ci ties: amcndinry
section 50 -3 01 to provi de that ci tics may cxcn::inc and
perform all f uncti on~ of local aelf-govcrnmcnt.
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LOCl\L GOVEJlN!IE:IT COHMITT:::E

MI N U T E S
TIME:

1:30 P.M,

- JANUARY 28, 1976

PLACE:

ROOM 416, STI\TEIIOUnE

Pl\ESENT:

Onweiler, Mrs. Neider, Ingram, \·/heeler, Bunting,
Munger, Stivers, Swishe.-, Harlow, 'fwilaqar, Abbott,
Hosack,

GUESTS:

ooan Huntsman, Max Yost, Floyd Dacker, Russell Bishoo,
Eddie BlinKo, Petar S. t·7ilson, M::i.yo!:' John:."Ion of ?.:'Jncrt,

Elmer Shank, Gordon Thatcher, Bob Leeright of AP,
Richard Charnock of UP, Bert Martin repre,;enting Utah
Power.
·
Meeting was called to order by Chairman onweiler at
l:36 p.m.
MOTION:

Motion made by Representative Swisher to approvo the
minutes of the January 26, 1976 Local Government Committee meeting; seconded by Ingram.

RS

By Davidson -- relating to electric service furnished by
cities, ~manding Ch. 3, 'l'itle Gt by adding a new
section - 51-33Jn, providing method of compensation
to cooperative.

lda:10

MOTION CARRIED.
682

Messrs. Floyd Decker, Peter B. Wilson, Mayors Johnson
and Shank discussed the rneri ts of the bill at s0111¢
length and Mr, Gordon '!'hatcher, Attorney for the
Idaho Cooperative Utilities Association gave a lengthy
speech against the legislation.
MOTION:

Motion was made by Representative Abbott to '!'able the
bill: seconded by Representative Munger.
ltarlow,

Neider, Ingrl!llt, Bunting, Hunger, Stivers,
Twilegar, Abbott, !losack.

NAYS,

Wheeler, swisher.

AYES:

MOTION CARRIED,

RS 853

By TWilegar - concurrent Resolution providing a statement of legislative findings regarding the • 1902"
portion of St, Alphonsus.

MOTION:

Motion made by Representative Stivers to introduce
this Resolution; seconded by Harlow.
MOTION CARRIED.

HB 420

By Wheeler~ To change fiscal year of cities and counties
to October 1 through September lO.
Chairman Onweiler suggested that this bill be postponed
. until 2'oclock on Monday, February 2, giving everyone
an opportunity to consider it more fully.
All agreed to this suggestion.
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LOC/\L GOVEllN!ENT COMM!'r'ft'.E

'!'I!'!!'::

2 ?.~. N~dnesd~Y, February 4, 1976.
!tOOt: HG ST!.TF:HOlJSE

onwe.ilcr, .t:igrru11, ":¥heeler, Suntinq, ~unqcrf
St.ivcr,::. 1 Swisher, Harlow: Abbott, · nosacY..,

Twilegar~
GOESTS:

,Jean Ura..ngct, ittorney \Jancr,:11 's Office; Bct.tba:ra ny~r,
t,,;,:v I Boi:!e; j{i:3 We,:,ther:Jy, A~~oci.:ttion o:' Ic"ia!'-io Ci t.i~:..;

J .. Wo!Jbt Assoc\ntiv:n ')~ Itluho Citie~; Floyd A.
O~ck-cr, A11:;oci.ati.nn of 'Cd.a..h.o Citl:!-s:, .J~ff S01:1.1rd, :\~cID-1'V;
Rogt2r Sni.:.Jc-r, O' of .!r D.P~A .. R.; Donna noo, PoczitP.llo
City Council; Ann Han5en, LW"!; ,Jel\n L.:i.ngrill L\1Vi.:.

De.an H-:J.nt~:aan 1 IA.CC; A.rthur t. Smith, City Attor.aGy,
Idaho Falls,
Meeting wa3 called to o:r<!er nt 2:10 p.itL by Chairman

onweile:r.
,10.1n Uranga o! the Attorney Genei:al •" Office presented
an opinion fi:011 that of!icr1 .,n/1 a swm..,ry of the

quoation~ pre!entsd, analysis and conchrn i..ong.

Cop tos

of the opinion, Ho. 76-3, wera made i,vaila.ble to ~l:e
,.elll!:>en of th" co!lll'Ai.ttee.
11:r. A:rthn:r Slllith, City /\ttorney for Idaho Falls,
apoke in h.vor of the bill, axplainlnq his views
on wuttto:rs ot local concern in Idaho l"alls.
Jay Webb spoke in favor of the Bill for the

Allsociation of Idaho Citi,a: Donna Boe, Pocatello
City Council also snokc in tavor of th" bill;
t'loyd [)Qcker, ,Tim Weatherby also spoke in favor

ot the bilL
MOTIO!';:

Motion ~ade by Reor0gcntativ0 tnqraJn to hold the
Bill in !:O:r'Jli ttee for further colltdd1.tratl,on; Seconded by

Representative S~ishe:r.
NO'l'!Oll C/\RRiilD.
ltS 852

SuhMitted by Little for tho counties -- RS 852

vould 11111end Section 25-2801 to give the county
co-.i1sionerA the aothorlty to provitl~ for acounty dog lican~Q t~x.
l!OTION:

Motion 111ad0 by Reor.,aentative \fh<taler that RS 352
be referr2d for printing: seconded by Reprasentative
Svisher.
HOT!ON Cl\RR1£D,

RS 863

Sy Whil,;,ler • Granting authority to make payroll <!<1duction5
for any purpose approved by oity council upon written
approval by individual emp1oyQc, (amend9 Sec. 50-1016)

l«JTION:

Motion made bv rtfforcsontative Svishnr to introduce
RS 863; $Qcondcd by Rcprc~entative ~bbott.

MO'f!ON CARRIED•

(Stivers voting "No,")

hr
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PAGE 2 - MINUTES - LOCAL GOVERNMENT C01ll4ITTEE Ml!:ETING
Fei.n;uar1 ,i, ·1976.

RS

864

MOTION,

By Wheeler - relating to audits of city finances,
amending Seo. S0-1010 to provide annual audits.
Motion made by Representative Swisher that this
RS be held for further study1 Motion seconded
by Harlow.
MOTION CARRIED.

3 I 45

!),Ill,

Motion was made by Representative Bunting to adjourn;
Seconded by Ingram,
MOTION FAILED.

MOTION:

Motion made by Reoresentative Munger to appoint a
sub-committee to study the following RS numbers
RS 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 8711, 871, 872, and
873; Seconded by Stivers, which will then be
brought to the committee for further consideration.
(Subcommittee members - Wheeler, Chair.; Munger & Hosack)
MOTION CARRIED.

ADJ'OURNMENT1Motion made by Wheeler, to Adjourn; seconded by Stivers.
MOTION CARRIED.
Meeting adjourned at 4100 p.m.

.
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T
I

M!HOTES

Ul!E:

TV.:SDA!, FEBRUARY 14, 1976.

PP.EStNTt

onw«il~r, Neider, Ingr~~r Wh~~lcr, Buntinq 1
Munger; Stivers, S>wiaher,.. ?..1.tr:lc"'; T-«ilega:t: t:to~ack.

GUESTS:

SOJiG. Grays.on, (!l)~R: H .. A.. Mct-tur:ra:y, Uriitsd Trani:mort~tion

Union; Lille Ravmond, t!nit"-d '!'ran~Dortat:ion tlnion;
Ja.caz B. Ba:rhAm, S.alf; £.L .. 3utlC::, trPJUl, Special A.1:f&nt;
Ji• ~leathe:r!Jy, Aa~octAtion of !daho Citi,es.

Meeting called to or~cr by Ctaim~n onweiler ~t 3:00 P.M.
Kl'!'IOII:

Motion made by Repres.autativ~ S\,i!!her that the minutes

of th• rebruarv 20, 1976 bo approvdd; seeonUeQ by
Repre•antative Neider.
HCJ'?IOII CARR!ED.
!IB 636

By l!nnger - Rdatinq to jurisdicticn oc plnc.,111er1t o!

atop signs at raiiro•d croasinqs~
Mr.Grayson ot the Union Pacific Railroad Cot1pany spoke
vith regard to this proPoHd legislation, op9oai:1q its
paeaage. B& mtatea that the lav a5 it ia now on ths
book• ia a good law and does not recoa,,iand that it b$
changed. Mr. McMurray alao apoka, giving hi~ r1111Gona
for oppollition to thh bill. Ue prc:ent•d figures
aupporting his vi•w5, copi&B or which are attache1.
Meaars. Barba• and Remand also exoraa~ed their vi~ws
against the proposed legislatio1i. Hot!oo "'•do by llepreoantative Stivers that US 636
be held for further study; s•conded by Representative
Ingram,

88 42l
HO'l'ION:

By Swisher - Relating to &elf-governing pow.,rn ot oities.

Representative Ingra111 moved that ilB 02 be a"nt to

th" desk vith a "do pau• recca:,,!!ndation: 5econded
by Repr~~•ntativa Swisher.
MOTION Ci\R!UED,

118 644

By Harlow - to provid,;, tha Board of County Co•iasioncn
ot a countv ~ftY conv&y real property,""ned by county to
local historical society.

HOTioll,

Reprsatentative Wheeler f\\0\'•<1 that HB 64( be !(t;nt to
the da•k with 'do pa.a:=• reca11:Gendatiot1; Seconded
by Harlow.
1

MO'rION CARRIED,

__________ _____ _
,.
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MINIJ'l'ES - FEBRUARY 24, 1976

HB

By onweiler - relating to taxing districts within
cities; and adding new section to provide new taxing
districts within cities.

638

Representative Swisher moved that l!B 638 be sent .to
desk with •do pass• recommendation, seconded by

MO'I'ION:

Representative Wheeler.

SUBS'l'I'.t'trrE

MO'I'ION

Representative Munger made a substitute motion that HB
638 be sent to the desk without recommendation;
Seconded by Hosack.

MO'l'IO!f CAAAIED.

' BB 637

Gines - This bill would remove the irrigation
companies• power to place a lien on properties not
having water delivery available to them.

By

Representative Gines explained this bill and answered
questions presented by mern!:>ers of the committee,
MO'.t'ION,

Representative Munger moved that HB 637 be held until
the next meeting of the Local Government Committee,
'l'hursday, February 26; seconded by Representative
· swisher.
MO'l'ION CARRIED.

MEETING APJOURNED at 4:45 P,M,

,7

.

;fj!{Z
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1976

HOUSE PRINTING AND LEGISLATIVE EXPENSE COMMITTEE
MINUTES

2nd Regular Session
Idaho Legislature

'-~

- - - ~.........:...- -- -- - - --

- - --------·--St
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HOUSE PRHITWG t.t LEIHSLATIVE EXPEIISE COMMITTEE
FORTY-THIRD LEGISLATURE - Second Sess1nn

"

The Printing Committee met in Room 311 at 2:00 PM on January 21, 197n.
PRESENT:
MOTION:

All Members
Mr. Johnson moved that the previous minutes be apnroved,
seconded by Mr. Brooks. The motion was carried.

The Chairman reported that he had met with Senator Darker yesterda_v to
discuss nr1nt1na bills with a r!F.W SECTION. The method used now when addinn
a new section to an existin~ lawis to orint !!fil:!. SECTION and underline the.
ad~ed section, The Senate feels that ft fs unnecessary to underline the
new section. It was the concurrence of the committee that the hills should
he continued to be printed with underline of new sections.
MOTION:

Mr, Swisher moved that the Prfntinq Committee go on record of
following existint or1nting methods of underlining, seconded hy
Hr, Hale. The mo ion was carried,

There was discussion that all new material was not underlined in a hill. '1r.
Hosack cited H 418 as an example, stating that it was an entirely new section.
HJM 12, RELATlNG TO THE REENACTMENT OF FEDERAL REVENUE SHARING, was presented
by Mr, Munger.
MOTION:
HJM 12

Mr. Munger moved that HJM 12 be rfnted,
seconded by Mr. Hosack. The mot on was carried,

H 407. RELATING TO THE HEAD TAX. REPEALINr. SECTIONS 57-lllO, 63-3082, 63-30P3,
63-3084. 63-3085 AND 63-3086, IDAHO CODE. was presented hy Mr. Brooks.
MOTION:
H 407

Mr. Brooks moved that H 407 be printed,
seconded hy Mr. Hale, The motion was carried.

H 408, RELATING Tn THE DISBURSEMENT OF A PORTION OF THE MPIERAL LEASING R()YALTIES TO COUUTIES IMPACTED BY EXTRACTION OF MINERALS, was nresented by Mr.
Swisher.
MOTION:
H 40A

Mr. Swisher movet1 that 11 41'18 he orinted,
secondP.d by Mr, Brooks. The mot1on was carried.

H 409, PROVIDHlr. FOR THE ORGMIIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE ArlD TAXATillN,
was nresented hy Mr. Harlow.
MOTION:
II 409

Mr, Harlow moved that H 409 be orfnted,
seconded by Mr. Swisher, The motion was carried.

H 410, RELATING TO THE STATE TAX COMMISSION; AMENDINt; SECTI01I 63-501, IDAHO CODE,
BY STRIKING CERTAIN POWERS OF THE STATE TAX COMMISSIOrl; MID AMEUOIIIG SECTIO'.I 63506, IDAHO CODE, BY PROVIDINr. FOR APPOINTMCNT OF A CHAIRMAN OF THE TAX COMMISSI0/1
BY THE GOVERNOR AND STRIKING CERTAIN Pm/ERS OF THE TAX COMMISSION ANO TRAtlSFERRHlr.
THOSE POWERS TO THE CHAIRMAN OF SAID COMMISSION, was presented by Mr. Munqer. It
was stated that H 410 was a Governor's bill,

1/21/7/'i
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MOTI0N:
H 410

Mr, Munqcr moved that H 410 be orinted,
seconded t,_v Mr, Swisher, The motion wa~ carried with Mr, Brooks
votinCJ 'nay,•

H 411, !1EL/\mm TO TflE AW1HOLISM MID ltlTOXICAT!Otl TREATt1ENT /\CT, was
presented t,y Hr. Wh~eler,

t·!nTIOtl:
H 411

11rs. nunt1nq moved that H 411 be orinted,
seconded h_v Mr. 11~le, The motion was carried.

H 412, q[lATHfr, T0 LICEtlSHJr. OF DRIVERS; AMEMomr, SECTIOtl 4~-316, IOi\Hf)
CODE, PRovrornr, FOR DEMONSTRATION OF ABILITY Tn EXERCISE ORDUIARY MID RE/\sm1ABLE CONTROL ()J:' A tlOTOR VEIIICLE TO l3E /\T THE DISCRETIOM OF THE E:WmlER,
was. nresentcd t,y Mr, Hale,
HflT!mf:
f-1 it 12

Mr. llale moved t'1at H 412 he nrinted,
secondprl h.v Mr. Hosacr. The motion was carried,

H 413, q[L/\T!'.lr, Tn i::'EES Pr..ID FOR MOTOR VEHICLE TRIP PERMITS; I\MErmrnr. SECTl'l'I

4~-1?.11, !MW! CODE, Tn !'Ir.REASE NONRES!DE'·IT rt~ flOUR TRIP PERfHT FEES
FLECT PICREASE!l S17.ES MID HEMHTS, was oresented hy Mr. Hale,
MOTimt:
H 413

·"

,n RE-

Mr. P.ale moved that fl 413 t>e r,rfnted,
seconded 1:-y Mr, Swisher. The motion was carried.

H 414, RELAWlr, TO THE llEVOCATION AND SUSPEUSIOII OF DRIVERS' LICENSES; AME'IDi nr,
SECTIOtl 49-330, IDAHO CODE, OY DEFINHlll THE mm "VIOLATI0tl 11 TO MEAN rn1AL
CONVICTION Ofl A CHARr.E INVOLVIrlA A MOVHIG TRAFFIC VIOLATIOU, was presented hy
Mr, flale.
MOTiml:
H 414

Mr. Ila 1e moved that fl 414 be printed,
seconded by Mr. Harlow. The motion was carried.

H 415, RELATiftr. TO EXP!RATIOtl OF ORIVERS' LlCl:tlSES; AMEtlDHtr. SECTION 49-322,
IDAHO CODE, TO STRIKE PROVISIONS RELATiflG TO THE AUTOMATIC RENEWAL OF Ari IDAII()
OPERATOR'S LICErlSE TO PERSO~IS SERvrnr, HI THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES,
was oresented by Mr. Hale.
MOTION:
H /\JS

Mr. Hale moved that H 1115 ho printed,
seconded by Mr. Orooks. The motion was carried.

H 4Hi, ~ELATPlr, rn TESTI~II', 13LflOD OF BREATH OF VICTIMS Ill MOTOR VEHICLE ACCI01.:'ITS; /1.~Ennt'lri SECTION 49-1016, IDAHO CODE, BY PROVIOI~lr, THAT TESTS SHALL 13E
ORT!IPIF.O F~OH 51,RVIVI'lt. MOTOR VEHICLE OPERATORS INVOLVEn IN MOTOR VEl!ICLE ACCinEMTS FATAL Tn OTHED.S, was nresented !ly Mr. Male.

winn•1:
H 416

Ir

!Ar, ftale Moved that H 416 be Dr1nted,
seconded hy Mr. Munoer. the motion was carried.

H 417, RELATINr~ TO LOCAL rMPROVEMENT DISTRICTS FOR !RRIMIITIOH PURPOSES; AME:ID[Nr, SECTWI 50-1706, IDAHO CODE, TO PROVIDE THAT COUNTIES M/\Y CR[!ITE LOCAL
IMPqovEME~IT DISTRICTS TO CONSTRUCT IRRIMTIOfl SYSTEMS MlD TO PROVIDE THAT
LCOAL IMPROVEMENT DISTRICTS Sft/\LL NOT CONTAIN TRACTS OF FIVE ACRES OF MORE WITHOUT THE WRITTEN COtlSErlT OF THE OWNER, was presented by Mr. Harlow.

- 2-
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MINUTES

LOCAL GOVl'.i!::t~MENT & TJ\.XAT ION

SECOND REGULAR SESSION

FORTY-THIRD .LRGISLl\'l'URE
The LOCAL GOVE: kt~MENT AND TAX1'.'l'IO.~ COM;'\UTTEE met Wednesday, March

10, 1976, at 8: 30 a.m, All members being prczent, the Chai r man
called tlle meeting t.o or der.
Their we r e many visitors to the
commttoe, some of those were Carol M. Dick, Washington County Assessor;
Dick Greener, Home Builders ttssociation; Pat llarwood, I dah o ll.s1,,_;ciutic-n,
of Commerc,1 and Industry: Pnul Ennis , Attorni:;y, Asso . ICI, Jim \'ieatherL
AIC; l'lip Kleffner, Ada County Cormnissioners; Bill Schroeder, Ada
County Assessors; J. I, . Clark, Attorney; A. L. Smi th, City Atto rne y
of Ida ho Fa lls,
H 593 - The purpose of t his bill is t o give property owners three y ea r ::;

to pay the incre ased taxes when taken into the ci t y by anne:s:atkm.
Mr, Smith, City JH:torney for Idaho Falls, told the col!lll\ittee that
the city of Idaho Falls is agains t t his bi ll, because i t i s rather
complicat;z,d bookkeeping. When these areas are taken into the city,
there i.s a great expense right away with such items as getting streets
up to stand ard, sewers, garbage colle c ting , and e t c. This is why we
ne e d the truces no,1 because we start our obligation right away.

Representa t ive Harlow f avors thi s leg islation beca use i f s oftens the
effects on annexation and does hope that the committee will send it

out.
Flip I<leffner , Ada County Commissioner, told the committ.Je that the
Ada County ·rreasurers office is against this bill. Dick Greenc,r,
reprcscmt.:.,"g Homo Builders As sociatio n, told the cowmittae that they
favor this b ill, feel that :i.t would be a good check and balance bill.
Senator H,u:tvig,mn moved, to send H 5S3 to the f l oor with a do-p :.rn s .

The motion failed for l a ck of a second. Senator Hartviqflen moved,
Senator 'l'acl{e seconded, to son.d H 593 to the floor without recommendation.

'I'he motion cm:riad five ayes, four nos.

Cobbs - aye
Summers - no
l<lein - rm

Watkins - no
Little - no
Saxvik - aye
Tacke - aye

Ha:i:tvig scm - aye
Judd --a ye
H 2
Mr. Wr.H,the rhy to ld the comm:i.ttc!?! that tl,e p u q :os<1 of thi ,;
lil1:r-ru to 1x-.:1r.t. 1:.1 limited form of lo,;«l seJ.Z -- government ,mtilr,1:ity to
I oc,hc, r:i tics.
Cui. ,:~ntly, :!'. S:k:!,.;, ' s ci ti.,~0 may f!zl,:i: c ise or,lyc::hose po•,.•err;
and vod:o i.m o n.1.y tho,:.c i::.mc:t.ions Hpc c:i. f: i cally w::::ntionod in the
Conn t i tuti on of tho Sta to of Id.1ho or j,n the Id <:!10 Co"('.
Hr. Wfrntho.th
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said t!u1t t he cities should h e given t:ln:me a uthori t ies th.a t ,, re not:
'fl'illlted by th e Cons ti t uti on dnd the Idaho code.
Wi. th the p.;:u,aagc of
II 422 t he Legis luture would give them home rule, then we c.nn com,:;

back and propose t o the Legislat ure a re as we feel that are too
restrictive or in conflicl the Code.
This is a most limi ted form ot
home rule. Does not provi de areas; be yond t he con trol o f the Legislatu,.
Sena t or Ri s ch asked where in the Code does i t l i rai t them f rom lfvyi r,cJ
any t axes? There were some amend."llimts suggested to help vith thla

problem.
!? a t Harwood, Caldwood, Associ a ti. o n o f Idaho Comnerce & Industry , said
that this bil.l could be very far reaching. l?aul Ennis, attorney for
the Asso ci a ti on o f I daho Commerce and Indu;¾try p r ese n ted a te s timony
and it i s attached to this set of minutes.

The mee t ing was i n recess until noon .
'!'he Commi t tee took up again a t 12:10 with a l unch meeting.

We

conti n:1ed talking about ll 422 .

H 422 Mr . Smi t h , Idaho Palls City httorney , told t he commi ttee
that the city of I daho Falls feels that the c ities should be uble to
pas s an ordnance

to take care of the problems that their cities have .

"1r. Ennis and Mr Greener b rour;tit amer, dments that the y ,ioul d like to

have the committee place on H 422. Mr. Decker, AIC, hopes that the
committee 1<10uld not place H 422 in the 14th Order. Mr. Male Yos.t
t old the c ommi tte e t hat t hese two amendments would make the bill a litt
mora liveable to the .l\ssociution of Idaho Taxpayers. 'I'he aml!)ndment on:t
act~ to strength it but doa s not go far enough t o gi ve !aaho a good
stro ng Horne r ule. I ( l1r~. Yost} beli.cves thnt I daho does have a good
basis for home rule now.
Sena t or Kl ein moved, Sena t o·, sur:,mara cecond, to send H 422 to t be f:loor
:r."f! Con·1ncn C1n t.ion.
Sr.\r1rt.1:.or r.lr:.ch mau(l c1 ::tt-n:; st. l . tu t <, motion to
iwnd H 422 to the Pourtec1ti:.!1 Ort:10.r tor ."u-nenca:K<nt,
Sen ,itor Wi'l f luns
sec:onc(i;d.-"t1ie..·i;\o"tion-~·-···-,i·fie-··mobon was tie d .:mcl-fai fe d .
ue'niltorsCobbs
Sumn:cirs ; 7 ffe :Gi-;""1fo'.xv!k and- '. l'acke voted no. Sena tors Watkins, Litt l e,
Risch, Hai:tvigson .-:md Judd voted aye. 'l'J1Q m,tin 1I1Qj;j,.QJLl;i!rri nd with

withoUt

~..IL..a:,'f~l:'.c.,_._illJ..,t ...t ~ ) ( ~ fl..._ _ _

Cobbs - aye
Suminers - aye
Klcd.n - aye

Watkins - no
Little - no
Rir;ch - no
S0xv ik . . . ayc1
'l' a eke

- ayo

H,, i:"l:vi <Jl'l!'n - v.y~
J·t:dd - no
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H 663 - The purpose of this bill is to grant city and county voters
tlie"Ireedom to authorize their city or county governments to adopt
and implement a sales and use tax.
In doing this it was felt that
their could be a relief in the property taxes. Mr. Decker told the
committee that H 663 would give the local voters the authority to
place a tax on themselves. The property tax would rise less rapidly
with the use of a city sale tax. Senator Hartvigsen moved, Senator
Summe rs seconded to send H 663 to the floor with a do-pass 1:acommendmon:--senator Watkins made a subst1 tute r.\otl.on to s end H ffi to the
llocil· without r e comm~ndation. Senator Judd seconded the motion,
fhe motion faiie d . Those voting no were Senators Cobbs, IClein-;-Littlo
Risch, Saxvik, and Hartvigsen. •rhose voting ave were Senators Su."tl!llers ,
Watkins, Tacke, Judd. The main motion failed:----¥hose voting no were
Senator Cobbs, Klein, Watkins, Risch, Li tfTe";°Saxvik. Those -voting
!l! were Senators Summers, Tacke, Hartvigsen, and Judd.
H 598 The purpose of this bill is to let the Mayor and City Council
act as a urban renewal agency. This bill would provide for the removal of urban renewal commissioners for inefficiency, neglect of duty,
or misconduct ;,n office; and provide that tho governing body of any c i\
may appoint and designate itself to be the Board of Commissioners of
the Ur ban Renewal Agency. Senator Hartvigsen moved, Senator Risch
seconde1d, to send H 598 to the floor without recommon'°1ation. •rfi'e motj_,_
carried unaniiiiouslv.

a 535a

- Mr, Huntsman, Clerks and Commissioners, told the committee
that 24 counties are at their maximum current expense levy. This bill
would remove the district courts from the current expense levy and
place a 2 mill increase in taxes for the courts alone. Sena t or Summer:
moved, Senator Judd seconded, to send H 535a to the floor'wI"t1l a do-p ~·

Tli'e motion"""ralTed.

,_ _

Cobbs - no
Summers - aye
Klein - no
Watkins - no
Little - aye

Risch - no
Saxvik - no
Tacke - aye
Hartvigsen - no
Judd - aye
H 534 - This bill would require the assessor to furnish the tai:payer
nth-personal property reporting fr, rms in duplicate . Senato:.:- Summe 1:3
moved; Senator Risch seconded to send II 534 to the floor with '"i1do.:pa s:·
recommendation. 'l'he motion carrled unan1moui.;l'{,
- --··

H 558 - This hill amend :i the curr ent st.;.tutc by removing reference to
apal:b .cul&r mo e ting of the Board of Comu1i s1.;ion0 rs me:cting u:; a Board
of J~ql1<\li Zlltion, then:by n.ffor.ding the ta>~f.·iiyer a tim~ for appo al from
the s ubsc:qutmt Board o: .E:qua liz ntion: ~"'.:..ll'.~.t.or Ris ch ...E~~~-~ .J~5',:.1.'!.~!£!:
Snmrn£E;-~~on oe d to :-, end our H 55 8 w1. tl!.._i!,_~~~~
-~-~_£~mnncnd nl2·.'.?~·
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The motion carried unaninrouslv.
H 605 - This bill provides a taxpayer with an appeal process on an
assessment made after the meeting of the County Commissioners meeting
as a subsequent board of eguali?.ation in November. Senator Risch move d
Senator Summers seconded, to send H 605 to the floor with do - pass.
fhe motion carried.
II 606 - Mr. Clerk told the committee that this amendment institutes a
certification program for appraisers. Senator Saxvik moved, Senator
Risch seconded, to send H 606 to the floor with a do-pass recommendatic.
The motion c1;1rr1.ea.
Chairman Cobbs thanked the members for coming and for giving up their
lunch hour. The meeting was adjourned.

41A./~li JI-

tl~/
KARRIB'.l" WALTERS, SECRETARY

~/4

A

(D,...AtJL<J.~
.-- -

~H1:rru1AN
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ADA COUNTY
STATE OF" IDAHO
MARJORIE: JCNACBQN, TREASURER

BOISE, IDAHO

March 10, 1976

Ada County Board of Commissioners
Ada County Courthouse
Boise, Idaho
Re:

House Bill No, 593

RELATING TO THE IMPACT OF PROPERTY TAXES
FROM ANNEXATION; PROVIDING A STATEHENT
OF PURPOSE: AMJ;NDING CHAPTER 22, TITLE 63
IDAHO CODE, BY nm ADDITION 01" A NEW
SECTION 63-2220A, IDAHO CODE, TO PROVIDE
THAT THE IMPACT OF CITY ANNEXATION ON
CERTAIN CITY PROPERTY TAX LEVIES SHALL BE
SPREAD ACROSS THREE YEARS; DECLARING AN
EMERGENCY AND PROVIDING FOR RETROACTIVE
APPLICATION.
Gentlemen:
The projected impact of House Bill No. 593 would be consj_derable on the
work load of this particular office. Our employee increase could run at a
maximum of 50%; and ac a minimum of 20%, depending upon the method chosen to
imple1ttenl: this bill. Also, the above percentages are only the increase in
the treasurer's office employees and do not take into account the additional
burdens placed on data proccsi;ing, audit:lng and assessing. It is the feeling
of the Idaho County Treasurers that this bill would create a bookkeep-lng
nightmare, with very little savings to the taxpayers after the expenses that
would be involved in complying with this bill.
Very truly yours,
,; . MA!$-j_>R~E
J~SSN

h/4:;'.:' ,'

-

.

~/!./·(,,(,, '-'

4y11'liJrY,.:;" • annin
Chief lleputy
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P. 0 . BOX 359
SIMPLOT 6\/ILl>ING
BO ISE, H)AHO e:rnn
P HO:.lli. 208 • 343- 111,;9

March 9, 1976

Th e Honorab l e Ly l e Cobb s
Chai r man , Se nate Lo c al Governmen t
and Ta xaLlon Co,;nn.i. t t:ee
Ida ho Stat e Sena t e
Sta t e.house
Bo i s e, ID 8372 0
Dea r Senat or :

Considerable intere st ha s be en expre ssed in HB 422, now be f or e
your Committ ee , by membe r s of t hi s As soc i ation .
Concern cen ter s in uncer tainty a s to exa c t ly what new au tho r i ty
HB 422 wi ll conve y to cit y gov e r nments, if ena cted , and how
far-rea ch i ng it could become .
Spons ors of the bi ll have prov i ded a ssuran ces as t o the i n tent
of t he mea s ur e , bu t disturbing ,loubts l ing er and r ema in unanswered. Fur t her, these mi s giv ings have been intens ified by
t he opinim, . . . . cop y enclos ed . ... fro m a ttorney Paul Enn is .
It i s our bel ief that HB 422 should be amende d a s a ttorney
Enn i s st.;.gg es t s . Addit i onally, we be l ieve o the r amendments
should be prepare d t o make spec if ic the new powers HB 422 is
t o convey.

We urge t h i s cour se of action by your Commit tee.

Encl .
cc : Membe r s of Sen ate Loc al Govt. Committe e

'•.<~
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March 13, 1976

T01

Local Government & Taxation committee

FROM:

Senator Cobbs

SUBJECT:

Senate Bill 1338

Shall the Local Government & Taxation Committee recommend
concurrence in the House Amendments to Senate Bill 1338?
YES

Cobbs

summers
Klein

Q_'L

40th
,xi'f{"
y

Watkins

Little
Risch
Saxvik
Tacke

Hartvigsen
Judd

NO

lli

p;J~
~

~

.~-'.fit_L
~

-4rJ_
,.._

7tx
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EXHIBIT B: OPINION OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON IDAHO CODE§

50-301

Note: This opinion evaluates the statute before the 1976 amendment. It does not address the
effect of the amendment. This is the opinion referenced in the legislative history.

OPINIONSOFTHEATTORNEYGENERAL
7 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 7 6-3

.1anuary 20, 1976

SUMMARY OF ATTORNEY GENERAL
OPINION NO. 76-3
BECAUSEOFTHEEXTRAORDINARYLENGTHOFATTORNEY
GENERAL OPINION NO. 76-3, WE HAVE FURNISHED TIDS
SUMMARY OF THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED, ANALYSIS AND
CONCLUSIONS FOR THOSE WHO MAY NOT NEED THE DETAILED LEGAL AUTHORITIES.

WAYNE L . KIDWELL
ATTORNEY GENERAL

QUESTIONS PRESENTED:
1. What powers are conferred upon Idaho citie s by Article 12, Section 2,
Idaho Constitution, and to what extent is Idaho a " home rule " state ?
2 . What powers are c onferred upon Idaho cities by Sections 50-301 and
50-302, Idaho Code?

I
I
1

l

l

l

I

j

,J
1

3. Does Article 7, Sectio n 6 of the Idaho Constitution, when coupled with
Section 50-302, Idaho C od e , constitute a bro~d gra nt o f legislative po wer to
Idaho cities to asses s and collect taxes on a local-option basis?

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION:
uHome rule" is, in esse nce, the right and power of self-governme nt in affairs
of local concern which may be granted to cities and countie s either by the state
constitution or by state statutes. In the absence of a grant of home rule powers,
a city or county is ine rely an arm of the state, subjec t to absolute control by the
legislature.
1. Article 12, Section 2 of the Idaho Constitution constitutes a direct,.
constitutional grant of home rule power to Idaho cities and Counties in police
power matters . But, consistent with the language of Article 12, Sec tion 2 of the
Idaho Constitution and Idaho case law, the exercise of local police power is
subject to two major limitations. First, the polic e power may be exercised only
within the territorial limits of the city or county. Second, the exercise o f police
powers through city ordinance or county resolution must not conflict with its
c harter or gene ral laws. Such general laws include those pr~m~lgated by the
United States Constitution, federal statute s, the Idaho Constitution and Idaho
s tate statutes.

In contrast, Ida ho cities and counties do not enjoy co n stitutional h o me
powe r s in local matters wruch fall outside the realm of local po lice powers.
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Thus, Idaho cities and counties must look to enabling legislation to validate all
actions, such as the raising ofrevenue and the making oflocal improvements,
which fall outside the realm of local police powers.
2. Sections 50-301 and 50-302, Ida.ho Code, are both general statutes relating to
city powers. It is the opinion of the Attorney General that neither statute grants
to Idaho cities any more power than is already conferred upon them by Article
12, Section 2 of the Idaho Constitution and by state statutes. These statutory
sections do not constitute a general grant of power to Idaho cities, but rather act
as a limitation upon the powers of cities. Thus, neither Section 50-301, Idaho
Code, nor Section 50-302, Idnho Code, can be considered a grant oflegislative
home rule regarding matters beyond the realm of police powers.
3. Article 7, Section 6 of the Idaho Constitution is a constitutional provision
which grants to the legislature the authority to invest, by law, local taxation
powers in cities and counties. It is the opinion of the Attorney General that
Article 7, Section 6 of the Idaho Constitution, when coupled with Section
50-302, Ida.ho Code, does not constitute a broad grant of legislative power to
Idaho cities to assess and collect taxes on a local-option basis for two major
reasons. First, on its face, Article 7, Section 6 of the Idaho Constitution requires
enabling legislation to invest powers of taxation in municipal corporations.
Such constitutional limitation cannot be supplanted by a general statutory
enactment, such as Section so.'302, Idnho Code. Second, based upon the
analysis of Section 50-301, Idaho Code, in response to question 2, Section 50-302,
Idaho Code, does not constitute a general grant of power to cities, and thus,
Section 50-302, Idaho Code, cannot be construed to be a law investing taxation
powers in municipal corporations.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 76•3
TO:

Mr. F. W. Roskelley

Councilman, Pocatello
President, Association of Idaho Cities

Mr. R. R. Earc!Jey
Mayor, Boise
Second Vice President
Association of Idaho Cities
1402 Broadway
Boise, Idaho 83706
Per request for Attorney General Opinion.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED:

H

: 1.'

;. ··I!
' !11

1. What powers are conferred upon Idaho cities by Article 12, Section 2,
Idaho Constitution, and to what extent is Idaho a "home rule" state?

2. What powers are conferred upon Idaho cities by Sections 50-301 and
50-302; Icl.aho Code?

··.

.,:· !

3. Does Article 7, Section 6 of the Idaho Constitution, when coupled with
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'l Section 50-302,

Idaho Code, constitute a broad grant of legislative power to

j Idaho cities to assess and collect truces on a local-option basis?

i

!·•

CONCLUSIONS:

!f

1. Article 12, Section 2, Idaho Constitution, confers upon Idaho cities con-

i stitutional "home rule" only to the extent of police power functions. As to all
t other matters, Idaho cities must look to the legislature for enabling legislation.

j

2. Sections 50-301 and 50-~02, Idaho Code, grant to cities no greater powers
~ than those expressly granted by the constitution or state statutes.
·

~

3. Article 7, Section 6 of the Idaho Constitution, when coupled with Section

~.

~ 50-302, Idaho Code, does not constitute a broad grant of legislative power to

~ Idaho cities to assess and collect truces on a local-option basis.

it

J ANALYSIS:
'£

:s
"'

Due to the confusion and ambiguity surrounding the existence of home rule
@ in Idaho, an introduction seems appropriate. As a general rule,
j

i

!.;t

'.;.

(m)unicipal corporations are political subdivisions of the state, and
in the absence of constitutional restrictions, the legislature has absolute control over the number, nature, and duration of the powers
conferred, and the territory over ~hich they shall be exercised, and
may qualify, enlarge, abridge, or entirely withdraw at its pleasure the
powers of a municipal corporation. C. Rhyne, Municipal Law §4-2, at
61 (1957). {Emphasis added.) See also, 56 Am.Jur.2d Municipal Corporations §98 (1971); 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations §107 (1949).

j

g
i'

j.

&:

"'·i
IiJi';l

:t:

Thus, municipalities generally have no inherent right of self-government or
"home rule" unless expressly granted by the state constitution or state statutes.
C. Rhyne, Municipal Law §4-2 (1957): 56 Am.Jur.2d Municipal Corporations
§125 (1971).

I
i

Notwithstanding, in many jurisdictions, state control of municipalities has
been limited by either legislative or constitutional home rule provisions. In such
jurisdictions, home rule or self-government has been granted and home rule
cities may have complete power and authority over matters of local concern,
subject to limitation only by constitutional provisions and conflicting state
statutes which deal with statewide concerns. 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations
§108b and §187 (1949); 56 Am.Jur.2d Municipal Corporations §128 (1971).

'i
.;s

I

i

'~

·"

To further aid in this discussion, another distinction which must be drawn is
the distinction between constitutional home rule and legislative home rule. As
these two types of home rule connote, under constitutional home rule a city
derives power directly from the constitution and, as a result, the power granted
is generally equal to the constitutional grant of power to the legislature. In
contrast, under legislative home rule, a city's power is derived solely from
legislative enactments, and the city is ultimately governed and controlled by
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the legislature. Stephen L. Beer in hls Idaho Law Review article entitled
"Constitutional Home Rule for Idaho Cities" succinctly states the importance of
the distinction.
The distinction between constitutional home rule and legislative home
rule is important for many reasons. First, the courts have strictly (
construed legislative grants of power in favor of the granting power. f
Constitutional grants of power, on the other hand, are construed
broadly in favor of the grantee. Second, legislative grants of power to . ·
municipal corporations are not vested rights and the legislature may
change, modify or destroy them; whereas, constitutional grants of ,
power cannot be changed or abolished except by constitutional 1'
amendment which requires direct consent of the electorate. There- ;_
fore, even though the Ida.ho Code grants broad powers to municipal
corporations very similar to the grant of power found in Article 12,
Section 2 of the Idaho Constitution, the power granted by the Jegisla- F
tu.re does not have the inherent protections afforded constitutional
provisions. In addition, in construing grants of power, the courts will
strictly interpret them in favor of the legislature. 8 Idaho L. Rev. 355, at
355 (1972). (Citing, 1 Dillon, Municipal Corporations 449 {5th Ed. 1911);
2 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations 804-806 (3rd Ed. 1966); Id . at 15;
Idaho Code §50-302.)

l

t_
'_·
.·.

Assuming a constitutional home rule provision exists, a final determination
which must be made is whether or not the constitutional provision is self.
executing. If a constitutional home rule provisions is self-executing, no action
by the legislature is necessary to make it effective. That is, the provision itself
provides a basic source of local government power. I Antieau, Municipal
Corporation Law §3.01 (1975). In contrast, constitutional home rule provisions
which are not self-exacting require legislative enactments pursuant to constitutional mandates in order to make home rule effective. 1 Anieau, Municipal
Corporation Law §3.01 {1975); 1McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations
§3.2lb (3rd Ed. J. Dray 1971).
In sum, the following inquiries must be made. First, is Idaho a home rule
state, and if so, to what extent? Second, if a home rule state, is Idaho governed
by constitutional home rule or legislative home rule? Third, if governed by
constitutional home rule, does Idaho have a self-executing home rule provision?

,I

·1

1. Regarding the issue of whether or not Idaho is a home rule state, a review
of the authorities and Idaho case law raises ambiguities and differences of
opinion. The Specific constitutional provision in question is Article 12, Section 2
of the Idaho Constitution which states:
Local police regulations authorized-Any county or incorporated city
or town may make and enforce, within its limits, all such local police
sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with its charter or
with general laws.
Various authorities, citing this Idaho constitutional provision, unequivocally
state that Idaho, along with about thirty other states, is a constitutional home
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rule state. See, 1 Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law §3.00 (1975); Rhyne,
Municipal Law §4-3 (1957); 38 Was. L. Rev. 743 (1963). Futher, in a lengthy
analysis, Stephen L. Beer concluded, in his law journal article entitled "Constitutional Home Rule for Idaho Cities"' that Idaho does recognize constitutional home rule. 8 Idaho L. Rev. 355 (1972). In addition Antieau contends
that the constitutional home rule provisions of the Idaho constitution, 'like
California and ·Washington, among others, are self-executing and are basic
sources of local government power. I Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law,
§3.01 (1975).
From a review of these above-cited authorities, it appears that the major
reason they consider Idaho a constitutional home rule state is that the Idaho
constitutional provision is virtually identical to constitutional provisions of
California and Washington, and that the constitutional provisions of California
and Washington have been interpreted to grant constitutional hoine rule to
cities. For example, in his law journal article, Stephen L. Beer cites the 1964
edition of Antieau's treatise, wherein Antieau takes the position that Idaho
cities enjoy a direct constitutional grant of power, but, contends Antieau, the
Idaho Supreme Court has often overlooked this power when deciding cases. In
reaching his decision, Antieau relies upon the fact that Article 12, Section 2 of
the Idaho Constitution is virtually identical to the California Constitution, Article 11, Section 11, through which California cities enjoy constitutional home
rule . Antieau states:
Section 11 (of the California Constitution, Article 11) . . . provides:
Any county, city, town or township may make and enforce within its
limits all such local, police, sanitary and-other regulations as are not
in conflict with general laws. Washington's Constitution is the same,
and Idaho's would be identical but, as in some other home rule states,
the comma after "local" is omitted ... It should be perceived that
the language of these constitutional provisions could hardly be
broader. If a local charter provision or ordinance should not be classified as "police" or "sanitary," it would almost always qualify as a
"local" one, and in even more instances, it could be characterized as
.. . "other.,; 8 Idaho L. Rev. 355, at 359-360 (1972). Citing, 1 Antieau,
Municipal Corporations Law at 95, n. 7, and 100 (1964).
Based upon the above-cited provision, Beer concludes:
According to Antieau, these constitutional provisions perm.it home
rule cities to enjoy the same police power within their territorial limits
as the state has itself. Since the California and Washington constitutions provide home rule to their municipalities, and since Idaho
drafted a similar provision, it can be assumed that Idahc/s framers of
its.constitution intended to provide home rule to its cities. The Idaho
Supreme Court in State v. Robbins has adopted this view and has used
California judicial reasoning in interpreting Article 12, Section 2 of the
Idaho Constitution on other cases. 8 Idaho L. Rev. 355 (1972), at
359-360. State v. Robbins, 59 Idaho 279, 81 P .2d 1078. (1938).
The Attorney General takes issue with such general statements for two
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major reasons. First, as will be hereafter noted in the review ofidaho case law,

adistinction should be drawn between constitutional home rule only to extent
of police powers, as opposed to a comprehensive grant of constitutional home
rule in all matters of local concern, as argued by Antieau and Beer. Second,
due to differences in the Idaho Constitution as compared with the general
constitutional provisions of California and Washington relating to municipal
corporations, an across-the-board comparison cannot adequately be made.
Regarding the failure of the above-cited authorities to distinguish a limited
form of home rule to the extent of police powers from an all-inclusive form of
home rule, even Antieau, in the 1975 edition of his treatise, seems to back down
from an all-inclusive interpretation of home rule. Antieau states:
The_California Constitution provides: "It shall be competent in any
charter framed under the authority of this section to provide that the
municipality governed thereunder may niake and enforce all laws
and regulations in respect to municipal affairs, subject only to the
restrictions and limitations provided in their several charters and in
respect to other matters they shall be subject to general laws."
Another section provides: "Any county, city, town or township
may make and enforce within its limits all such local, police, sanitary
and other regulations as are not in conflict with general laws." Provisions such as these are held to mean that home rule units enjoy the
same police powers within their borders as does the State itself. "It is, of
course, undisputed," says the California Court, "that a municipality,
under Article XI, sec. 11 of the State Constitution may within its limits
exercise police powers equal in extent to those of the state."

J

I
!

;I
·I:

The Washington constitutional clause provides: "Any county, city,
town or township may make and enforce within its limits all such local
police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with general laws." Of this clause, the Washington Court has said: "This is a
direct delegation of the police power as ample within its limits as that
possessed_by the Legislature itself. It requires no legislative sanction
for its exercise so long as the subject-matter is local, and the regulation
reasonable and consistent with the general laws." The Idaho constitutional clause is virtually identical, and under it the Idaho Court has
said that home rule cities possess "full police power in affairs of local
concern." (Emphasis added . 1 Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law
\3.03, at 3-11 and 3-12 (1975). (Citing, Article XI, Section 8 and Article
XI, Section 11, California Constitution; McCay Jewelers v. Bowron, 19
Cal.2d 595, 122 P.2d 543, 546 (1942); Article XI, §11, Washington Constitution; Detamori, v. Hindley, 83 Wash. 322, 326, 145 P. 462 (1915);
State v. Musser, 67 Idaho 214, 176 P.2d 199, 201 (1946).)
A comparison of these two positions taken by Antieau reveals that in his 1964
treatise , Antieau says that the constitutional provisions ofldaho, California and
Washington grant very broad powers to municipalities. In contrast, in his 1975
edition, Antieau cites only authorities which say that the constitutional provisions ofldaho, California and Washington give a direct grant of poijce power in
affairs of local concern, as opposed to a general grant of power over all
municipal affairs. As will be shown in the analysis ofldaho case law, Antieau's
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latter position comports with the position of the Idaho Attorney General.
Regarding a comparison between Idaho, California and Washington, therj!
seems to be a danger in unequivocally saying that Idaho is a constitutional
home rule state merely because California and Washington, with similar constitutional provisions, are constitutional home rule states. First, even though
the constitutional provision allowing cities and counties to make and enforce all local police, sanitary and other regulations which are not in conflict
with general Jaws are similar in the three states, both California and Washington also include constitutional provisions expressly providing for the adoption
of city charters. In 1 McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations §3.41, at309
(3rd ed. Dray 1971), it is noted: "The method of creating a home rule charter is
usually fixed by the constitution in the states where such charters are permitted, ... " The Idaho Constitution contains no such provision relating to the
adoption of home-rule charters. Second, similarly to Idaho, there is also dispute in Washington as to whether Washington is a constitutional home rule
state.
Article 11, §5(a) of the California Constitution provides:
It shall be competent in any city charter to provide that the city
government thereunder may make and enforce all ordinances and
regulations in respect to municipal affairs, subject only to restrictions
and limitations provided in their several charters and in respect to
other matters they shall_be subject to general laws. City charters
adopted pursuant to this Constitution shall supersede any existing
charter, and with respect to municipal affairs shall supersede al! laws

inconsistent therewith. (Emphasis added.)

·

The California Constitution further specifically provides detailed methods for
establishing city charters and incorporating cities. (It should be noted that
California completely amended its constitutional provisions relating to local
government in 1970 but nonetheless, the general intent of the constitutional
provisions remains the same, and Article 11, Section 11 of the California
Constitution was merely renumbered,

In like manner, Article 11, §10 of the Washington Constitution provides that a
city with a population of20,000 inhabitants or more may "frame a charterforits
own government, consistent with and subject to the Constitution and laws of this
state, . .. " (Emphasis added. ) Article 11, §10 of the Washington Constitution
then specifically provides the procedures required to prepare and adopt each
city charter.
·
Of course, it is not absolutely necessary, in either California or Washington,
for a city to adopt a charter, pursuant to their respective constitutional provi-sions, in order to exercise all home rule powers. That is, all California and
Washington cities, regardless of home-rule charters, are granted constitutional
home rule at least to the extent oflocal police powers A home-rule charter only
makes it more difficult for the legislature to pre-empt home rule authority by
passing a general law .
In contrast to the California and Washington Constitutions, there are no
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,constitutional provisions in Idaho relating to the adoption of home rule charters. The Idaho Constitution merely provides that the legislature shall establish t
l\
general laws relating to the incorporation, organization and classification of u
cities and towns, such general laws being subject to alteration, amendment or ·
repeal by further general laws. See, Article 12, §1, Idaho Constitulion. Thus in
the absence of a comparable Idaho constitutional provision , an u;;qualified
comparison of constitutional home rule among the three states cannot adequately be made. This is not to say that California and Washington case law
may never be looked to for guidance, but rather, when used, California and
Washington cases must be qualified depending upon which constitutional
provisions the court is interpreting.

I
f

r
!

By way of further comparison between the Washington and Ida ho constitutional provisions, Antieau and Rhyne in their treatises on municipal corporations unequivocally state that Washington is also a home rule state, but an
extensive law journal article by Philip A. Trautman, Professor of Law for the
University of Washington, concludes that Washington is not a purely home rule
state.
The conclusion to be drawn is that in Washington a home rule city is
subordinate to the legislature as to any matter upon which the legislature has acted, whether it be regarded as of state, local, or joint
concern. In the event of an inconsistency, the statute prevails. However, in those instances in which the legislature has said nothing, an
analysis of interest is vital. If the subject is of paramount state concern,
some delegation of power by the legislature , express or implied, to the
municipal corporation must be found. This is likewise true in those
instances in which there is a joint state-local problem. Since the state
will be affected by any action of a municipal corporation, it is necessary that an authorization to act for the legislature be found . In those
instances in which the matter is solely of local interest, however, home
rule cities may act without a delegation from the legislature, express or
implied . To that extent the home rule prpvision is self-execl!ting. Any
other interpretation leaves the provision without meaning, and unless
and until the court clearly decides to the contrary, there is no reason to
expect such treatment. 38 Wash. L. Rev. 743, 772 (1963).
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It must be noted that this conclusion was made in reference to Article 11,
Section IO of the Washington Constitution, that provision which specifically
provides that Washington cities containing a population of20,000 inhabitants or
more may frame a charter for their own government; and, as noted above, the
Idaho Constitution does not have a comparable provision.
Notwithstanding, Trautman states that due to Article 11, §11 of the Washington Constitution, relating to police powers, a different rule applies with regard
to home rule in local police power matters.
Also requiring separate attention are the police powers of
municipalities. Here as with the powe r of eminent domain, all classes
of cities are treated bascially a like. However, whereas in the case of
the power of eminent domain no city may act without le gislative
authorization , in the case of police powers, all cities derive authority
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directly from the constitution. 38 Wash. L. Rev. 743~ 775 (1_96:~).

1
!

Trautman notes that, in Washington, Article ll, Section 11. of the W~shington
Constitution does grant cities a broad measure of power. Nonetheless, the
police powers of cities are strictly limited to their territorial boundries, and
J where a state statute conflicts with a city ordinance, the state statute always
prevails.

I

1
-j
'.j

Since none of the aforementioned authorities are completely conclusive,

-t resort must be had to Idaho case law for a determination of the stat.us of home
~~

rule for Idaho cities.

j Idaho Case Law
"3 In his law journal article, StephenL. Beer states: "The quandry whether the
constitution was intended to directly grant constitutional home rule to Idaho
; municipalities has resulted in confusing case law." 8 Idaho L. Rev . 355, 360
,; (1972). After a .lengthy analysis of most Idaho cases interpreting Article 12,
Section 2 of the Idaho Constitution, Beer takes the position that prior to 1938
1 and the case of State v Robbins, 59 Idaho 279, 81 P.2d 1078 (1938), the Idaho
:j Supreme Court did not recognize constitutional home rule. But, Beer contends
-i that, since the Robbins case in 1938, the Idaho Supreme Court has, with a few
-i exceptions, taken the position that Idaho does have constitutional home rule:

J

~

.,'l

j

It seems appropriate to take issue with Beer's position for the reason that he
does not adequately distinguish between constitutional home rule regarding
police powers , as opposed to constitutional home rule regarding all matters of
local concern. It is the position of the Attorney General that the Idaho Supreme
Court has always acknowledged constitutional home rule with regard to police
powers.

,l

Cases Involving Police Power Matters:
Since the adoption of the Idaho Constitution, there have been approximately
thirty-five appellate cases interpreting Article 12, Section 2 of the Idaho Constitution or dealing with related matters, even though Article 12, Section 2 of
the Idaho Constitution was not always discussed. (For a summary of these
Idaho cases, see Appendix A .) Of these, approximately twenty-nine cases
have dealt with the police powers of Idaho cities. Of the approximately
twenty-nine cases dealing with the police powers of cities and counties, eighteen cases expressly upheld the city or county ordinance as a valid exercise of
police power, and eleven cases held the city or county ordinance conflicted
with state law or the case was decided or remanded on other grounds.
Regarding the eighteen cases which upheld city or county ordinances, the
Idaho Supreme Court has made the following representative statements. ·1n
State v . Quang, 8 Idaho 191, 67 P. 491 (1902), the•court considered a situation
where there was both a state law and a city ordinance making battery a crime.
The court stated:
The ordinance is not in conflict, but in harmony, with the general law.
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The authority of the city to enact police regulations, and to enforce
them, where they do not contravene and general law of the state, is,
under the provisions of our constitution, beyond question. The municipal government may not take from the citizens any constitutional
rights - hr.s no power to do so - yet by the express provisions of
section 2, article 12, the power to make and enforce sanitary and police
regulations is expressly given to cities and towns. The object of the
provision is apparent, its necessity urgent. State v . Quong, supra., at
194.
In the case ofFoster's, 111.C. v . Boise City, 63 Idaho 20~. 118P.2d 721 (1941), the
plaintiff challenged ihe validity of a parking meter ordinance, and the court
ruled that such a parking meter ordinance was within the police powers of the
city. In its decision, the Idaho Supreme Court did not specifically refer to
Article 12, Section 2 of the Idaho Constitution, but did state:
The police power is a necessary concomitant to complete sovereignty
and inheres primarily in the state. The exercise of that power, within
the corporate. limits of cities and villages, has been delegated to the
respective municipalities. The full exercise of that power is one of the
governmental duties of the respective municipalities as arms of the
state, in preserving the health, safety and general welfare of the
people. Foster's, Inc. v. Boise City, supra., at 211.
·
In another case, the court considered the conviction of the defendant under a
Boise city ordinance prohibiting the drinking of intoxicationg liquor in a public
place, even though there was a state constitutional amendment ending prohibition. The court upheld the validity of the Boise city ordinance and ruled: .
Under the above constitutional provision (article 12, section 2, Idaho
Constitution) counties, cities and towns have full power in affairs of
local government notwithstanding general laws of the state defining
and punishing the same offense. (Citations omitted.)
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.. . The ordinance is not repugnant to, nor in conflid with; the statutes, neither does it violate any constitutional principal, but merely a
further or additional regulation enacted by the city under its police
power, specifically granted to counties, cities and incorporated towns
by section 2, article 12, of the Constitution. (Citations omitted.)State v.
Musser, 67 Idaho 214, 176 P.2d 199 (1946), at 219. ·
As a final representative ·case, in Rowe v. City of Pocatello, 70 Idaho 344, 218
P.2d 695 (1950), the plaintiff challenged a city ordinance prohibiting door-todoor solicitations declaring such solicitations to be a public nuisance. The city
ordinance was upheld as a valid exercise of local police power. In examining
Article 12, Section 2 of the Idaho Constitution, the Supreme Court stated:

This is a direct grant of police power from the people to the
municipalities of the state, subject only to the limitation that such
regulation shall not conflict with the general laws. Comprehended in
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the term, "general laws" are other provisions of the constitution, acts
of the state legislature, and, of course, the constitution and laws of the
United States. Under this constitutional provisi~~-th~ c_it~s_of !h.i_s
state are in a notably different position than are cities in jurisdictions
where their police power is strictly limited to that found in charter or
legislativ~ grants. Rowe v . City of Pocatello, supra. , at 698.
For other Idaho cases upholding city and county ordinances as valid exercises of local police power, see, State v. Preston, 4 Idaho 215, 38 P. 694 (1894)
(city vagrancy ordinance upheld even though state statute punishing the same
offense); In re Francis, 1 Idaho 98, 60 P. 561 (1900) (upheld Grangeville city
ordinance imposing license taxes on various callings and businesses); Gale v.
City of Moscow, 15 Idaho 332, 97 P. 828 (1908) (upheld city ordinance
prohibiting the sale of liquor within the city limits notwithstanding a state
statute generally allowing for the sale ofliquor); Baillie v. The City of Wallace,
24 Idaho 706, 135 P . 850 (1913) (upheld city's power and control over streets and
sidewallcs); State v . Hart, 66 Idaho 2°17, 157P.2d 72 (1945) (upheld city ordinance
prohibiting the carrying of a concealed weapon); Clark v. Alloway, 67 Idaho 32,
170 P .2d 425(1946) (upheld city vagrancy ordinance even though it was broader
in scope than a state statute on the same subject and P.rovid_e d for different
penalties); Clyde Hess Distributing C. v. Bonneville County, 69 Idaho 506, 210
P.2d 798 (1949) (upheld county regulation establishing more restricted hours for
the sale of beer than those provided by state law); State v . Poynter, 70 Idaho
438, 220 P .2d 386 (1950) (upheld Pocatello city ordinance,prohibiting the driving
of an automobile while.!.111der the influence of intoxicating liquor even though
state statute on same subject); Gartland v. Talbott, 72 Idaho 125, 237 P .2d 1067
(1951) (upheld county resolution restricting number of issuable beer licenses in
a designated area); Schmidt v . Village of Kimberly, 74 Idaho 62, 256 P.2d 523
(1953} (upheld city ordinance regarding financing, establishment and operation
of a municipal water and sewage system as valid exercise of police power);
Taggart v. Latah County, 78 Idaho 100, 298 P .2d 979 (1956) (upheld county
ordinance providing more prohibitive hours for the operation of licensed beer
establishments than hours prohibited by state law};State v . Clark, 88 Idaho 365,
399 P .2d 955 (1966) (upheld county subdivision ordinance as valid exercise cif
police power); County of Ada v. Walter, 96 Idaho 630, 533 P.2d 1199 (1975)
(uphe ld county zoning ordinance as valid exercise of police power).
In twelve other cases, the Idaho Supreme Court considered the validity of
various city ordinances and county resolutions adopted under local police
powers. Four of these cases held the city ordinance or county resolution
conflicted with the general laws of the state, two of these cases held the city
ordinance or county resolution was unreasonable and oppressive, and six of
these cases were reversed on other grounds.
The four cases which held the city ordinance or county resolution conflicted
with the general !aws of the state are In re Ridenbaugh, 5 Idaho 371, 49 P . 12
(1897}; Mix v. The Board of County Commissioners of Nez Perce County, 18
Idaho 695, 112 P. 215 (1910); State v. Frederic, 28 Idaho 709, 155 P. 977 (1916};
and Citizens for Better Governmentv. County of Valley, 95 Idaho 320, 508 P.2d
550 (1973). In the Ridenbaugh case, the city ordinance in question permitted
gambling within the Boise city limits, in contravention of a state law prohibiting
gambling , The court stated:
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Thus, it is shown by the original charter of Boise city, also by section 2
of article 8 of the constitution, and the act amending the charter of
Boise city, that it was not the intention of the legislature or the framers
of the constitution to empower the council of incorporated cities ,md
towns to pass ordinances in conflict with the generallaws of the state .
. . It is not the intention to permit or authorize the councils of incorporated cities to legalize, by ordinance, acts prohibited as criminal by the
general criminal laws of the state, or to enforce ordinances in conflict
with the general law. In case of a conflict, the ordinance must give
way. In re Ridenbaugh, supra., at 375.
Thus, the city ordinance was declared invalid not because there was no express legislative authorization for its enactment, but rather because the ordinance conflicted with the general laws of the state.

Mix v. Board of County Commissioners of Nez Perce County, supra., involving a conflict between a county ordinance prohibiting the sale of liquor within
the county and a Lewiston city ordinance allowing the sale of liquor within the
city. The county prohibition was based upon a vote of the people of Nez Per.c e
County under a state statute allowing local option in the prohibition ofliquor.
The court held that since the state statute allowing local option to the counties
was a general law of the state, a county resolution adopted pursuant thereto
was likewise a general law. Thus, the city ordinance was declared invalid upon
the grounds that it conflicted with the general law of the state. In view of the
state statute giving counties local option, this decision does not conflict with the
general premise that cities and counties co-equally share their constitutional
grant of police power.
·
_
'
The case of State v. Frederic, supra., is often cited for the proposition that the
Idaho Supreme Court does not recognize constitutional home rule. The case
states:
A municipal corporation possesses only such powers as the state confers upon it, subject to addition or diminution at its discretion. . ,
These powers are conferred by the legislature under either special ,
charter or general law. It is a well settled rule of construction of grants
of power by the legislature to municipal corporations, that only such
powers and rights can be exercised under them as are clearly com- I
prehended in the words of the act or derived therefrom by necessary !
implication, regard being had to the object of the grant. Any ambiguity
or doubt arising out of the terms used by legislature must be resolved
in favor of the granting power. Regard must also be had to constiµitional provisions intended to secure the liberty and to protect the
rights of citizens to the end that no citizen shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law. State v. Frederic,
supra., at 715.
·

_
1

·!'

It is the opinion of the Attorney General that State v. Frederic need not be so
narrowly r-ead. 4', State v. Frederic, the defendant was indicted under a city
ordinance for unlawful possession ofliquor. Disposition of the case was complicated by the fact that the city ordinance in question had been adopted pursuant
to statutory authority allowing cities to "license, regulate and prohibit ·the
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selling or giving away" of intoxicating liquor, but after adoption of the city
ordinance, Kootenai County and the City of Coeur d'Alene had adopted localoption prohibition thus, making the statutory authority inapplicable. In addition, after the adoption of the city ordinance, the state had passed a statute
making Idaho a prohibition state. The court stated:
While, as before stated, the ordinance, except in the matter of
punishment, being in substance a reenactment of the provisions of
Senate Bill 50, might be contended to be in harmony with the state law
and therefore not repugnant to sec. 2, art. 12 of the constitution, yet the
question of conflict between the ordinance and the provisions of the
state Jaw in the matter of punishment is not a serious question involved
in this case. The real question for our determination is one of jurisdiction. That is: ~an a municipality confer upon police judges jurisdiction
to summarily hear and determine acts denominated by the general
law of the state indictable misdemeanors, by the enactment .o f an
ordinance prohibiting such acts and prescribing a punishment therefor? State v. Frederic, supra., at 715-716.
It was concluded by the court that it was not the intention of the legish,ture to
authorize municipalities to prohibit acts which, under the general laws of the
state, were indictable misdemeanors. _It was also noted that Article 1, Section 8
of the Idaho Constitution expressly prohibited the legislature from giving
municipalities such jurisdiction over indictable misdemeanors.
To hold otherwise would be to concede that police magistrates have
unlimited jurisdiction in all criminal matters, and that municipalities
could by ordinance punish acts which, under the general laws, are
felonies, ~uch as murder, robbery, burglary, which would be in violation of the constitution and statutes of this state. State v. Frederic,
supra., at 719.
Thus, the case was decided upon the grounds that the city ordinance, by
improperly conferring jurisdiction on police judges, conflicted with general
law, both constitutional and statutory, and not on the grounds that Idaho was
not a constitutional home rule state with regard to local police powers ..
Finally, in the recent case of Citizens for Better Government v. County of
Valley, 95 Idaho 320, 508 P.2d 550 (1973), a county zoning ordinance was
declared invalid for the reason that the county had not followed proper procedures for adoption of zoning ordinances as required by I.C. 50-1204. The Idaho
Supreme Court conceded that zoning ordinances were clearly within the police
power of a city or county, but held:
Idaho Const. art. 12, §2, authorizes a county to make police regulations
not in conflict with the general laws. Although the appellant restricts
the definition of a "general law" to laws defining the scope and nature
of matters subject to regulation, the definition of "general law" under
Idaho Const. art. 12, §2 is not so narrowly limited. The authority "to
make" regulations comprehends not only the nature and scope of the
subject matter of the regulation in relation to the general laws, but also
the method and manner of its adoption. The authority "to make"

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT-CROSS APPELLANT CITY OF HAYDEN
2002127_75 / I 1599-4

Page 89

OPINIONS OF '.I'HE ATTORNEY GENERAL
75.3-~------------------------,-20
police regulations as used in the constitution includes the procedures
for their adoption, which must not be in conflict with the general laws.
A general law may confer direct authority to act as well as supply
procedural requirements for the adoption of police regulations under
Art. 12, §2. Citizens for Better Government v. County of Valley, supra.,
at 551.
Thus, the county zoning ordinance was invalidated only for the reason that the
adoption procedures used conflicted with general state law.
The two ·cases which held the city ordinance or county resolution invalid
because they were unreasonable and oppressive are Continental Oil Co. vs.
City of Twin Falls, 49 Idaho 89, 286 P . 353 (1930) and Barth v. DeCou.rsey, 69
Idaho 474, 207 P .2d 1165 (1949). In Continental Oil Co. vs. The City of Twin
Falls, supra., the court declared a city ordinance, which prohibited the construction of gasoline service stations near schools, invalid upon the grounds
that it was an \mreasonable restriction upon plaintiffs property rights. Notwithstanding, the court determined that, if the city ordinance had not been
unreasonable, the police power to validly enact such an ordinance could be
inferred from various statutes. The court did not really d~cuss Article 12,
Section 2 of the Idaho Constitution, but did state:

!o
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A municipal corporation possesses only such legislative powers as are
conferred upon it by the Constitution, charter or general statute. (See ,
State v. Frederic, 28 Ida. 709, 715, 155 Pac. 977). Such powers may be
expressly laid down in the charter or legislative act, or they may be
necessarily inferred from powers granted. Continental Oil Co. v . The
City of Tw in Falls, supra., at 104. (Emphasis added.)
Since the Idaho Constitution does provide a direct grant oflocal police power to
cities and counties, this statement by the court does not conflict with the
premise that Idaho does recognize constitutional home r.ule to the extent of
local police powers.

·.'

A Canyon County resolution which prohibited the sale •of beer at retail
outside· the boundaries of cities or villages within the county was declared
invalid as being unreasonable, uajust and unduly oppressive in the case of
Barth v. DeCoursey, supra. The court did not expressly discuss Article 12,
Section 2 of the Idaho Constitution, but in a concurring opinion, Justice Taylor
noted that Article 12, Section 2, Idaho Constitution, provides a direct grant of
police power to counties and municipalites, which power is held co-equally by
counties and municipalities.
The decisions of the six other cases which considered the validity of various
city ordinances and county resolutions adopted under local police powers are
not so easily categorized. Thus, each case must be considered individually.
In State v. Robbins, 59 Idaho 279, 81 P .2d 1079 (1938), the appellant had been
convicted of selling beer in the City of Moscow without having received a
county license to do so, even though he had obtained a city and state license.
The gist of the issue before the court was whether a county resolution constituted a general law capable pf pre-exempting a conflicting city ordinance. The
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court rnled that Article 12, Section 2 of the Idaho Constitution granted co-~qual
authority to counties and cities to adopt police power regulations, and that a
county ordinance could not operate as a "general.Jaw" capable of invalidating
\ · a contrary city ordinance. The Idaho Supreme Court further noted that the
1
constitutional grant of police powers to counties and citi'es was not without
limitation ..That is, the constitutional grant oflocal police power was limited to
regulations which did not conflict with general state laws.

InStatev . White , 67 Idaho311; 177 P.2d 472 (1947), the Idaho Supreme Court
upheld the validity of a city ordinance which prohibited a person from allowing
a vicious dog to run at-large within the city limits. The ordinance was held to be·
a valid exercise of police power, but the case was remanded uponthe grounds
that the defendant had not received a jury trial.

.,

A similar result was reached in four related cases. In State v. Rmnich, 67
Idaho 229, 176 P .2d 204 (1946), the defendant had been convicted of selling
intoxicating liquor in violation of a Boise city ordinance, even though, as in
State v . Musser, supra., an Idaho constitutional amendment had ended prohibition. The court did not expressly discuss Article 12, Section 2 of the Idaho
Constitution, but did rule that a city ordinance prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquor was a valid exercise of police power, notwithstanding the constitutional amendment ending prohibition. Further, the court found no conflict with
. general law for the reason that the constitution and state statutes relating to the
sale and control of liquor still gave authority to the cities to regulate these
matters. The case was remanded upon the grounds that the defendant had not
' received a jury trial. In addition, the court partially invalidated the validity of
the Boise city ordinance for the reason that a special legislative act to amend
the Boise city charter provided for greater criminal penalties than those authorized by general law, particularly Section 49-69, LC.A., later know as
Section49-1109, LC.A., the forerunner of Section 50-302, Idaho Code. The court
declared the greater penalty provision void, but nonetheless remanded the
case for a new trial, presumably allowing only those penalties authorized by
the forerunners of Section 50-302, Idaho Code. Accord,' State v. Brunello, 67
Idaho 242, 176 P.2d 212 (1946); State v. Leonard, 67 Idaho 242, 176 'p.2d 214
(1946); State v. Finch, 67 Idaho 277, 176 P .2d 214 (1946).
!_ ·

!

In sum, based upon the foregoing discussion of Idaho case law, it is the
opinion of the Attorney General that the Idaho Court has never failed to
recognize the direct constitutional grant of police power to cities and counties,
pursuant to Article 12, Section 2 of the Idaho Constitution. To this extent,
Article 12, Section 2 of the Idaho Constitution is self-executing. Of course,
consistent with the language of Article 12, Section 2 of the Idaho Constitution
and Idaho case law, the exercise of local police power is subject to two major
limitations. First, the police power may be exercised only within the territorial
limits of the city or county. Second, the exercise of police power through city
ordinance or county resolution must not conflict with its charter or general
laws. Such general laws include those promulgated by the United State Constitution, federal statutes, the Idaho Constitution and Idaho state statutes.
Cases Involving Other Matters Of Local Concern:
I
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. In matters other than police powers, the Idaho Supreme Court has been
more restrictive. There are approximately six cases dealing with Article 12,
Section 2 of the Idaho Constitution and related matters. In all of these cases, the
Idaho Supreme Court held that enabling legislation by the state legislature was
necessary in order to validate the city or county action.
Taking these cases in chronological order, in 1912, the Idaho Supreme Court
decided the case ofByrns v. City ofMoscow, 21Idaho 398, 121 P. 1034 (1912). the
suit sought a Writ of Prohibition prohibiting the City of Moscow from adopting
an ordinance which would allow the issuance of municipal bonds to make
street improvements. The court only briefly discussed Article 12, Section 2 of
the Idaho Constitution, and ruled that Article 12, Section 1 and 2, gave the
legislature authority to provide for the incorporation, organization and classification of Idaho cities, "and that such cities and towns shall have the power and
authority given them by the laws enacted by the legislature." Byrns v. City of
Moscow, supra., at 403. Since the questioned city action had .not yet been
officially adopted as an ordinance the court merely noted all of the state statutes
dealing with local improvements by cities, and said that in order to make the
proposed ordinance valid and enforceable, the city would have to comply with
the applicable statutory provisions.
In like manner, the case ofBradburyv. CityofldahoFalls, 32Idaho28, 177P.
388 (1918), an injunction was sought to enjoin the city ofldaho Falls from issuing
and selling municipal bonds for the purpose of providing funds to pay for th/!
cost of acquiring an adequate electric light and power plant. The city action
was based upon an ordinance passed by the city council, and the court ruled
that the power of municipalities to issue bonds must be derived from
legislative enactment. Thus, as in Byrns, the Supreme Court took the position
that the issuance of municipal bonds for local improvements was a matter of
statewide concern and was subject to control by the legislature. The court cited
1 Dillon, Municipal Corporations §237 (5th ed.) for the proposition that:

'.,.;.·_·

l;

(i)t is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal
corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers and no
others: First, those granted in express words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted;
third, those essential to ihe accomplishment of the declared objects
and purposes of the corporation, - and simply convenient, but indispensable. Any fair, reasonable, substantial doubt concerning the existen,c e of power is resolved by the courts against the corporation and
the power is denied.
. Bradbury v._City of Idaho Falls, supra., at
32.

It is the contention of the Attorney General that this position does not negate the
existence of constitutional home rule with regard to police powers for the
reason that the position taken in Bradbury clearly states thaf a municipal
corporation may exercise all powers expressly granted, and Article 12, Section
2 of the Idaho Constitution does constitute such an express grant of power.
Then, in 1923, the Idaho Supreme Court considered the case of State v .
Nelson, 36 Idaho 713,213 P . 358 (1923). The defendant had been prosecuted for
violation of a city ordinance imposing a license tax upon certain businesses.
• The court held that the clear purpose of the ordinance was to raise revenue,
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and was not for the purpose of regulation. As such, the city ordinance violated
Article 7, Section 2 of the Idaho Constitution, which provides that only the
legislature may impose license taxes on businesses. This case is not dispositive on the issue of constitutional home rule since the city ordinance in question
clearly conflictt!d with a provision of the Idaho State Constitution.

In Reynard v. City of Caldwell, 53 Idaho 62, 21 P.2d 527 (1933), the City of
Caldwell had levied sp!lcial assessments against various properties, including
city property, for local improvements. The plaintiff, a bond holder, sought a
Writ of Mandamus to compel the city to pay its share of the special assessments.
The Idaho Supreme Court only briefly discussed Article 12, Sectionsl and 2 of
the Idaho Constitution and, similarly to their holding in Byrns v. City of Mos-.
cow, supra., held that Article 12, Sections 1 and 2 clearly gave the legislature
power to provide for the incorporation, organization and classification of cities.
But, the court added a qualification not present in their decision inByrns. That
is, the court further stated:" .. . such cities and towns shall have the power
and authority given them by the laws enacted by the legislature, subject only to
constitutional limitation. ·.. " Reynard v. City of Caldwell, supra., at 66-67.
The court invalidated the city action upon the grounds that the city had attempted to incur an indebtedness exceeding the yearly income and revenue of the
city without a two-thirds voter approval, contrary tq the requirements of
Article 8, Section 3 of the Idaho Constitution. Again, Reyna.rd does not represent a limitation upon the constitutional grant of police power to cities; rather,
Reynard does recognize that the power of the legislature to govern
municipalities is subject to constitutional limitations, as may be found in Article
12, Section 2 of the Idaho Constitution.
Finally, in the case ofO'Bryant v. City of Ida.ho Falls, 78 Idaho 313,303 P.2d
680 (1956) and Oregon Short Line Ra.iiroad Co. v. V illa.ge of Chubbuck, 83 Idaho
62, 357 P.2d 1101 (1960), the Idaho Supreme Court did not discuss Article 12,
Section 2 of the Idaho Constitution, but both cases did involve the authority of a
city to act in matters other than police power matters. In O'Bryant, a declaratory judgment was sought. The lawsuit tested the validity of a city ordinance
which granted a franchise to a cooperative gas association for the construction
and operation of a. gas distribution system within the city. The court again
quoted l Dillon, Municipal Corporations, (5th ed.) §237 for the proposition that
cities could exercise only such powers as were expressly granted, necessarily
implied from powers expressly granted, or those essential to the declared
objects and purposes of the corporation. The court held that construction,
operation and maintenance of a gas distribution system did not fall within the
police power of the city, and thus required an express legislative grant of power
to validate the city ordinance. No express grant of power was found, and the
court declared the city ordinance invalid.
Of more major importance, it should be noted thatO'Bryant is the only Idaho
case in which the Idaho Supreme Court directly addressed itself to a consideration of "home rule" as such, even though the court did not discuss Article 12;
Section 2 of the Idaho Constitution. The court ruled:
(w)e are not concerned with the merits or demerits of so-called "home
rule" bymunicipa!ities whereby the law would empower a municipal-
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ity to construct, operate and maintain its own system of distribution of
:gas as compared with a system for distribution of gas constructed, { ,_
maintained and operated by a public utility holding a certificate of f
convenience and necessity. Such question is strictly a matter of policy f
for the people or the legislature and is not for consideration by the court.
This court is only concerned with statutes as it finds them and the f
application of same to the facts before the court. O'Bryant v. City of f
Idaho Falls, supra., at 687. (Emphasis added.)

t

f

f
From this, perhaps it can be said that the Idaho Supreme Court will not declare t

Idaho a constitutional home rule state as to any matters without clarification of
existing law by the legislature, or without clarification by the people through
adoption of a constitutional amendment.
In the case of Oregon Slwrt Line Railroad Co. v. Village of Chubbuck, supra.,
the court again did not discuss Article 12, Section 2 of the Idaho Constitution.
The Village of Chubbuck had enacted a city ordinance attempting to annex
railroad land. The court merely held that annexation of additional territory
could be expressly granted only by the legislature, and such annexation was
subject to the conditions, restrictions and limitations. imposed by the legislature. Consequently, the city ordinance was invalidated.
In conclusion, and as illustrated by the above six cases, the Idaho Supreme
Court will most probably require enabling legislation to validate all ~ity and
county actions which fall outside the realm of loca l police powers. Thus,
beyond the realm of local police powers, Idaho cities and counties do not enjoy
·
constitutional home rule .

2. In response to the second question concerning the powers conferred upon
Idaho cities by Sections 50-301 and 50-302, Idaho Code , these statutes provide:

t

t

'I
f

r

t
i

rf
t
t

t

t,·.

Cities governed by this act (Municipal Corporations Act) shall be
bodies corporate and politic; may sue and be sued; contract and be
contracted with; accept grants-in-aid and gifts of property, both real
and personal, in the name of the cities; acquire, hold, lease, and
convey property, real and personal; have a common seal, which they
may change and alter at pleasure; may erect buildings or structures of
any kind, needful for the uses or purposes of the city; and exercise
such other powers as may be conferred by .law. I.C. §50-301. (Emphasis
added.)

'

i j

··1

i '.

,:

,j.

l'

Cities shall make all such ordinances, by-laws, rules; regulations and
resolutions not inconsistent with the laws of the state ofIda.ho as may be
expedient, in addition to the special powers in this a.ct granted, to
maintain the peace, good government and welfare -of the corporation
and its tmde, commerce and industry. Cities may enforce all ordinances by inflicting fines for the breach thereof, not exceeding the
amount permissible in probate, justice and course of similar jurisdiction for any one (1) offense, or penalties not more than thirty (30) days
imprisonment in the city jail, or both such fine and imprisonment,
recoverable with costs, and in default of payment, to provide for
confinement in prison or jail; .. . I.C. §50-302. (Emphasis added.)
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Both of these sections were ameni:led in 1967, but the operatiye provisions of
both statutes were previously· included as state law under different section
numbers.
It is the opinion of the Attorney General that neither of these statutory
provisions grant direct power to municip!'l/lies, but rather act as limitations
upon the powers of municipalities. LC. §50-301 clearly states that cities may
exercise only "such other powers as may be conferred by law." Thus, by its
own language, LC. §50-301 contains an inherent limitation upon a city's power.
In contrast, the effect of I.C. §50-302 is not so clearly limited.
There are approximately eight Idaho Supreme Court cases dealing with I.C.
§50-302. None of these cases deals with I.C . §50-302 in depth, and the most
succinct statement of the powers granted by I. C. §50-302 is found in the case of
Rowe v. City of Pocatello, supra. In examining the powers granted by I.C.
§50-1109, the forerunner of I.C. §50-302, the court stated:
IIii.

~

ll

i

These are broad powers. But in this state acts of the legislature
governing municipal_police regulations are to be -looked to as limitations upon, rather than as grants of power to the municipalities. Rowe
.v. City of Pocatello, supra., at 698.

µ
rl

In all other Idaho cases referring to I.C. 50-302, or its forerunners, the Idaho
; Supreme Court has referred to I.C. 50-302 only to supplement Article 12,
,, Section 2 of the Idaho Constitution, and in consequence, to supplement the
fl proposition that municipalities have police power in affairs of local concern.
~ See, State v. Frederic, supra. (ordinance in question imposed only the max[ imum penalties allowable to cities under I.C. §50-302 (then known as S.L. 1915,
[~ page 232, Section 2238K) ); Continental Oil Co. v. The City of Twin Falls,
fi supra. (I.C. §50-302 granted a city authority to enact a police power ordinance
prohibiting the establishment of gasoline service stations near schools); State v.
·, Romich, supra. (ordinance in question allowed for greater punishment than
j} that allowed by Section 49-69, I.C.A., later known as Section 49-1109, LC.A. ,
~ the forerunne_r of LC . §50-302); State v. White, supra. (Section 49-1109, I.C.A.,
i the forerunner of LC. §50-302, gave a city power to prohibit the allowing of a
ff vicious dog to run at-large within the city limits); Sta.te v. Paynter, supra.
iJ (Section 49-1109, LC., the forerunner ofl.C. §50-302, in conjunction withAr.:icle
I 12, Section 2 of the Idaho Constitution, gave a city power to adopt an ordinance
prohibiting the driving of an automobile while under the influence of intoxicating liquor); Condie v. Mansor, 96 Idaho 345, 528 P.2d 907 (1974) (I.C. §50-302
gave a city power to license a business and regulate it for the general welfare) .
It is interesting to note that in both Continental Oil Co. v. The City of Twin Falls,
supra., and State v. Whi te, supra., the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the
validity of police power regulations based upon I.C. §50-302, or its forerunners,
without even·considering Article 12, Section 2 of the Idaho Cons!:itution.

I·

The foregoing case law referring to I.C. §50-302, or its forerunners, offers
little evidence regarding the legislative purpose and intent of, or powers conferred by, I. C. §50-302. All of these cases consider only the validity of local
police power enactments; that is, I. C. §50-302 has seemingly never been applied to city enactments extending beyond the realm of police powers.
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Notwithstanding the absence of explicit case law, it is the opinion of the
Attorney General that, for several reasons, neither LC. §50-301 nor I.C. §50-302
grant cities·any more power than is already conferred upon them by Article 12,
Section 2 of the Idaho Constitution and by state statutes. First, even though not
expressly interpreting I.C. §50-301 or LC. §50-302, all Idaho cases whlch have
considered tne validity oflocal regulations relating to matters beyond' the r2ahn
of police powers have held that an express legislative grant of power is necessary. See, "Cases Involving Other Matters of Local Concern," p. 21. Second, in
Rowe v . City of Pocatello, supra., the Idaho Supreme Court did rule that I.C.
§50-302 was not a grant of power to cities, but rather was a limitation upon the f,}.:.
power of cities. Third, on its face, LC. §50-302 contains a limitation of power; ,.
that is, city ordinances, by-laws, rules, regulations and resol.utions may not be t
inconsistent with the laws of the State ofldaho. Fourth, LC. §50-302 refers only
to a municipality's interest in the "peace, good government and welfare of the if.-.:.··
corporation and its trade, commerce and industry." (Emphasis added.) The
interests encompassed are really no more than police powers, and such police ;
powers are already directly granted to the cities by Article 12, Section 2 of the
Idaho Constitution.

l·

In conclusion, it is the opinion of the Attorney General that neither I.C.
§50-301 nor I.C. §50-302 grant to cities any more power than is already conferred upon them by article 12, Section 2 of the Idaho Constitution and by state
statutes. Such statutory sections can in no way be considered a grant of
legislative home rule regarding matters beyond the realm of police powers.
3, In response to the question whe.ther Article 7, Section 6 of the Idaho
Constitution, when coupled with I. C. §50-302, constitutes a broad grant of
legislative. power to Idaho cities to assess and collect.taxes on a local-option
basis, Article 7, Section 6 of the Idaho Constitution provides:

r
·

The legislature shall not impose taxes for the purpose of any·county,
city, town, or other municipal corporation, but may by law invest in the
corporate authorities thereof, respectively, the power to assess and
collect taxes for all purposes of such corporation. (Emphasis added.)

It is the opinion of the Attorney General that Article 7, Section 6 of the Idaho
Constitution, when coupled with I.C. §50-302, does not consµtute a broad grant
of legislative power to Idaho cities to assess and collect taxes on a local-option
basis for two major reasons. First, on its face, Article 7, Section 6 of the Idaho
Constitution requires enabling legislation to invest powers oftaxation in municipal corporations. Such constitutional limitation cannot be supplanted by a
general statutory enactment, such .as I. C. §50-302. Second, based upon the
analysis of I.C. §50-302 in response to·Question 2, I.C. §50-302 does not constitute a general grant of power to cities, and thus, I.C. §50-302 cannot be construed to be a law. investing taxation powers in municipal corporations.
AUTHORITIES CONSIDERED:

. ,.:;
,.

1. Cal. Const. art. 11, §5(a) (1970), amending Cal. Const. art. 11, §8 (1879) .

2. Cal. Const. art. 11, §7 (1970), amending Cal. Const. art. 11, §11 (1879).
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3. Idaho Const. art. 7, §6.

4. Idaho Const. art. 12, §1.
5. Idaho Const. art. 12, §2.

6. Wash. Const. art. 11 , §10.
7. Wash. Const. art. 11, §11.
,.·

8. Idaho Code §50-301 (1967).

9. Idaho Code §50-302 (1967), formerly R.C., §2238, subd. 11 ; reen. 1911, ch. 81,
§1, subd. 11, p. 276; enacted as R.C ., R238k by 1915, ch. 97, §2, p . 232; compiled
and reen. C.L. 152:20; C.S., §3948; I.C.A., §49-1109; LC.A., 50-1109.

··,,,.

10. County of Ada v. Walker, 96 Idaho 630, 533 P.2d 1199 (1975),
11. Condie v. Mansor, 96 Idaho 345, 528.P .2d 907 (1974).
12. Citizens for Better Government v . County of Valley, 95 Idaho 320, 508 P .2d
550 (1973).
13. State v. Clark, 88 Idaho 365, 399 P .2d 955 (lll66).
14. Oregon Short Line Railroad Co. v. Village of Chubbuck, 83 Idaho 62, 357
P .2d 1101 (1960).

15. O'Bryant v. City of Idaho Falls, 78 Idaho 313, 303 P .2d 680 (1956).
16. Taggart v. Latah County, 78 Idaho 100, 298 P.2d 979 (1956).
17. Schmidt v. Village of Kimberly, 74 Idaho 62, 256 P .2d 523 (1953).
18. Gartland v. Talbott, 74 Idaho 125, 237.P.2d 1067 (1951).
19. State v. Poynter, 70 Idaho 438, 220 P .2d 386 (1950).
20. Rowe v. City of Pocatello, 70 Idaho 344, 218 P.2d 695 (1950).
21. Clyde Hess Distributing Co. v. Bonneville County, 69 Idaho 506, 210 P.2d
. 798 (1949).
22. Barth v. DeCoursey, 69 Idaho 474, 207 P .2d 1165 (1949).'
23. State v. White, 67 Idaho 311, 177 P .2d 472 (1947).
24. State v. Brunello, 67 Idaho 242, 176 P.2d 212 (1946).
25. State v. Leonard, 67 Idaho 242, 176 P .2d 214 (1946).
26. State v. Finch , 67 Idaho 277, 176 P .2d 214 (1946).
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30. State v. Hart, 66 Idaho 217, 157 P.2d 72 (1945).
31. Foster's, Inc. v. Boise City, 63 Idaho 201, 118 P.2d 721 (1941).
32. State v. Robbins, 59 Idaho 279, 81 P.2d 1078 (1938).
33. Reynard v. City of Caldwell, 53 Idaho 62, 21 P.2d 527 (1933).
34. Continental Oil Co. v. The City of Twin Falls, 49 Idaho 89, 286 P . 353 (1930).
35. Sate v. Nelson , 36 Idaho 713, 213 P. 358 (1923).
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36. State v. Frederic, 28 Idaho 709, 155 P. 977 (1916).
37. Bradbury v. City of Idaho Falls, 32 Idaho 28, 177 P. 388 (1918).
38. Baillie v. The City of Wallace, 24 Idaho 706, 135 P . 850 (1913) .
39. Byrns v. City of Moscow, 21 Idaho 398, 121 P. 1034 (1912).
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40. Mix v. The Board of County Commissioners of Nez Perce County, 18 Idaho
695, 112 P. 215 (1910).
.
41. Gale v. City of Moscow, 15 Idaho 332, 97 P. 828 (1908).
42. State v. Quong, 8 Idaho 191, 194, 67 P ._491 (1902).
43. In re Francis, 7 Idaho 98, 60 P . 561 (1900).
44. In re Ridenbaugh, 5 Idaho 371, 49 P. 12 (1897).
45. State v. Preston, 4 Idaho 215, 38 P . 694 (1894).
46. 1 Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law at 95, n . 7, and 100 (1964).
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48. 1 Dillon, M1:micipal Corporations §237 (5th ·ed. 1911).
49. 1 McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations §§3.216, 3.29 (3rd ed. Dray"
1971).
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50. Rhyne, Municipal Law §§4-2, 4-3 (1957).
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52. 38 Wash. L . Rev. 743 (1963).
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DATED This 19th day of January, 1976.
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF IDAHO

t
!
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ANALYSIS BY:
1£ JEAN R. URANGA
~ Assistant Attorney General
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APPENDIX A
CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF IDAHO CASE LAW
As early as 1894, the Idaho Supreme Court began interpreting Article 12,

I Section 2 of the Idaho Constitution in the case ofState v.Preston, 4Idaho 215, 38
N P. 694 (1894). The defendant in Preston was convicted of vagrancy under a city
ordinance. The defendant challenged the validity of the city ordinance on the
iJ grounds
that vagrancy was also punishable under state statute. The Idaho
Court did not discuss Article 12, Section 2 of the Idaho Constitution,
I Supreme
but did rule that the city had authority to adopt an ordinance and punish

I,

!

ia

vagrants notwithstanding a state statute on the same subject.

,
,;

•
~

In the case of In re Ridenbaugh; 5 Idaho 371, 49 P. 12 (1897), the court
considered a conflict between a Boise city ordinance which authorized gambling and a state law which prohibited gambling. The court recognized Boise as a
special charter city established prior to the adoption of the Idaho Constitution,
but nonetheless ruled:
Thus, it is shown by the original charter of Boise City, also by section 2
of article 12 of the constitution, and the act amending the charter of
Boise City, that it was not the intention of the legislature or the framers
of the constitution to empower the council of incorporated cities and
towns to pass ordinances in conflict with the general laws of the state
... It is not the intention to permit or authorize the councils of incorporated cities to legalize, by ordinance, acts prohibited as criminal by the
general criminal laws of the state, or to enforce ordinances in conflict
with the general law. In case of a conflict, the ordinance must give
way. In re Ridenbaugh, supra., at 375.

In the ·case of In re Francis, 7 Idaho 98, 60 P. 561 (1900), the Idaho Supreme
Court considered a petition for a writ of prohibition which sought to challenge
the validity of a Grangeville ordinance imposing certain license taxes upon
various callings and businesses. The court briefly referred to Article 12, Section 2 of the Idaho Constitution, and held that this provision of the Constitution
authorized the enactment of the challenged ordinance and further, that there
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was nothing in the charter of Grangeville or in the general law which prohibited
the passing of the ordinance.
In 1902, the Idaho Supreme Court considered a situation in which there was
both a state law and city ordinance making battery a crime. The court ruled:
The ordinance is not in conflict, but in harmony, with the general law.
The authority of the city to enact police regulations, and to enforce
them, where they do not contravene any general law of the state, is,
under the provisions of our constitution, beyond question. The municipal government may not take from the citizens any constitutional right
- has no power to do so - yet by the express provisions of section 2,
article 12, the power to make and enforce sanitary and police regulations is expressly given to cities and towns. The object of the provision
is apparent, its necessity urgent. State v. Quong, 8 Idaho 191, at 194, 67
P. 491 (1902).

'·

The city ordinance was held to be a valid exercise of local police power.

ii

I

I

!·· -·

The Idaho Supreme Court considered the issue of an apparent conflict
between a state statute generally allowing the sale of liquor and a city ordinance prohibiting the sale of liquor within the city limits in the case of Gale v.
City of Moscow, 15 Idaho 332, 97 P . 828 (1908). The court considered both
Article 12, Section 2 of the Idaho Constitution, and a state statute, S .L. 1907,
page 518, which allowed cities to "license, regulate and. prohibit selling or
giving away of any intoxicating, malt, vinous, mixed ·o r fermented liquor, ... "
The court further stated that the constitutional provision gave the City of
Moscow the authority to make and enforce all necessary "police regulations"
relating to the civil government within its jurisdiction.
In the case of Mix v. The Board of County Commissioners of Nez Perce
County, 18 Idaho 695, 112 P. 215 (1910), the suit was based upon a petition for a
Writ of Mandamus seeking to compel the county commissioners to issue a
liquor license to the p·etitioner. The County of Nez Perce voted to prohibit the
sale of liquor within the county which prohibition conflicted with a Lewiston
City ordinance allowing the sale of liquor. Similarly to Boise, Lewiston is a
special charter city, chartered prior to the adoption of the Idaho Constitution.
The court h.eld:
Special charter cities cannot by ordinance make acts lawful that are
made criminal by the general law of the state. Sec, 2, art. 12, of the
state constitution prohibits special charter cities from making or enforcing any local , police , sanitary or other regulation that is in conflict
with its charter or the general law of the state. At 705.
The choice by the. voters _of Nez Perce County to prohibit the sale of liquor
within the county was based upon a state statute allowing local option in the
prohibition·ofliqudr, and the court ruled that the state statute upon which the
prohibition was based was a general la~ of the state, and thus, a county

. !',
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ruolulion adop~ pursuan1 th reto allo constituted a a neral law or th state.
The city o ~ was conaeq ntly Invalidated.
A Writ of Prohibition, pn>hlbiting the City of l\loec,o &om adoptina a city
authoriz:lnf th lu\w\Ce of ruunlcipal bands to malt I
t fflprovem nts, wuaoughl ln the caeeo! Blf"U v. C tvo/MOM:OIO, 21 Idaho
,
121 P. 1034 (1912). The court only brleR.y diac
d Iha app.licabiUty of Artlde
12, Section 2, Idaho ConstllUtlon, and stated:
~

R (erring ri.rst to the constitutional provisions ·th reference to the
Incorporation, orpnlu.tlon and classilications of cities and towns, we
lhink that the constitution, art. U (sic), sec. 1 and 2, clearly confen
upon the I
I.Ure lO prov;de for the lncorpo lion, or anb:allon and
cless!Ocation or c:i a, end thal such cities and Lowns 1hall have the
pow r and authority ·ve.o th m by the laws enacted by the ~
ture. In th ptt,ent cue, there
an applicable ata law allowin
locn1 bnprovementa by cit.lea and villaces. B ym, v. Cit11 of Mtueov,,
supra., a 403.
ow had th atatulory a uthority lo adopl such an
ordinance, so 10111 u the atatulOry procedw-e. were Collowad.

The court held that

In Botlli# v. TT,., CUyo/Woltoc., 24 ldaho 706, 135 P . 850 (1913), the plaintiff
10\18hl i'! rec:! 'ver for pcrao~al- ~~· alle d lo bav been SU;,rtafn d b7
reason of a.n obstnict!on ov r a 11clewallr. lo e City or Wallace. ~ court
~rely referred Lo the langua e of Article U. Section 2, ldaho Constitubon and
1ppl1Cable stale slatules for the proposition lbal I c:lty b given bsolu power
and control over 1treets and ~wa
In lhe c:ue ()f' B~rv v. C Ill of ldollo Faila, 32 Idaho 28, 177 P .
(11118).
&om lssulna
the plalntiff 10ugbt ao lnJuncllon lO ~oin the city of Idaho
and lling municipal bonds for the purpose or providing funds Lo ~ for lhe
cost of acquiring ao adequate leetrlc Jlahl and power plant. The ac:tloo by lhe
city was baaed upon an ordin nee passed by th dty council. The court ruled
!hat the power oC munlclpalltl I lO 1'5UC bonds must be dariwd from I
live
enactrnen1. In addition, the court held that any such ~alive rwclmenl ruust
be strictly construed a ainst
granlff. The coun ciled I Dillon, Municipal
CorporaUoo., f237 (5th ed.) for lh proposition thal:
(l)l II e general and und11puted proposilion oC

,w

that a mwucipal
corporation po
and can cxc.rciR lhe following powtta, and no
others: Finl, I.hose ,ranled In 6'(>T words; cond, lhoff nec«WU'
lly or fairbr lmpl d In or Incident lo ~ poW1era exprel&ly granted;
third, thole s,enUaJ lo the accomplis
nt oi lhe declared oilj~ta
aod purpows of lhe corpora on, - not limply convenl~, bul Ind!.
~nsahle. Any lair, reaaonabl , substantial doubt cone mingtheuatence ol power ls resolv d by the courts against th corporation, and
the poweriad nled , . . Bradb,,"'11 v. CilyofldahoFalt., aupre., 11132.
The coun not.eel lhal there wu I slaLe sl.lllUle allowm, municipalities to Issue
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bonds for the purpose of purchasing light and power plants, but using a strict ( ,
construction of the statute, the court held that the statute did not give a city ;_:_:1__,_:
authority to issue bonds to improve existing light and power plants.
v.,

:/
'j

.,:.

In State v. Frederick, 28 Idaho 709, 155 P. 977 (1916), the defendant was
charged with violating a city ordinance prohibiting the unlawful possession of
intoxicating liquor. The ordinance in question was in substance identical to a
state statute except that the ordinance imposed only the maximum penalty
allowable to cities under Idaho Code 50-302, then known as S.L. 1915, page 232,
Section 2238K. After adoption of the city ordinance, the state had passed a
statute making Idaho a prohibition state, and making possession of liquor an
indictable misdemeanor. The court stated:
A municipal corporati.li'n possesses only such powers as the state
~onfers upon it, subject to addition or diminution at its discretion.
These powers are conferred by the legislature under either special
charter or general law. It is a well settled rule of construction of grants
of power by the legislature to municipal corporations, that only such
powers and rights can be exercised under them as are clearly comprehended in th~ words of the act or derived therefrom by necessary
implication, regard being had to the object of the grant. Any ambiguity
or doubt arising out of the terms used by the legislature must be
resolved in favor of the granting power. Regard must also be had to
constitutional provisions intended to secure the liberty and to protect
the rights of citizens to the end that no citizen shall be deprived of life ,
liberty or property without due process of law. State v. Frederic,
supra., at 715.
·

i
f

i

l
!.

Since the state statute had made possession of liquor an indictable misdemeanor, the actual issue before the court was one of jurisdiction.
:,-:1

,,:j
. ,;i)
! 1,.

': f

That is: Can a municipality confer upon police judges juriscliction to
summarily hear and determine acts denominated by the general law
of the state indictable misdemeanors, by the enactment of an ordinance prohibiting such acts and prescribing a punishment therefor?
State v. Frederic, supra., at 715-716.
·

!.

, 1

The court concluded that it was not the intention oft.he legislature to authorize
municipalities to prohibit acts which, under the general laws of the state; were
indictable misdemeanors. In fact, the court noted that Article 1, Sections of the
Idaho Constitution expressly prohibited the legislature from giving
municipalities such jurisdiction over indictable misdemeanors. Thus, the case
was decided upon the grounds that the city ordinance, by improperly conferring jurisdiction on police judges, conflicted with the general laws of the state,
both constitutional and statutory.
The case of State v. Nelson, 36 Idaho 713, 213 P. 358 (1923) involved the
prosecution of the d~fendant for violation of a city ordinance imposing a license
tax upon certain businesses.· The clear purpose of the ordinance· was for the
purpose of raising revenue and not for the purpose of regulation: The court
referred to Article 7, Section 2 of the Idaho Constitution, which provides that
only the legislature may impose a license tax. The court held tl,e ordinance an
illegal attempt to raise revenue and stated:
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One of the distinctions between a lawful tax for regulatory piirposes
and one solely for revenue is: if it be :imposed for regulation·, under the .
authority of sec. 2, art. · 12, of the:-.coristitution, · the license 'fee demanded must bear some teascinah)e relation to the ctist of sµch ~egula·
·
·
tion; . .. At 722.
The court considered a city ordinance prohibiting gasoline ·s.erv:i,;'e .stations
near schoois in Continental Oil Co. v. Tlie City ofTwin F~lls, 49 Idaho 89, 286 P .
353 (1930). While examining the validity ofthe ordinance, the court stated:
A muni~ipal.corporation possesses only such legislativ~ powers as are
conferred upon it by the Constitution, charter or general statute. (See,
State v. F,:ederic, 28 Ida. 709 (715) 155 Pac. 977.) Such powers may be
expressly laid down in the charter or"legislative' act,· or they may be
necessarily inferred from powers granted. At 1~.
The court then quoted Article 12, Section 2, Idaho Constitution; and further
stated that there was no express authority for the enactment of such an ordinance, but the general police power to enact such ordinances could be inferred
from the various statutes governing police powers, including I.C. 50-302. Notwithstanding, the court threw out the ordinance upon the grounds that it was
an unreasonable restriction upon the plaintiffs property rights.
In Reynard v. City of Caldwell, 53 Idaho 62 , 21 P .2d 527 (193:i), the City of
Caldwell had levied special assessments against various properties, including
city property, for local improvements. The plaintiff, a bond holder, sought a
writ of Mandamus to compel the city to pay its share of the special assessments.
The Idaho Supreme Court only briefly discussed Article 12, Sections 1 and 2 of
the Idaho Constitution, and stated:

Referring to the constitutional provisions with reference· to the incorporation, organization and the cla,1,sification of cities and towns, we
think that the Constitution, article 11 (sic), sections 1 and 2, clearly
confer the power upon the legislature to provide for the incorporation,
organization, and classification of cities, and that such cities and towns
shall have the power and authority given them by the laws enacted by
the legislature, subject only to constitutional limitation . . . Reynard v.
City of Caldwell, supra., at 66-67.
The court-then referred to Article 8, Section 3 of the Idaho Constitution which
provides that no county or city may incur any indebtedness exceeding the
yearly income and revenue of the county or city without a two-thirds voter
approval. In addition, the legislature had enacted laws concerning the method
whereby cities and counties could obtain special assessments for local improvements. The court refused to issue the Writ of Mandamu_s for the reason
that the plaintiff had not shown that the city had lawfully made assessments
against its own property.

In State v. Robbins, 59,Idaho 279, 81 P.2d 1078 (1938), the appellant had.been
convicted of selling beer in the City of Moscow without having received a
county license to do so, even though he had obtained a city and state license.
The gist of the case was whether a county conviction could lie where both the
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of the Idaho Constitution and explained that this section was an exact copy of
Article 11, Section 11 of the California Constitution. The court thfln cited a
California case, Ex parte Knight, 55 Cal.App. 511, 203 Pac. 777, 778, which
stated:
The only limitation upon the exercise of the power is that the regulations to be made under it shall not be "in conflict with general laws" as ,:
this limitation applies equally to regulations af the county and the city
it cannot be held by the terms of the limitations that the regulation of t.
either of these bodies is a general law for the other, and it is held that t'..
an ordinance passed by a county is not a "general law" within the
meaning of this section of the Constitution. Citing, Ex parte Roach, 104
Cal. 272, 37 Pac. 1044; Ex parte Campbell, 74 Cal. 20, 25, 15 Pac. 318, 5
Am.St. 418.
'

r

The Idaho Supreme Court further stated:
However, the right to an exercise of police power of the state in local
police, sanitary and other regulations, has not been granted to counties and municipalities by thl constitution without limitation. That
right is limited to such regulations as are not in conflict with general
laws. State v. Robbins, supra., at 286.
The court invalidated the county action on the grounds that cities and counties
co-equally share local police power, and that a county resolution could not
operate as a "general law" capable of invalidating a contrary city ordinance.
InthecaseofFoster's,Inc. v.BoiseCity, 63Idaho201, 118P.2d 721 (1941), the
Idllho Supreme Court oonsidered plaintiff's challenge to the validity of a parking meter ordinance. One of plaintiff's contentions was that the parking meter
ordinance violated Article 12, Section 2, Idaho Constitution. Even though the
court did not specifically refer to this constitutional provision, the court stated:
The police power is a necessary concomitant to complete sovei;eignty
and inheres primarily in the state. The exercise of that power, within
the corporate limits of cities and villages, has been delegated to the
respective municipalities. The full exercise of that power is one of the
governmental duties of the respective municipalities as arms of the
state, in preserving the health, safety and general welfare of the
people. Foster's, Inc. v. Boise City, supra., at 211.
The city ordinance was upheld as a valid exercise of police power.
The Idaho Supreme Court upheld a validity of a city ordinance prohibiting
the carrying of a concealed weapon in the case of State v. Hart, 66 Idaho 217,
157 P.2d 72 (1945). The court briefly referred to ~icle 12, Section 2, Idaho
Constitution, and merely stated that such an ordinance was within the police
power of the municipality.
The case of Clark v. Alloway, 67 Idaho 32, 170 P.2d 425 (1946) involved a
malicious prosecution and false imprisonment action. The plaintiff had been
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arrested pursuant to a city vagrancy ordinance, and plaintiff appealed from
judgmel'lt for the defendant. One of plaintiff's contentions was that the city
ordinance was invalid since there was a state law prohibiting a similar crime.
The court did not discuss Article 12, Section 2, Idaho Constitution, but did rule
that a city ordinance was not unconstitutional merely because it was broader in
scope than the general statute and provided for different penalties.

In State v. Musser, 67 Idaho 214, 176 P.2d 199 (1946), the defendant was.
convicted of drinking intoxicating·liquor in a public place in violation of a Boise
city ordinance, even though there was a constitutional amendmen_t ending
prohibition. The court held that " Boise city possesses full police power in
affairs of local concern," State v . Musser, supra., at 218, and further held that
since Boise was a special charter city, its charter and ordinances could not be
amended by general law. Referring to Article 12, Section 2, Idaho Constitution,
the court stated:
Under the above constitutional provision counties, cities and towns
have full power in affairs oflocal government notwithstanding general .
laws of the state defining and punishing the same offense. State v.
Musser, supra., at219.•Citing, State v. Quang, supra.; Continental Oil
Co. v. City of Twin Falls, supra,; State v. Robbins, supra.; State v.
Hart, supra; and Cia-rk v. Alloway, supra.
Furthe r, the court compared Article 12, Section ·2, Idaho Constitution, to an
almost identical California constitutional provision. Quoting 14 Cal.Jur. sec. 8,
p. 726, the Idaho Supreme Court stated:
This power, vested by direct grant, is as broad as that vested in the
legislature itself, subject to two exceptions: it must be local to the
county or municipality and must not conflict with general laws. State v.
Musser, supra., at 219.
Finally, it was noted that there was no conflict between the state constitution
and the city ordinance, and it was held:
The ordinance is not repugnant to, nor in conflict with, the statutes,
neither does it violate any constitutional principle, but merely a
further or additional regulation enacted by the city under its police
power, specifically granted to counties, cities and incorporated towns
by section 2, article 12 of the Constitution. State v. Musser, supra., at
219.
In State v. Romich, 67 Idaho 229, 176 P.2d 204 (1946), the defendant had been
convicted of selling intoxicating liquor in violation of a Boise city ordinance,
even though as in State v. Musser, supra., an Idaho constitutional amendment
ended prohibition. The court did not discuss Article 12, Section 2 of the Idaho
Constitution expressly, but did cite State v. Frederic, supra., for the proposition
that a municipal corporation possesses only such powers as the state confers
upon it. Nonetheless, it was ruled that a city ordinance prohibiting the sale of
intoxicating liquor was a valid exercise of police poV{er, notwithstanding the
constitutional amendment ending prohibition. Further, the court found no
conflict with general law for the reason tha t the constitution and state statutes
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relating to the sale and control of liquor still gave authority to the cities to
regulate these malters. The case· was. remanded upon the grounds that the
defendant did not receive a jury trial. In addition, the court partially invalidated the validity of the Boise city ordinance ·for the ·reason that a special
legislative act to amend the Boise city charter provided for greater criminal
penaltie s than those authorized by general law particularly Section 49-69,
LC.A., later known asSection49-1109, LC.A., the forerunnerofSection50-302,
Idaho Code. The court declared the greater penalty provision void, but
nonetheless remanded the case for a new trial, presumably allowing only those
penalties authorized by the forerunners of Section 50-302, I.C. Accord, State v ,
Brunello', 67 Idaho 242, 176 P.2d 212 (1946); State v. Leonard, 67 Idaho 242, 176
P.2d 214 (1946); State v. Finch, 67 Idaho 277, 176 P.2d 214 (1946). A dissenting
opinion in State v. Romich, supra., noted that a special charter city, such as
Lewiston and Boise, was not bound by general law.
·

In 1947, the Idaho Supr~me Court decided the case of State v. White , 67 Idaho
311, 177 P .2d 472 (1947). The defendants appealed from a conviction ofallowing
a vicious dog to run at-large within the city limits. The court did not discuss
Article 12, Section 2, Idaho Constitution, but did look to Section49-1109, I.C.A ,,
the forerunner of Section 50-302, Idaho Code. In reaching its decision that the
city ordinance was valid, the court cited State v. Musser, supra., and stated:
"Boise city possesses full police power in affairs of local concern." State v.
White, supra., at 473. The case was remanded upon the grounds that the
defendant had not received a jury trial.
A Writ of Mandamus was sought to compel the Canyon County Board of
Commissioners to issue a county license to sell beer in the case of Barth v.
DeCoursey, 69 Idaho 474, 207 P.2d 1165 (1949). The suit challenged a county
· resolution which prohibited the sale of beer at retail outside the boundaries of a
city or village. The court did not discuss Article 12, Section 2, Idaho Constitution, but merely stated:

It is the general rule that where authority to license and regulate a
business is granted by the legislature to a municipality, the regulation
adopted must not be unreasonable, unjust or unduly oppressive. At
1167.
.
.

It was ruled that the Canyon County resolution was unreasonable, prohibitory
and 9ontrary to state law. In a concurring opinion, Justice Taylor noted that
Article 12, Section 2, Idaho Constitution provided a direct grant of police power
to counties and municipalities, which power was held co-equally by counties
and municipalities.

J,
I'

·!.,

In Clyde Hess pistributing Co. v. Bonneville County, 69 Idaho 506, 210 P.2d
798 (1949), the plaintiff challenged a county regulation prohibiting the sale of
beer between more restricted hours than those allowed by state law. The court
noted that both the applicable state law and county ordinance were prohibitive, the only difference being that the county ordinance was more prohibitive.
Further, it. was held that the legislature.had not intended to occupy the whole
field of liquor regulation. Citing, Am.Jur. 37, p. 790, the court said:
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___
b1-.to-ry_a_n_d :::
only difference between them is that the ordinance goes further in its
prohibition, but not counti!r to the prohibition under the statute, and
the municipality does not attempt to authorize by the ordinance what
the legislature has forbidden or forbid what the legislature has expressly licensed, authorized, or required, there is nothing contradictory between the provisions of the statute and the ordinance because
of which they cannot co-exist and be effective. Clyde Hess Distributing
Co. v. Bonneville County, supra. , at 800. Citing, Clark v. Alloway,
supra., State v. Musser, supra.; and State v. Brunello , supra.·

lz
~ The court referred to Article 12, Section 2, Idaho Constitution, only for the
:£,
proposition that a county cannot make police regulations effective within a
municipality; that is, the police powers of counties and municipalities are
ii co-equal.

f

I
[y

In Rowe v. City of Pocatello, 70 Idaho 344,218 P.2d 695 (11150), the plaintiff
~ challenged a city ordinance prohibiting door-to-door solicitations. Such solicitations were declared by the ordinance to 6e a public nuisance. The court
examined the general legislative powers conferred by Section50-1109, I.C., the
g forerunner of Section 50-302, I.C ., and stated:

I

i

I
i:

1l

i

These are broad powers. But in this state acts of the legislature
governing municipal police regulations are to be looke d to as limitations upon, rather than as granis of power to the municipalities. Rowe
v. City of Pocatello, supra., at 698.
In addition, the court looked at Article 12, Section 2, Idaho Constitution, and
held:
This is a direct grant of police power from the people to the
municipalities of the state, subject only to the limitation that such
regulation shall not conflict with the general laws. Comprehended in
the term, "general laws" are other provisions of the constitution, acts
of the state legislature, and, of course, the constitution and laws of the
United States. Under this constitutional provision, the cities of this
state are in a notably different position than are cities in jurisdictions
where their police power is strictly limited to that found in charter or
legislative grants. Rowe v. City of Pocatello, supra., at 698.
It was further stated by the Idaho Court that where a city's powers were not
granted directly by the constitution, the municipality was limited to such powers as had been expressly granted, necessarily implied or essential to the
objects and purposes of the city. Citing, Bradbury v. City of Idaho Falls, supra.
The city ordinance was upheld upon the grounds that it was a valid exercise of
local police regulation and was not in conflict with any general laws.

In the case of State v. Poynter, 70 Idaho 438, 220 P.2d 386 (1950), the defendant was convicted under a Pocatello ordinance of driving an automobile while
under the influence of intoxicating liquor . .The constitutionality
ordinance was challenged, then the court discussed both Article 12, Section2 of the
Idaho Constitution and Section 50-1109, I.C ., the forerunner of Section 50,302,

or the
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I.C. Based upon these and other provisions, the court upheld the ordinance;
and said:
The state and a municipal corporation may have concurrent jurisdiction over the same subject matter and in which event the municipality may make regulations on the subject notwithstanding the existence
of state regulations thereon, provided the regulations or laws are not
in conflict.
The mere fact that the state has legislated on a subject does not
necessarily deprive a city of the power to deal with the subject by
ordinance. (Citations omitted.)

!;
,.
,,.

.1,,

A municipal corporation may exercise police power on the subjects
connected with municipal concerns, which· are also proper for state
legislation. State v. Poynter, supra. , at 388-389.
A county resolution restricting the number of issuable beer licenses in a
designated area was challe nged in the case of Gartland v. Talbott, 74 Idaho 125,
237 P .2d 1067 (1951). The court referred to the applicable state laws allowing
cities a nd counties to increase and regulate beer establishments, and held:
Also, to be considered is §2 of Art. 12, of the State Constitution, which
is a qirect grant of police power to the _c ounties and municipalities of
the state, subject to the limitation that such powers shall not be exercised in conflict with "the general laws." Under the provision the
counties and cities of this state are not limited to police powers granted
by the legislature, but may make and enforce, within their respective
limits, a ll such police regulations as are not in conflict with the general
law. Hence, the statutes are to be looked to for limitations upon the
police power of the municipalities rather than as grants of such powe r .
Gartland v. Talbott, supra., at 1069. Citing, State v. Musser, supra.;
Clyde Hess Distributing Co. v. Bonneville County, supra.; and Rowe v .
City of Pocatello, supra .

,.,

. ,:1.

,, -i··

The court held that a limitation on a number of beer licenses which could be
issued within a city or county was a legitimate police power regulation.
In Schmidt v. Village·of Kimberly, 74 Idaho 62, 256 P .2d 523 (1953), the.
plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the Reve nue
Bond Act an.cl the validity of a village ordinance providing for the establishment
and operation of a municipal water and sewage system and for the financing of
the same through issuance of revenue bonds . .The court upheld the validity of
the acts of the city. In examining Article 12, Section 2, Idaho Constitution , the
court stated:
It is admitted that a municip ality may make and enforce all reasonable
rules and r egulations essential and appropriate to the preservation of
public health, as a valid exercise of its police power. In this state that
power is given to the municipalities by the constitution itself. Schmidt
v. Village of K imberly, supra., at 523. Citing, Art. 12, §2, Idaho Con·
stitution; and Rowe v. City of Pocatello, supra.
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The esl:abl.iahmenl or an ad quoin se a disposal system was found to be
clearly appropriate to lhe promotion of public heal1h.
The !acts pruenlecl in &he case ofT~QC11 v. Woll COVttty, 78 Idaho 100, 298
P,2d 979 (1956)
re Jd ntical to those pruerued In the cue of Cl~ ff~"
oWribudngCo. v. Bofl,.mlz.Covnt)I, supra. Tbtb, theplalntiffchaD nged1
county ordinance which established more pruhlbitlve houn for the operation
of• lie IW!d beer .stablWunenl than were prohibited by state statute. The
court stated: "Anicl 12, section 2 of the Idaho Constltuilon givea a higb aoun:e
of pollctt power.'' Tall!1Drl v. Lomh Counll!, s1.1pra., l 982. rn lteepin1 with the
Hr., decillan, the court h Id lhllt tho.county ordinance wu valid, o.nd not
unre.uonabl or dllcrilninatory,

A declaratory judgm nt, 1 ting the validity or a city ord.inanc granllnlJ a
franchise to a cooperative
UIOCUltl n for the CQnslJ"uclion and op,el'ation of
1 p.s di.~tlon s ~ w_!~ the city, wu.soueht !n µ, c~ o!O'B'1/Clftl v.
Cil\l of ldallo Falla, 78 Idaho 313, 303 P.2d 680 (1956). The sul.l challen ed I.be
authority of Td'aha Falls lo gram such a franchise. The court quoted l Dillon,
Municipal Corporations; (5th Ed..) 1237 wherein It t stated:

I\ is a enenil and undispu1ed propoliiti.o n or law tho.I a municipal
corporation pos.sessH and c:an u rcise the followina powen, and no
otbttl: Frrst, I.ho grunted in expreu worda; aecond, lhoae necessarily or fairly implied In or incident to the powen upresaly granted;
third, thoR s: ntial to the 11CCOmpliahme:nl of th declared objects
and pUJ'l)OaCS of the corponllon, - not .simply convuil nt, but indJs.
pensable. Any fair, rcaaooable.. substantial doublconumlngthe nlsoce of power la resolved by Iha court aiainst the corporation, and
lhe power ls denied. 0'B11,hnt v. Cill/efldGho Fall,, 5Upra.. at682-683.

Based upon the (oreaom1, th court held that n lther th constitution nor the
statu\cs of Idaho expreuly granted to citiell the riaht to construct, operate and
maintaln II gas distribution system. ll should aha be noted that O'Br'l,lllnl
appears to be the only Idaho case in which lhe Idaho Supreme Court directly
addr
Usell Lo a coo:sidttatlon of "home rule," even thou,t, Anicl 12,
Section 2 of the Idaho Constitution wu not disci=ed. Tlie court stated:
We ore not conctmed \Dith lhe mntu or cl.efflffiu of ~allwd "lu,ndc" b11 "'1111 dpcuitlu wh reby the law would empower a muoleipal·
ity to construct, operate and m-1ntaln its own system of distribution of
gas
compared with I ay1tem for distnbution of gas construe d,
maintained aru:I operated by a public utllity hoJdlni II tertlficate of
convenience 11nd DeC?ti$1ly. Such ~dlon I.a •1nctl11 o ma.tiff of poliey
f'1r 1h p,r.oplcc,rdte legi,lolvreond llnotJc,rCOll.ridna:tion111!1hccoun.
This court is only concerned
th mtutea as It finds th m and the
11.ppllcaUon of li,IIJil8 Lo the facta before the court. 0'81"l,'Gnl v. Ci~ of
Jdalto Falu, supra., al 687. mphuis added.)
Frvm lhis, perhaps It c1111 be ald thal lhe Idaho Supreme Court will re.fuse lo
decl re Idaho a constitutionel home rule state regarding any matters ol local
concern without clarification of existing law by the legis)atuN!, or without
clarlflca on by the people through adopUon of a corutitutional amendment.
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In the case of Oregon Short Line Railroad Co. v. Village of Chubbuck, 83
Idaho 62, 357 P.2d 1101 (1960), the plaintiff brought an action to void an
ordinance which attempted to annex railroad land. The court did not discuss
Article 12, Section 2, Idaho Constitution, but did rule:
Municipal corporations can exercise only such powers as are expressly granted or necessarily implied from the powers granted;
doubt as to the existence of powers, must be resolved in favor of the
granting power. Oregon Short Line Railroad Co. v. Village of Chubbuck, supra., at 1103. Citing, State v. Frederic, supra.; Continental Oil
Co. v. City ofTwin Falls, supra.; and O'Bryant v. City of Idaho Falls,
supra.
The court held the attempted annexation invalid upon the grounds that cities f
have the power to annex additional territory only under the conditions, restric- t
tions and limitations imposed by the legislature.
.1.·

In State v. Clark, 88 Idaho 365, 399 P.2d 955 (1966), the defendant was t
convicted of violating a county subdivision ordinance. On appeal, the defen- [·.
dant alleged that the county did not have authority to adopt a subdivision
ordinance. In interpreting Article 12, Section 2, Idaho Constitution, the court
quoted both State v. Musser, supra., and Gartland v. Talbott, supra. (Both of
these quotes are hereinabove quoted in this summary.) The court also compared the Idaho constitutional provision with Article XI, Section 11 of the
California Constitution, a similar provision, and quoted Pasadena School District v. City of Pasadena, 166 Cal. 7, 134 P. 985, 47 L.R.A., N.S. 892 (1913).
Therein the California Court stated that this constit,itional provision conferred
power upon every county, city and town to make and enforce within its limits
all local police, sanitary, anq other regulations which were not in conflict with
the general laws, subject only to the limitation that such regulations must not
conflict with the general laws enacted by the legislature on the subject. The
Idaho Court then stated;
From a review of the cases construing such constitutional provision it
may be said that there are three general restrictions which apply to
legislation under the authority conferred by such provision; (1) The
ordinance or regulation must be confined to the limits of the govern·
mental body enacting the same, (2) It must not be in conflict with other
general iaws of the state, and (3) It must not be unreasonable or
arbitrary enactment: State v. Clark, supra., at 960.
The subdivision ordinance was upheld as a valid exercise oflocal police power.
A citizens group brought a declaratpry judgment seeking to declare the
county zoning ordinance void in Citizens for Better Government v. County of
Valley, 95 Idaho 320, 508 P.2d 550 (1973). Valley County had adopted a zoning
ordinance without following proper procedures for adoption of zoning ordinances as required by I.C. 50-1204. In discussing Article 12, Section 2, Idaho
Constitution, the court stated:
Idaho Const. art. 12, §2, authorizes a county to make police regulations
not in conflict with the general laws. Although the appellant restricts
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th d finition af a "general law" to law. defining the~ and nature
o.fmatters subj- to regulation, the deJinltion ol"general law". undu
ldaho Colllt. Art. 12 §2, la nol so narrowly limited. The authorlg "to
make" regulati.on.1 camprehencb not only the nature and !!Cope of the
subject mattvoClhe regulation lnrdationlothegimerallaws, but also
them th.o d and IJlllllnel' of n. adoption. Th authruil.y ''1ll make"
police regul Uom as U51!d in the constitution Includes the pi:oceciure
for lhelr adop an, which must not be in co let with the g neral laws.
A gmuaJ law may com r d1red authority to I U W ll U supply
procedural requirement.I for the adoption of poUc:e regulations under
Art. 12, 12- Cittan./orBetlffGownl,....1 v.C011.nti,qf'Vallq,, supra.,
1551.

The mnlnganfinancc, waideclan,d void by the court for fallw-eo!lhecow:1tylo
comply with the sc.a.rutory requiremenb for a public huiin& foUowb\i pubUshed notice.
In the case ofCou,.11/o/Adav. Wa.Uon-, 96(daho630, S33P..2dll99(1975), Ada
Counly sued the defendant far violation of a zonin, ordinance prolu'biting the
maintenance of mobila hom parb In spccllicd areas. The c:ourt merely referred lo Artie! J 2, Section 2 ohhe Idaho Con..tillJtion for the proposition that lhb
constitutional provision granted authority for adoption ohoning ordinances by
1 city or i:ounty, IUld held that zoning ordinanc,H constitute a ....U.d exercise of
local police power.

..
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